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Abstract  
 
Probably nowhere are the themes of tolerance and multiculturalism more prominently at 
display than in the recently flourishing literature on Ottoman religious-ethnic 
communities in Turkey, wherein Ottoman rule, particularly the Millet System of the 15th -
17th centuries, is romanticized by Turkish nativist historiographers as a perfect model of 
peaceful coexistence distinguished by exemplary hospitality and multicultural tolerance 
toward the Other, the “minorities”, be they Jews, Armenians or Greeks. In this 
dissertation, I investigate the role of these nativist historians and their historiography in 
the recuperation of Turkish national imagery, as well as the pitfalls of this sort of 
remembrance. While doing so, I draw upon the psychoanalytically-inspired concept of 
fantasy and postcolonial theory to demonstrate how the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance as 
a melancholic attachment to the past deals with the empire’s loss by pointing to internal 
and external enemies as threats to the unity and coherence of the nation. Domestically 
speaking, this fantasy promises to bring back the golden age in as much as enemies new 
and old will be eliminated on the way to restoring the nation’s power. At the same time, 
this fantasy takes on an international significance as it captures the essence of the 
reaction to the European imperative: “you should become multicultural and liberal like 
us.” The fantasy of the Ottoman Tolerance beats its European Other at its own game by 
claiming: “we were already multicultural.” Seen in these terms, the analysis of the 
nostalgic literature on Ottoman peace can illuminate how the “Occident/Western” and 
“Oriental/Derivative” (i.e. the Ottoman and Turkish) formations of the national 
imaginary are constructed, remembered and contested in the contemporary Global 
South. In light of these discussions I will question the conditions and possibilities of the 
ethics of remembering the Empire, and of entertaining a different relationship to the 
past in contemporary politics in Europe and Turkey. The key concern of my work is 
then to inquire into alternative ways to remember the Empire without remaining trapped 
in the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance, or its obverse, the fantasy of Oriental/Ottoman 
Despotism. 
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Introduction 
 
 
When a few environmentally conscious activists set up tents in a small park near one of 
Istanbul’s most central squares in Istanbul in late May 2013, they could not have anticipated 
the chain of events that their actions would instigate. The small patch of green space in the 
centre of a buzzing metropolis, Gezi Park, was under the threat of redevelopment as an 
Ottoman-era army barracks to be used as a museum and a shopping mall.1 For the critics of 
the redevelopment project, the barrack cum-museum symbolized the Prime Minister’s 
imposition of a conservative Ottoman-Islamist ideology, while the shopping mall signified 
the government’s neo-liberal policies and ambition to spawn a society of conspicuous 
consumption. As the protests escalated, police brutality and heavy use of tear gas against 
peacefully assembled crowds quickly brought out demonstrators in the thousands, who 
joined at initial handful of sit-in protestors. The protestors rallied not only in what is 
symbolically the most important square of Istanbul, Taksim, but also in other parts of the 
city; the protests quickly mushroomed in many other major cities in Turkey, and escalated in 
terms of their tenor. What started as an attempt to save a few trees spontaneously burgeoned 
into a movement in which a vast array of grievances were given voice; marginalized and 
oppressed people found themselves free to articulate their collective traumas and demand 
recognition from the state. While the wellspring of the protests had been centered at the 
occupied and re-collectivized Gezi Park, throughout Turkey multitudes performed both 
time-tested and novel forms of protest and civil disobedience.   
 
One of the most significant points of contention between the state and the protestors was 
the use and abuse of history and, in particular, the questioning of certain milestones in 
Turkish collective memory. While the protests did take aim at recent state policies for 
curtailing basic freedoms and rights (e.g., pertaining to reproduction, to alcohol 
consumption, etc.), history, as usual in Turkey, was one of the most important terrains of 
                                                
1 Critical coverage and details of the events surrounding the Gezi Park revolts can be found in international 
media. See for instance: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/turkeyprotests and 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22924886.  
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this struggle. The critical space opened up by the revolts enabled demonstrators to recall 
silenced collective memories, traumas and wounds of the past 20, 50 and even 100 years, 
going as far back as the Armenian atrocities committed at the hands of the Young Turks. It 
seemed as though everyone had gotten their hands on an Ouija board and was invoking 
sacred spirits and ghosts of late heroes and leaders, and slogans from various periods of the 
past. Some of the demonstrators made recourse to the War of Independence in 1923 and 
believed that its spirit of solidarity was uniting people on the streets across Turkey in self-
defense of their way of life and territory. Others likened the struggle waged against Prime 
Minister Erdoğan’s uncompromising attitudes and his authoritarian regime to the struggle 
for liberation from Ottoman Sultans’ oppressive Islamic rule. Some recalled internationalist 
anti-fascist student and leftist movements of the 60s and 70s and invited people to stand in 
solidarity against the brutality of the oppressive state apparatuses as they chanted: “either all 
of us or none of us”. Not only the struggles of Turks but also those of Armenians within 
Turkey were conjured up by the protests. For it came to light that the part of the park 
housed a significant Armenian cemetery which had been confiscated by the state and recast 
as a site of public recreation in the 1930s, and this former life of Gezi Park was 
commemorated by participants of the protest. Besides the Armenian minority, one of the 
biggest Muslim minorities, Alevis (Alewites), raised their voice in protest of the state’s 
attempt to give the name of the 16th century Ottoman Sultan to the new bridge project on 
the Bosphorus. For Alevis, Sultan Yavuz Selim was responsible for the massacre of 
thousands of their ancestors and a bridge with his name on it would only add insult to injury.      
 
The person who was the main target of the revolts, Erdoğan, along with his cabinet, 
responded to these voices of dissent by making references to Turkish-Ottoman history. To 
those who accused him of authoritarianism, the Prime Minister tried to justify his actions by 
reminding the Turkish public that from the founder of the Ottoman state, Osman Bey to the 
Sultans of the Golden Age (Fatih the Conqueror and Süleyman the Magnificent) and to the 
founder of the Modern Turkey, Atatürk, all great leaders had “distinguished characters and 
idiosyncratic styles”. Furthermore, the Prime Minister contended that the demonstrators 
resembled the Janissaries, specially trained Imperial troops, well known for posing a threat to 
the Sultans’ sovereignty, especially in their revolts in 19th century. More importantly, as he 
addressed his supporters at the airport upon returning from a trip to North Africa at the 
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height of the protests, Erdoğan asserted that the protests had been plotted by the those 
seeking to prevent the emergence of a powerful Turkey, that would stand as a model to the 
countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caucasus. Then he went on to 
acknowledge (alleged) messages of support for his government coming from Bosnia, Baku, 
Cairo, Baghdad, Aleppo, Mecca and Medina. When one connects these dots, what emerges, 
of course, is the map of the Ottoman Empire at its peak. What the Prime Minister sought to 
accomplish by invoking the Ottoman legacy was to portray the protests as nothing more 
than the result of plots orchestrated by external forces and internal collaborators to sidetrack 
Turkey from regaining its power as the heir of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The representatives of the US and the European Parliament, the Prime Minister claimed, 
crossed the line when they publicly shared their worries about police violence and violations 
of the rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of speech. According to him, Western states 
and media such as CNN and BBC misunderstood the nature of the events and 
misrepresented them to the international audience. To put it in Erdoğan’s words, “their 
masks fell off” and they were revealed as conspirators against the Turkish state. Moreover, 
the American government that allegedly killed seventeen people to tackle the Occupy Wall 
Street protests, did not, according to Erdoğan, have the right or the moral authority to give 
any advice or ultimatums to their Turkish counterparts. Similarly, the European Parliament’s 
warnings about freezing Turkey’s accession due to its handling of the protests were deemed 
hypocritical, since it was the same European states that had violently suppressed mass 
demonstrations recently in their own countries (e.g., Greece). Turkey’s Minister of EU 
Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış further blamed the EU for their hesitance to 
intervene against the oppressive Assad regime in Syria and this, he argues, clearly evinced a 
“double standard”. According to the Minister, beneath the surface of Turkey-EU relations 
there exists an undercurrent of European resentment towards Turkey, which “has the most 
reformist and strongest government in Europe and the most charismatic and strongest 
leader in the world”.2      
 
                                                
2 The full text of the Minister’s press release can be found at the Turkish Ministry for European Affair’s 
website: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=49004&l=2.    
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The immanent opponents, such as artists, journalists, progressive union members, dissident 
students, minorities and liberal business elites – basically, whoever criticized the state policies 
-- were immediately labeled as collaborators of foreign powers seeking to weaken Turkey. 
Those who do not fit in with the image of Turkishness prescribed by the state, i.e., as ideal 
national subject, were declared as obstacles and threats to Turkey as an “emerging regional 
great power”. As the Secretary of the State, Hüseyin Çelik, put it, those demonstrators 
abused the tolerance and patience afforded by the Prime Minister and his government and 
should face what they deserved for crossing the line and becoming intolerable.  
 
For anyone who knows a bit about the official version of the Turkish history, this paranoia 
about plots by external forces and traitors from within strikes a familiar chord.   
Unsurprisingly, the same pedagogical narrative of Turkish nationalism is used to explain the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire a century ago, with the same tropes of holding 
European imperial powers and Ottoman non-Muslim communities. It seems as though the 
ghostly presence of the lost Empire is still haunting and informing Turkish politicians – and, 
as we will see, the Turkish historians.  
 
Rare are the moments such as the Gezi revolts that bring into such sharp relief not only the 
broader transformations and antagonisms that face Turkey today, but also the ways in which 
history is used by the powers that be to grapple with these issues. The Occupy Gezi 
movement, in that regard, was quite revelatory as it cast light on how the legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire has been appropriated by the state, especially over the last decade, to 
consolidate Turkish identity domestically as well as internationally.  
 
In this dissertation, in terms of first hand material and field research, I investigate the role of 
historians and historiography in the recuperation of Turkish national imagery and collective 
identity. I conceive of the recently emerging Ottoman historiography over the last two 
decades as part of this rehabilitation process which attempts to design a Turkish self based 
on a Turkish-Muslim essence vis-à-vis the West as well as those segments of the Turkish 
society that do not fit that mold. In the following chapters, you will find an in-depth analysis 
of works by the Turkish historians and scholars who subscribe to the historical narrative of 
the “glorious” Ottoman Empire with an eye to (re)defining modern Turkish identity as the 
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heir to the Ottomans. I argue that the work of these Turkish historians, İlber Ortaylı, Kemal 
Karpat, Yavuz Ercan and Ahmed Akgündüz to name a few, who teach humanities, science, 
literature and law at various Turkish state universities (mostly based in Anatolia) as well as at 
prestigious universities abroad, is an important object of analysis to any student of 
nationalism and Orientalism. Alongside Turkish historians, in this thesis, I also incorporate 
the works of certain Western scholars whose body of work constitutes a major frame of 
reference for these Turkish intellectuals, both as a source of inspiration and scientific 
support. Bearing this connection in mind is crucial to discursively locate the recently 
flourishing nationalist Ottoman-Turkish historiography. I am also aware of the mutual 
influence and exchange between history and popular, public and political discourse. For this 
reason, I analyze certain public discussions and political narrative in relation to the uses and 
abuses of Ottoman history. 
 
To be sure, the connection between nationalism and historiography has always been a closely 
interwoven one. Whenever nationalism and nation formation need to engender an origin, 
homeland, golden age, etc., historiography is put in the service of this project. As discussed 
in detail in Chapter Two, what distinguishes the nationalist-cum-Ottomanist historiography 
of the Turkish historians under study here is the heavy emphasis on historical and 
essentialized notions of tolerance and multiculturalism with direct reference to the imperial, pre-
colonization era. Particularly since the rise of the religious right to elite positions in Turkish 
politics, there has been a phenomenal and officially sanctioned proliferation of the kind of 
Ottoman historiography that praises Ottoman peace, hospitality and multiculturalism that 
minorities are claimed to have enjoyed under the tolerant rubric of the Empire, known as the 
Millet System. Ottoman-Turks, in this portrayal, were the creators of a great civilization that 
made possible the survival of various ethnic and religious communities and cultures until the 
modern age and the intrusion of European powers into Ottoman state affairs. Based on this 
assumed historical legacy, the latest manifestations of Turkish nationalist imagination 
projects that unity and harmony can be successfully restored under the protective umbrella 
of “great” and “powerful” Turkey as long as it can revive and practice the principles that had 
guided the Muslim Ottomans for many centuries. This paternalistic, religion-based and 
fantasy driven notion of minority rights in the name of “tolerance” no doubt has serious 
repercussions for both the older and newer minorities in today’s secular Turkish Republic.  
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As will be illustrated in Chapter One, tolerance and multiculturalism have become very 
popular in the political lexicon in the age of global liberal governance since the 1980s. They 
are seen as the foundational principles with which Western societies supposedly deal with 
the immigrant minorities from their former colonies and the Global South who have settled 
in their midst. I wish to demonstrate in this thesis that in the case of post-Ottoman Turkey, 
the state and nativist intellectuals appropriate the contemporary Western governmental 
language of difference, but with a strong Occidentalist twist. Over the last two decades this 
newly emerging discourse has been striving to rebut the Orientalist stigmas attributed to 
Turkish-Ottoman culture and civilization—such as barbarian, despotic and authoritarian—
and construct its own historical tolerant and multicultural imagery. In particular, neo-
Ottomanist historians are trying to beat Europe at its own game by proclaiming: We were 
already multicultural!   
 
What could be so troubling about constructing a nationhood declaring itself tolerant, 
peaceful and multicultural? As this dissertation will reveal, it blocks, cleanses and silences. 
The objective of this dissertation is thus to critically analyze the pitfalls and dangers of this 
kind of an approach to history and societal memory. To this end, postcolonial theory, 
criticism and experience offers invaluable insights and lessons from anti-colonial and 
derivative nationalisms in South Asia to North Africa and Middle East. If the task of 
postcolonial criticism, as spearheaded by Aime Cesaire (1955), Albert Memmi (1957), and 
Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961), and Amilcar Cabral (1973) is to investigate and deconstruct the 
uneven dynamics of social authority and the cultural and psychic representation during the 
colonial encounter between the West and non-West from which subjectivities of nation, 
gender, ethnicity, class, race and empire emerge, the Ottoman-Turkish case appears as an 
interesting terrain for the analysis for postcolonial criticism. Unlike other “exotic” colonial 
countries in Latin America, South Asia and Africa, the Ottoman Empire is geographically 
proximate to Europe, which made the encounter between the two civilizations all the more 
intimate and the threat from the other side all the more imminent. Thus the Ottomans were 
at the same time very close to and very far away from Europe. Or, to put it differently, they 
were the extimate Other of Western identity. This extimacy was also haunting the Ottoman-
Turkish state authorities and elites’ perception of Europe, which was seen superior and 
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accepted as something to be mimicked and internalized. Yet, the West was the archenemy, 
the alien force threatening the Empire, encroaching upon it like a vulture. Despite this 
extimacy in the European and Turkish collective unconscious, the Ottoman-Turkish case is 
left out of the literature and has until recently remained as a black hole in postcolonial 
criticism.   
 
This omission in the postcolonial literature was nicely diagnosed by the scholars in Turkey 
who registered the ambivalent situation of the Ottoman-Turkish states in the works of 
prominent scholars of Orientalism. This invisibility of the imprint of the Ottomans in the 
history of colonialism stems from certain complications in properly locating the features the 
Ottoman-Turkish experience. On the one hand the Ottoman Turks had been known as a 
colonizing force, surviving through the modern age and controlling many colonies in North 
Africa and the Middle East. They were the colonizers. On the other hand the Ottoman state 
authorities and elites witnessed the hegemony of Western colonialism as it tore the social 
fabric of the Empire by inciting minorities and by beginning to seize Ottoman territories. 
The Ottoman state elites tried everything to maintain the sovereignty of the Empire even 
when survival necessitated that they mimic and adopt the very model of Western modern 
colonialism that it simultaneously despised and admired. The Ottoman-Turks, once 
colonizers, had themselves become the subjects of European imperialism. Their once-
colonizer-then-colonized situation means that they occupy an obscure location in the victor-
victim dichotomy. Perhaps the big challenge for postcolonial scholars reflecting on the case 
of Turkey is this ambivalence, which may well result in silence and oversight.  
 
Since the late 1990s there has been robust dialogue and engagement in Turkey as some 
scholars mobilized the critical analysis strategies of Orientalism and postcolonial critique as 
pioneered by Said (1979 and 1993), Bhabha (1994) as well as Chatterjee (1993) and 
Chakrabarhty (2000) to inscribe the Ottoman-Turkish experience into the history of modern 
colonialism and nationalism. These Turkish scholars wished to demonstrate that the 
Ottoman Empire and its Turkish successor state are significant cases of the transnational 
processes of the modernity and modern colonial history. These fruitful engagements with 
the postcolonial criticism have recently offered important contributions to fill in the gaping 
hole within which Ottoman-Turkish history fits. The melancholic intellectual and political 
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climate that the encounter with Western hegemony and Westernization had evoked in the 
Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey have been designated as Internalized Orientalism, 
Occidentalism, Ottoman Orientalism, Belated Modernity, etc. In Chapter Three I discuss the works 
of scholars such as Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2002), Meltem Ahıska (2003), Selim Deringil 
(2003) and Nurdan Gülbilek (2003) who have bridged Ottoman-Turkish and postcolonial 
criticism; this melding of literature has yielded insights into how Western hegemony has had 
a hand in the construction of not only the identities of Ottoman state authorities but also the 
identities of those they governed, and of intellectuals. 
 
Insightful as these scholarly works may be, they nonetheless mostly remain focused on the 
period of transition from the late Ottoman Empire to the early Turkish Republic (1870-
1930). Thanks to these scholars’ contribution to post-colonial criticism, we are well informed 
about the ways in which Ottoman-Turkish governors and elites of is period constructed an 
image of themselves in response to the Orientalist perception of their backwardness and 
belatedness, countering these judgments with resentment and self esteem. In this study, I 
investigate the recent past and, more specifically, the recent surge of scholarly (and popular) 
interest in Ottoman minorities, in the post-1980s - a surge that acts in defense of a national 
culture. The emergence of this new Turkish-Ottoman imaginary and its discourse of a 
Turkish nativism and Occidentalism that emphases minority rights, tolerance and the 
harmonious coexistence of a plurality remains an under-explored territory for postcolonial 
criticism. These fantasies of nationalist historians, which can be summed up through their 
discussion of Ottoman tolerance, multiculturalism i.e., in the Millet system, and their critical 
connection to the fantasies of “derivative” Turkish nationalism have not been adequately 
investigated. The public discourse of Ottoman multiculturalism and the Millet System has 
only been tangentially examined and when it has been mentioned, the phantasmatic and 
affective aspects of the historians’ discourse on the Ottoman peace are often left unanalyzed. 
Elsewhere, when the concept of fantasy has been employed, the dangers and pitfalls of this 
sort of Turkish-Ottoman nationalist historiography and remembrance have not been probed 
to their limits. Yet, Turkish historians’ recent discourse must constitute a pivotal object of 
investigation in postcolonial studies: scholars must analyze how Turkish nationalism deals 
with the melancholy and affective injury that arose from the loss of the Ottoman Empire as 
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well as how colonialism gave rise to contemporary ambivalence towards a European identity 
and European hegemony.  
 
Let me state it from the outset that my goal is not to disprove the theses of historians of 
Ottoman nostalgia. It is not my primary goal to prove that their accounts do not mach the 
reality. As will be discussed in Chapter Two in detail, there has been a series of scholarly 
attempts to veridically correct these historians’ “ideologically biased” accounts and to offer 
in their stead a more truthful picture of the Ottoman past. Rather than following this path, I 
intend to explore urgent questions regarding ethics and politics of collective memory. 
Instead of focusing on whether these Turkish historians misrepresent historical reality, I am 
interested in the ways in which their narratives of Ottoman tolerance constructs and makes 
possible the social reality of the modern national subject. This is why I call this nativist 
nationalist historiography the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance. Throughout the dissertation I employ 
the psychoanalytically inspired notion of this “fantasy,” conceiving of it as a prerequisite for 
managing the impossibility of harmonious society. 
 
Nationalist fantasies, such as Ottoman tolerance, are vital because, such narratives 
coordinate the affects and that of desires of their adherents. What interests me in this 
dissertation is the mobilizing power of the fantasy of the Ottoman tolerance. It is the 
quintessential social fantasy, the vital ethno-symbolic myth of the new Turkish-Islamic 
nationalism, which enables its adherents to claim that it is who are the “authentic natives” of 
the historical Turkish-Islamic state and to sustain their present identities via the promise of a 
harmonious order in the future. Further, the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance explains not only 
why things went wrong in the past, but also singles out certain inassimilable elements as the 
culprits for the problems of the present. Reifying past traditions as essential culture and 
mobilizing the subjects of the nation with the fantasy of a lost Golden Age is a trope 
common to most anti-colonial and postcolonial nationalisms. The path of the Turkish 
historians and the politicians that I closely examine in this dissertation is variation on this 
trope. In Chapter Three, we will delve into the deployment of the fantasy of a glorious, 
tolerant and multicultural Ottoman past to stimulate and energize an expansionist, imperial 
tendency. 
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Inasmuch as I aim to delineate and discursively demarcate the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance, 
in this dissertation I also explore alternative ways of remembering and their limits. In other 
words, not only do I aim to discursively map out this fantasy, but I also want to discuss the 
conditions for traversal of this fantasy by imagining and remembering different paths and 
pasts. Insofar as the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance, in so far as it is fixated on the loss of the 
Empire, it silences other stories and injuries. Moreover, since this fantasy constantly 
displaces the guilt and fault regarding past violences onto external and internal Others, it 
substantiates and preserves a narcissistic Turkish collective group identity. A mourning 
process wherein subjects unquestionably identify with Ottoman-Turkish ancestors and the 
old social order, feeling betrayed and backstabbed for having tolerant is very perilous for the 
present and the future of this post-imperial/post-colonial society. As long as history is 
remembered in this way, the Other - be it Armenians, Greeks, Alevis or Kurds- is doomed 
to be seen as a problem in need of requires immediate solution and if necessary, elimination. 
Past traumas and injuries will continue to haunt the relations between the Turk and its 
Other(s). However, I firmly believe that it is possible to relate to the Ottoman past in a 
different way. This is why, in Chapter Four, I will seriously consider the question of how 
future generations could remember or relate to the Ottoman past without disavowing it as a 
dark age or elevating it to the status of a paradise lost. In light of literature on the ethics and 
politics of mourning collective losses, we will probe the conditions of confronting the loss of 
the Empire and the sense of belatedness without forcefully and fully forgetting its socio-
cultural history or oversaturating the present with it. To that end, I will entertain different 
possibilities offered by historiography and lend an ear to alternative genres that encounter 
the Ottoman loss. By taking a critical glance at works in oral history, documentary novel; and 
memoir forms; I will question whether they may enable us to genuinely come to grips with 
the loss of the Empire-cum-fantasy.     
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Chapter One 
Minorities in the Age of  Global Liberal Multiculturalism: The 
Turkish Candidacy and Promise to Become European 
 
 
What distinguishes the last two decades in contemporary Turkey from earlier periods of 
Republican history is the phenomenal increase in academic literature and official/state-
sanctioned discourse that romanticizes Ottoman rule, particularly the so-called “Golden 
Age” between 15th and 17th centuries, as the epitome of cosmopolitanism and multicultural 
tolerance towards “minorities.”3 For scholars and intellectuals who glorify the Ottoman 
peace [Pax-Ottomana], the classical Ottoman social-political structure, commonly referred to 
as the Millet System constituted the bedrock of how the Empire successfully dealt with the 
question of the Other. They regard the Ottoman Empire as exhibiting one of the most 
astonishing and beautiful experiences of “the art of living together”2 in peace and with 
tolerance towards the Other. The Empire is deemed praiseworthy for its purportedly 
benevolent treatment of non-Muslim subjects, be they Christian, Armenian or Jewish. The 
authors characterize this so-called classical structure of the Ottoman Empire as “peaceful,” 
“tranquil,” “generous,” “just,” and “benevolent.”4 In these accounts, the Ottoman Empire is 
thus hailed as “humanist,” “egalitarian,” “liberal,” “plural,” “multicultural,” and so on.  She is 
                                                
3 According to this narrative, the Ottoman non-Muslim ethnic and religious communities - mainly the 
Armenian, Jewish and Greek communities - were recognized by the Ottoman state as millets and granted the 
autonomy to self-govern their communal cultural, judicial and religious affairs. See Bilal Eryılmaz, Osmanlı 
Devletinde Gayrimüslim Tebanın Yönetimi [Governance of non-Muslim Subjects in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: Risale 
Yayıncılık, 1996), 17, 49; and Gülnihal Bozkurt, Gayrimüslim Osmanli Vatandaslarinin Hukuki Durumu (1839-1914) 
[Legal Status of non-Muslim Ottoman Citizens (1839-1914)] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996), 9-10. 
2 This phrase stands for the title of a book compiling speeches and panels discussing the tolerant multi-religious 
structure of the Empire in 1999. The municipality of Istanbul organized and hosted the panels in 1999 along 
with other activities, to celebrate the 700th anniversary of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Armağan, ed.   
Osmanlı’da Hoşsgörü: Birlikte Yaşama Sanatı [Tolerance in the Ottomans: The Art of Living Together] (Istanbul: 
Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı Yayınları, 2000).  
4 Bilal Eryılmaz, “Osmanli Devletinde Farklılıklara ve Hoşgörüye Farklı Bir Yaklaşım,” in Osmanlı`dan 
Günümüze Ermeni Sorunu, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel (Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Yayınları, 2000), 203; Aryeh 
Shmuelevitz, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the Late Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries: Administrative, Economic Legal 
and Social Relations as Reflected in the Responsa (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), 30; and Yuluğ T. Kurat, “Çok Milletli bir 
Ulus Olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu,” [The Ottoman Empire as a Multinational Society] in Osmanlı`dan Günümüze 
Ermeni Sorunu, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2000), 170.  
12 
lionized as the “Oriental architect of multiculturalism” and her Millet System is cherished as 
a prototype for a “mosaic society.” 
 
The main premise of this chapter is to analyze how the current fascination with the Ottoman 
past (imagined as liberal, cosmopolitan, just, benevolent, peaceful, multicultural, tolerant and 
so forth), actually has more to say about the present than the past. A thorough analysis of 
the Turkish scholars’ and historians’ description of the Ottoman past will be presented in the 
next chapter. In the meantime, as any critical reading of those intellectuals’ historical 
accounts of the Ottoman past would immediately reveal, the lexicons of tolerance and 
multiculturalism that they employ really pertain more to contemporary liberal political 
discourse than to the past. The issues that conservative and state-sanctioned Ottoman 
historians deal with are indeed the issues and problems of our age. These Turkish scholars 
whose anxieties, concepts and problems stem from our times, have tapped into the reservoir 
of history to find inspiration and solutions to modern predicaments.  
 
Notions of tolerance and multiculturalism have become key features of Western liberal 
discourse. Therefore, to properly analyze the works of Turkish historians who draw on the 
idea of Ottoman tolerance, we need to examine the basic parameters of our contemporary 
global governmental lexicon as well. To this end, this chapter explores the debates 
surrounding multiculturalism and minorities with an eye towards the issues faced and limits 
stumbled upon both in Europe and Turkey. “In many parts of the world,” as Gerard 
Delanty has pointed out, “there is little attention given to how non-Western societies have 
responded to the rise of multiculturalism, which, having been internationalized, is now part 
of most societies throughout the world.”5 This chapter in particular, and the dissertation in 
general, aims to analyze the internationalization of multiculturalism in “non-Western” 
societies, in particular within the context of Turkey’s candidacy for the European Union 
membership. This chapter primarily delves into the ways in which minority rights are 
negotiated and contested during the European enlargement debates between Turkey and 
Europe. I will then analyze at length how Turkish historians use Ottoman historiography to 
                                                
5 Gerard Delanty, “Multiculturalism From a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Renewal 
of Critical Social Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 132. 
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respond to this internationalized and contemporary “multicultural condition” in the 
following chapters. 
 
Here, my aim is not to provide a complete overview of theories of multiculturalism or a 
complete inventory of the discussions on multiculturalism. Rather, my goal is to work 
through the literature on multiculturalism and minorities to touch on the major areas of 
tension and antagonism that appear critical to understand the making of European and 
counter-European, post-colonial and post-imperial identities. The emphasis here is on the 
rhetoric between the European Union and Turkey and the issues that are highlighted as 
Turkey continues to seek accession to the EU. This inventory is important for critically 
engaging with the recent surge of fascination with Ottoman tolerance, older forms of 
multiculturalism and their use in the restoration of a particular fantasy of Turkish identity in 
contradistinction to the Orientalist perception of the Turk as barbarian, authoritarian and 
despotic. This inquiry is key to analyzing the making of contemporary Turkish national 
identity during the post-1980 period where Turkish state authorities and nativist intellectuals 
and addresses questions of Otherness and democracy by making reference to an assumed 
Golden Age. The imaginary of Ottoman tolerance of minorities remains a melancholic 
nativist nationalist reaction, which tries to beat its European other at its own game by 
proclaiming: “we were already multicultural!” Thus, the inquiry into the key areas of tension 
and antagonism of multiculturalism is essential for making a connection between past and 
present, as well as history and politics.   
 
1.1 Liberal Multiculturalism and Tolerance in the West/Europe 
 
There are a few foundational features of governance, such as democracy, liberalism and 
tolerance, which are commonly assumed to characterize the trajectory of political maturation 
in Western societies. Alongside these elements of Western states, which are often cited in 
reference to the rights of the individual, we witness emerging concerns about minorities, 
multiculturalism and group-differentiated rights. These features are significant to understand 
the negotiations between the European Union and Turkey and to analyze Turkish historians’ 
responses to these negotiations.  
14 
 
In the post-WWII European context, particularly in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the 
protection of the rights and liberties of the individual is no longer seen as adequate in and of 
itself. These rights and liberties are to be supplemented with group/minority rights as 
Western liberal societies are striving to deal with difference and incorporate diverse ethnic 
and religious communities into their structure. Thus, harmonious coexistence appears to be a 
pressing question “In the Age of Extremes,” to use the title of Eric Hobsbawn’s 1994 book6.  
Negotiating difference and addressing the question of “Can We Live Together” (to refer to 
another book, this time by Alan Touraine7) is more pressing than ever. The massive 
atrocities witnessed in the 20th century and continuing into the 21st confront us again with 
the age-old question of how to deal with the Other, or how to love thy neighbor. The UN’s 
designation of 1995 as “the year of tolerance” was quite symptomatic in this respect, as it 
had been preceded by ethnic cleansing, rampant nationalism and racial hatred in the heart of 
Europe, Bosnia.  
 
Recent discussions and a rapidly flourishing literature on multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism(s) with emphasis on their moral, political and cultural aspects propose and 
imagine alternatives to the totalitarian and racist logic of ethnic nationalism. It is impossible 
within the confines of a short section to go through the intricate genealogical account of 
how minorities have come into existence as an entity and how they have become an issue for 
nation-states and the United Nations. However, it goes almost without saying that after the 
Second World War, the question of how nations treat the ethnic and religious minority 
populations within their territories has become a focal concern for transnational 
organizations, scholars and activists. As Will Kymlicka reminds us, several international 
treaties signed at the end of the twentieth century could be seen as a measure towards 
resolving minority questions.8  
                                                
6 Eric Hobsbawn, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 1994).  
7 Alaine Touraine, Can We Live Together?: Equality and Difference (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).    
8 He provides the names of a few significant treaties that address this sensitivity: “The United Nations (UN) 
adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic 
Minorities in 1992. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the 
International Labor Organization, and the World Bank, have also developed norms on minority or indigenous 
rights”. (Will Kymlicka, “Introduction,” in Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4). Kymlicka’s list would be extended by adding another 
significant document, the Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
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In addition to concerns about the rights of historical minorities, “indigenous minorities” and 
“national minorities” who have existed in a territory for a long time (such as Armenians in 
Turkey), new influxes of immigrants, - be they refugees, asylum seekers or workers - to the 
West also brought minority questions to public and political attention, especially since the 
1950s. Countries such as Britain and France solved the problem of demographic decline and 
labor shortage by opening their borders to their ex-colonial subjects. Considerable number 
of South Asian (Indians, Pakistanis and Bengalis) and Caribbean immigrants started to arrive 
in Britain in the 1950s and 60s. Similarly, many Algerians and Moroccans began to move to 
France in the 60s to find a “better life.”9 While Britain and France relied on their former 
colonial relations for resources, countries like Germany and Sweden tried to solve their labor 
and population problems by initiating guest worker programs. Guest workers brought in by 
trade agreements worked in factories and mines and they served in low-states public and 
municipal sectors (e.g., as bus drivers and garbage collectors). Germany, for example, signed 
bi-lateral trade agreements with countries such as Spain, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia 
and Yugoslavia.10 In addition to this wave of labor-based immigration, there emerged another 
wave of “guests.” Especially around the 1960s, European countries opened their gates to 
asylum seekers and refugees from countries experiencing socio-economic turmoil such as 
Turkey, Chile and Somalia. Thousands of people from Algeria, Vietnam, Iran and Iraq also 
sought refugee status in the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and France. Thus, the 
Europe of today is striving to integrate and absorb millions of immigrants who once came as 
guest workers, asylum seekers, and refugees but now have become residents, citizens or 
undocumented aliens in their host countries. Not only in Europe but also in Canada, 
Australia and the United States, Western societies in general, have been absorbed in debates 
regards to the recognition and negotiation of difference as they struggle to accommodate 
and govern diverse ethnic and religious groups.11  
                                                                                                                                            
Minorities, which attempts to set standards for European Union countries in regards to their treatment of 
minority populations under their sovereignty. 
9 See Robin Cohen, Migration and Its Enemies: Global Capital, Migrant Labour and the Nation-State (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2006) and Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West 
(New York: Anchor Books, 2009).   
10 Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, 25. 
11 Not only in Europe but also in Canada, Australia and the United States, Western societies in general, have 
been absorbed in debates regards to the recognition and negotiation of difference as they struggle to 
accommodate and govern diverse ethnic and religious groups. In academic circles and scholarly debates, 
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Considerable research has been done to formulate policies in different cities of Europe, from 
those of France and Switzerland to Belgium and Ireland, to better integrate the immigrants 
and minorities into the fabric of the society. Some of the policies pursued under the rubric 
of multiculturalism, such as the 1991Declaration entitled “Towards a New Multicultural 
Policy for Multicultural Integration in Europe,” aimed to foster better participation of 
immigrants by assuring their involvement in public enquiries and consultation and involving 
consultative councils of immigrants within local authorities decision-making processes.12 
Granting immigrant residents the right to vote in local elections was also part of such plan. 
Similarly, the Council of Europe’s Report on  “Community and Ethnic Relations in Europe” 
is also a good case in point to illustrate Western society’s rising need for recognition and 
incorporation of immigrant others. In the legal field, for instance, this mentioned report 
urges European countries to “extend rights of residence and formal citizenship – linked to 
providing greater access to the electoral process, education, housing, the labor market, health 
care, social services and access to public support for cultural and religious activities.”13 In 
terms of the socio-economic sphere, the Council of Europe suggested “the establishment of 
structures and institutions supporting tools for integration – language classes, special advice 
and employment agencies, vocational courses, and the ‘opening up of insufficiently 
accessible institutions’ – through making accommodations in education, housing provision, 
monitoring employment and extending infrastructural provisions through urban renewal 
programs.”14 In regards to the cultural dimension of immigrants’ integration and 
participation, the Council underlines “the need for making special accommodations in public 
services by way of linguistic provisions and sensitivity to cultural values, recognizing religious 
                                                                                                                                            
concepts like “fluidity”, “network”, “hybridity”, “transnational citizenship” and “differentiated citizenship” are 
reflective of the pressing issues of nation states and the difficulties of governing difference. For an eloquent 
discussion of the first three concepts, fluidity, network and hybridity, see Gerard Delanty, “Cosmopolitan 
Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory,” The British Journal of Sociology 57, no.1 (2006). On 
transnational and differentiated citizenship see (respectively) Rainer Baubock, Transnational Citizenship: 
Membership and Rights in International Migration (Aldershot: Elgar, 1994); and Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).       
12 Steven Vertovec, “Multicultural policies and modes of citizenship in European cities,” International Social 
Science Journal 50, (1998): 191.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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practices, providing mother-tongue teaching, and supporting the organization and activities 
of voluntary associations.”15  
 
According to Canadian multiculturalism expert Will Kymlicka, this last domain of cultural 
rights is particularly important for the successful accommodation of immigrant groups by 
Western liberal democracies. What he conceptualizes as the poly-ethnic rights of immigrant 
minorities would provide them with public funding for their cultural practices, e.g. the 
funding of ethnic associations, magazines and festivals.16 In addition to demanding better 
public support of their arts and culture, these ethnic and religious minorities, Kymlicka 
points out, demanded their exemption from laws and regulations that negatively affect them 
due to their religious practices. Here are some examples he enumerates of such exemptions: 
Jews and Muslims in Britain have sought exemption from Sunday closing, or 
animal slaughtering legislation; Sikh men in Canada have sought exemption 
from motorcycle helmet laws and from the official dress-codes of police 
forces, so that they can wear their turban; Orthodox Jews in the United 
States have sought the right to wear the yarmulka during military service; and 
Muslim girls in France have sought exemption from school dress-codes so 
that they can wear the chador.17   
 
In light of these sample debates, suffice it to say that the notions of minority and plurality 
along with those of group-based and poly-ethnic rights have become a central focus for 
Western countries, especially since the 1960s. One can indeed venture to say that the 
Christian theological commandment of “love thy neighbor” is extended to the secular 
commandment “you shall be multicultural”.  
 
1.1.1 The Crisis and Failure of Multiculturalism 
 
Whether these models and policies have proved effective in creating and regulating a 
harmonious society is an ongoing question in the West, where liberal “tolerant” 
multiculturalism has come under attack and scrutiny from many corners. Let us now 
                                                
15 Ibid.  
16 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 31. 
17 Ibid.  
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examine take a look at them one by one to discern the problems and limits of liberal 
multiculturalism, and to establish which subjects have emerged as the most thorny.  
 
First and foremost, multiculturalism has come under criticism for its failure to go beyond 
compartmentalizing and stereotyping communities into discreet cultural groups and for its 
neglect of intra-group diversity/multiplicity. From the perspective of its critics, 
multiculturalist policies place a great emphasis on the cultural expression, language, and arts 
of minority groups, but subsume other attributes of minority populations such as tradition, 
religion and ethnicity under the term “culture,” at the expense of politics. A statement in the 
Canadian Constitution of 1971 is one of the best examples of how difference and alterity in 
Canadian society are thus defined: “The Government of Canada will support all of Canada’s 
culture.”18 This statement is supplemented with three more objectives, which aim to foster 
the full participation of all cultural groups; creative encounters and interchange among 
cultural groups; and acquisition of one of Canada’s official languages by immigrants.19 As 
such, the state discourse, through the constitution, delineates the groups and immigrants in 
Canada through the sphere of culture. As a result of “culturization of politics,” as Slavoj 
Zizek coins the term, we often find ourselves engulfed by “political differences, differences 
conditioned by political inequality, economic separation, etc., [which] are 
naturalized/neutralized into ‘cultural’ differences, different ‘ways of life,’ which are given, 
something that cannot be overcome, but merely ‘tolerated.’ ”20  
 
The second issue regarding the crisis of multiculturalism, as seen from the perspective of 
progressive critics, is also germane to the way difference has been conceived of in 
contemporary liberal political traditions. As the argument goes, liberal multiculturalism de-
centers and obscures the location of power by making it multiple.21 It depicts society as 
though all groups and components enjoy and share equal power and they are equal partners. 
To put it differently, multiculturalism has been found at fault for trivializing and effacing the 
unequal power dynamics in the society and history by reducing everything to mutual 
                                                
18 Phil Ryan, Multicultiphobia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 46. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Slavoj Zizek, “Tolerance as an Ideological Category,” Critical Inquiry 34, no. 4 (2008): 660.  
21 Gerard Delanty, “Multiculturalism From a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” 148-151.  
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exchange and mutual recognition. By hiding historically constituted inequalities and 
disadvantages in the society, multiculturalism thereby perpetuates the status quo.  
 
In this context, Zizek provides an insightful criticism of the two problematic aspects of 
liberal multiculturalism so far mentioned: 
Multiculturalism is a disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of racism, a 
‘racism with a distance’ – it ‘respects’ the Other’s identity, conceiving the 
Other as a self-enclosed ‘authentic’ community towards which the 
multiculturalist maintains a distance made possible by his/her privileged 
universal position of all positive content (multiculturalist is not a direct racist; 
he or she does not oppose to the Other the particular values of his or her 
own culture); nonetheless he or she retains this position as the privileged 
empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and 
depreciate) other particular cultures properly – multiculturalist respect for the 
Other’s specifity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority.22         
 
Zizek’s critique of this insincere form of respect for the Other’s culture signals another 
critical issue pertaining to how liberal multiculturalism employs the discourse of tolerance23 
when it comes to the conception of the Other qua immigrant minorities. For instance, 
Gerard Delanty has rightly asked “where the limits of tolerance lie: does tolerance have to 
translate into solidarity across culturally defined groups or does it breed indifference? [Or] 
does tolerance amount to accepting others who are different and possibly intolerant?”24 In 
practice, the hegemonic discourse of tolerance sees the Other as someone who is intolerant 
and radically different. Thus, rather than genuine recognition and dialogue, the act of 
tolerance in multicultural democracies constitutes a dichotomy between the sovereign and 
the subject by the very act and performance of tolerance. The Other’s difference in this 
dialectic relationship is tolerated as long as it does not transgress the line and bother Us. To 
put it in the words of Wendy Brown, tolerance as a political discourse of Western 
democratic societies:  
                                                
22 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject (New York: Verso, 2003), 216.  
23 See John Rawls on ‘Toleration and The Common Interest’ and ‘Toleration of the Intolerant’ in his seminal 
work A Theory of Liberal Justice for fundamental axioms of toleration in liberal tradition (John Rawls, A Theory of 
Liberal Justice: Revised Edition (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999 [1971]), 186-194.). Michael 
Walzer’s book On Toleration for an analysis of its application in various regimes, such as multinational empires 
and nation-states, and to practical issues, e.g., religion, education, gender and so on (Michael Walzer, On 
Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). These two books serve as standard texts for liberal 
theory’s understanding of tolerance. 
24 Gerard Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, 149. 
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involves not simply the withholding of speech or action in response to 
contingent individual dislikes or violations of the taste but the enactment of 
social, political, religious, and cultural norms, certain practices of licensing 
and regulation; the making of subjects of tolerance as inferior, deviant, or 
marginal to those participating tolerance, and a justification for something 
dire or even deadly action when the limits of tolerance are considered 
breached.25  
 
She adds “almost all objects of toleration are marked as deviant, marginal, or undesirable by 
virtue of being tolerated, and the action of tolerance inevitably affords some access to 
superiority.”26  
 
As Brown brilliantly puts it, an important feature of tolerance as a discourse deployed by 
Western liberal democracies is that it subsume the issues of minority status and marginality, 
be it of immigrant, ethnic and or religious communities under its hegemony. This is why 
critics such as Delanty, Kymlicka and Gilroy criticize liberal tolerance and in its stead call for 
“acceptance and recognition,” “dialogue,” and “conviviality/convivial culture.”27  
 
It is only the progressive critics such as Brown, Kymlicka, Zizek or Delanty, who have 
questioned multiculturalism.28 While these critics complain about “not enough” dialogue and 
seek recognition of difference, conservative politicians, intellectuals and public figures accuse 
it for allowing “too much” space for difference and diversity. Multiculturalism has been 
criticized even in its own “home,” Canada, where it was legislated as the official ideology. In 
2009, Jason Kenney, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, Multiculturalism in Canada 
stated on several occasions that he was deeply concerned about the way multicultural 
policies of Canada allowed too much difference and segregation.29 As a result, he maintained, 
Canada is suffering from not having a common and unifying culture.30 Being trapped in their 
                                                
25 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008), 14.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Gerard Delanty, The Cosmopolitan Imagination, 191; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 171; Paul Gilroy, 
Postcolonial Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 150.    
28 See also Sara Ahmed “Multicultural Love,” in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York: Routhledge, 2004), 
133-143.   
29 For an elaborate analysis of Jason Kenney’s discourse see Phil Ryan, Multicultiphobia (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010), 200-206. 
30 Very similar musings emerged in the British public debate as well, see Bhikhu Parekh, Multiculturalism: Cultural 
Diversity and Political Theory (London: McMillan, 2000), 142-176.     
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ethnic ghettos, he claimed, allowed immigrants to keep their old cultures and traditions intact 
without having adequate language proficiency in either English or French, and without being 
properly integrated into their new country. Criticizing the multicultural policies of the 70s, 
which he deemed responsible for dilution of Canadian values and identity, Kenney stated 
that his government does not “want a country that is a bunch of different silos where people 
don’t associate with each other.”31 As part of measures aimed at better integration, he 
proposed more thorough implementation of language requirements for newcomers. 
Furthermore, Kenney stated that “if you can’t complete the [citizenship] test in one of those 
two languages, you are not supposed to become a citizen” and “it is just basically saying go 
back and study more and come back to us when you can get by in one of those languages.”32  
 
In fact, it was not only the Minister of Immigration but also other influential figures in 
Canadian public discourse that harshly criticized multiculturalism in the 1990s. The criticism 
they leveled against multicultural policies is multi-layered, addressing both the past and the 
present of multiculturalism. In his eloquent discourse analysis of those public critics and 
their attacks on multiculturalism, Phil Ryan demonstrates that despite their divergences on 
certain issues, attacks on multiculturalism are based on the assumptions that it causes harm 
to society by fostering: i) a poised sense of history, obsessed with various alleged sins of our 
past; ii) the loss of our “centre;” iii) mere coexistence; iv) cultural walls and separatism; v) 
divided loyalties; vi) a weakened English Canada; and vii) a weakened collective life.33 Thus, 
we are asked through these conservative articulations to believe that the cohesion of 
Canadian national identity is under severe threat due to multiculturalism.  
 
The failure of multiculturalism as state policy was also announced recently by certain 
European leaders, namely German Chancellor Angelina Merkel, British Prime Minister 
David Cameron and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. They echoed one another’s 
strong conservative tone as they criticized multicultural state policies for allowing 
segregation of different cultures and separation of lives rather than making attempts to 
                                                
31 Raj Athia, “Minister Wants Ethnic Communities Embrace Canadian Values,” Calgary Star, April 4, 2009. 
Quoted in Phil Ryan, Multicultiphobia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 203.  
32 “French or English competence needed for citizenship,” The Canadian Press, March 20, 2009, accessed 
November 9, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/03/20/immigration-language-kenney.html.  
33 Phil Ryan, Multicultiphobia, 41-2. 
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successfully integrate immigrants and create a cohesive national identity. In 2010, while 
addressing the young members of the Christian Democratic Union Party, Angela Merkel said 
the “tendency had been to say ‘let’s adopt the multicultural concept and live happily side by 
side, and be happy to be living with each other’ but this concept has failed, and failed 
utterly.”34 In arguing that immigrant guest workers did not properly adapt to German society, 
Merkel effectively obscured the reality of institutionalized German racism and forced 
assimilation policies that have been in effect for the last 40 years. Following on the heels of 
Merkel’s declaration of the failure of multiculturalism was David Cameron’s comments on 
the British experience of multiculturalism. In his first speech as Prime Minister, at a 2011 
security conference in Munich, he also criticized immigrant communities and the laxness of 
British immigration and integration policies. In remarks resonating with Merkel’s, Cameron 
stated that “we have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to 
belong to,” and added “we have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in 
ways that run counter to our values” which are “freedom of speech, freedom of worship, 
democracy, the rule of law, equal rights, regardless of race, sex or sexuality.”35 Before the 
dust of Merkel and Cameron’s speeches settled, it was Nicolas Sarkozy’s turn in 2011 to 
declare, during a media conference held at the EU summit in Brussels, that multiculturalism 
in France had also failed.36 According to him, policies, which had been intended to promote 
religious and cultural difference, instead bred segregation. Like Merkel and Cameron, he 
maintained that tolerating the existence of divided communities, prevented France from 
having better-integrated immigrants, who would accept the core values of France. Here again 
we observe that the burden of failure of Western tolerant multiculturalism was placed heavily 
on the immigrant Other who ostensibly resists integration. Interestingly, however, in these 
speeches immigrants are not depicted as the only ones responsible for the failure of 
multiculturalism. From the perspective of these leaders, the state must also be criticized for 
being overly tolerant or passively tolerant of these ethnic and religious communities, via  
                                                
34 Gavin Hewitt, “‘Failure’ of multiculturalism,” BBC, October 18, 2010, accessed September 14, 2012,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2010/10/failure_of_multiculturalism.html. 
35 “State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron,” BBC, February 5, 2011, accessed September 14, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994. 
36 “Nicolas Sarkozy joins David Cameron and Angela Merkel view that multiculturalism has failed,” Dailymail, 
11 February, 2011, accessed September 15, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355961/Nicolas-
Sarkozy-joins-David-Cameron-Angela-Merkel-view-multiculturalism-failed.html. 
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them, official policies that encourage separatism and extremism by being too tolerant of 
religious and cultural differences. The choices immigrants make are welcome as long as they 
do not threaten the “French life style,” for instance.  
 
The year 2010 was particularly gloomy for immigration issues across Europe. Many more 
public critics joined the choir of anti-immigrant conservative sentiment and called for better 
integration and tighter immigration. The former Bundesbank member Thilo Sarrazin 
published a book entitled Germany Abolishes Itself, which claimed that immigrants, especially 
Muslims, did not properly integrate with German values and culture and had contributed to 
the decline of Germany.37 Similarly, the Bavarian state’s Premier, Christian Social Union 
leader Horst Seehofer proposed to suspend immigration from Turkey and Arab countries 
due to insurmountable cultural differences.38 Not only in Germany, France and the UK did 
multiculturalism stir such heated political discussions: in Australia and Spain too, 
multicultural policies were criticized. The former prime ministers of these countries John 
Howard and Jose Maria Aznar respectively, also expressed their concerns about the results 
of “unsuccessful integration.”39 These reactions from right wing or conservative politicians 
have been conceptualized by Etienne Balibar as the demonstration of “‘immigrant complex,’ 
which is based on a meta-racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the 
insurmountability of cultural differences.”40 It “does not postulate the superiority of certain 
groups or peoples in relation to others,” Balibar argues, “but only the harmfulness of 
abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions.”41   
 
                                                
37 Gavin Hewitt, “‘Failure’ of multiculturalism.”  
38 Matthew Weaver, “Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has ‘utterly’ failed,” The Guardian, 17 October, 
2010, accessed September, 15, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-
multiculturalism-failed. 
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1.1.2 Cultural Racism and Islamophobia in Europe 
 
There is an added element to this whole debate of the immigrant Other, and it concerns the 
age-old fear of Oriental or colonial subjects. For Balibar “this consideration is particularly 
important for the interpretation of contemporary Arabophobia, especially in France, since it 
carries with it an image of Islam as a ‘conception of the world’ which is incompatible with 
Europeanness.”42 Of course, France is not the only case in point. The perception of Islam as 
a threat to Western liberal and secular values can be extended to other Western nation-states. 
In addition to France’s population of 5 million Muslims, there were approximately 4 million 
Muslims living in Germany, and 2 million in Britain.43 In terms of distribution of the Muslim 
population according to European cities, Muslims are demographically predominant in 
“Amsterdam and Rotterdam in Holland; Duisburg, Cologne, and the Berlin neighborhoods 
of Kreuzberg and Neukoln in Germany; and Blackburn, Bradford, Dewsbury, Leicester, 
East London, and the periphery of Manchester in England.”44      
 
Recent history is full of incidents that, according to many conservative critics of 
multiculturalism, have raised questions about the compatibility between the “West” and 
Muslim communities. The controversy and reaction caused by Salman Rushdie’s (1988) 
novel Satanic Verses in Britain, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh after the 
release of his controversial film on women in Islam (2004), the publication of cartoons of 
Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper (2006), the banning of wearing of face covering 
veil, such as burka in France (2011), and the riots of Muslim youth in the banlieus of Paris 
(2005) all drew the Western eye toward the “tension” between Muslim immigrants and the 
assumed core values of the West: tolerance, secularism, freedom of speech.    
 
Even a cursory look at European history reveals that Muslims have not been the only group 
deemed inassimable into the society. Jews and Catholics have each been posited as alien to 
the modern European state and society, depending on the national context. Religious 
violence around the 16th century between the Catholics and Protestants caused immense 
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problems. As a result, as we are often told, religious tolerance emerged out of the necessity 
to peacefully coexist. Religious tensions and violence have always existed in the midst of 
Europe. However, the rhetoric of those who oppose Islam would have us believe that it is 
irrevocably incompatible, depicting it as the newest and most violent threat to what is 
conceived as Western civilization.  
 
The turn of the millennium also was marked by the “return” of religion and 
fundamentalisms. Everyday we face excessive media coverage on religion and religious 
extremism. As Asad cogently observes, our perception is bombarded with images where  
[i]n the West Bank and Gaza, Jewish zealots attack and kill Palestinians; in 
Egypt, Muslim zealots murder policemen, Copts and other civilians, in 
Algeria, the scale of terror directed by the Islamic Salvation Front at 
overthrowing the present unconstitutional regimes escalates to unmanageable 
proportions; in India, the Hindu nationalist movement targets Muslim, 
foments riots, threatens to take over state power, and upper-caste Hindus 
burn transgressive outcastes alive; in Iran, a despotic Islamic government 
persecutes religious minorities and homosexuals; in the US, “pro-life” 
Catholics and Protestants threaten abortion doctors with death.45 
 
Rosi Braidotti echoes these sentiments about fundamentalism as she points out that 
“religious extremism and the political return of God hold for all monotheistic religions 
nowadays and the Christian-backed new virginity and sexual abstinence movements, the 
Evangelical Protestants’ ‘born-again’ fanaticism” poses equally problematic conservative 
perceptions of humanity.46 However, at the end of the day, amongst all of these 
“fundamentalisms,” it is Islam that is brought to the fore and believed to be the most 
incompatible with modern democratic states and institutions. Different geographies and eras 
of Muslim countries and states are all condensed into one overarching civilizational bloc 
which emerges as the antithesis of West and irreconcilable with modernity. In the 
semiological construction of Islamic alterity to Europe, Islam is matched with a chain of 
equivalences such as patriarchy, authoritarianism, terrorism, fanaticism, and intolerance and 
seen as a culture and civilization that accommodates and fosters them. Thus, it appears as 
something inherently antithetical to modernity and the Enlightenment. Even if similar ideas 
                                                
45 Talal Asad, “Europe Against Islam: Islam in Europe,” The Muslim World 87, no.2 (1997): 183. 
46 Rosi Braidotti, “In Spite of the Times: The Postsecular Turn in Feminist Theory,” Theory, Culture & Society 25, 
no.6 (2008): 4-5.   
26 
and practices exist elsewhere – as in European Jewish communities which have ritual 
practices of slaughtering animals and in which the status of women is reduced in religious 
law pertaining to marriage and divorce, as Asad correctly reminds us – we are asked to 
believe that it is ultimately Islam that render them threatening.  
 
It is all too common today to see the representation of Muslims transposed with images of 
raging “fundamentalist” masses with flaming eyes who are ready to attack at any second, 
with pictures of attacks on Western missionaries and offices and promises of revenge, with 
footage of hostage takings and kidnappings, with images of veiled and silenced women and 
children, and with ominous call to prayers and massive praying crowds.47 Similarly, it is all 
too familiar a read to find articles reporting poll results measuring how Europeans feel about 
Islam. Here again, we encounter the same tropes and issues when Islam is discussed and 
understood in Germany, France, Britain or the Netherlands. It has become everyday routine 
to read yet another poll reporting that the majority of Europeans find Islam intolerant, 
authoritarian, overly traditional, antithetical to modernity, oppressive to women, and pro-
terrorist and that they experience a sense of threat at the number of Muslim immigrants in 
Europe.48      
 
In addition to the issues of fear and anxiety regarding the way western nation-states 
accommodate (or fail to accommodate) Muslim communities, there is another important 
dimension to “Islam in Europe” debate: the connection often made between Muslims living 
in Europe and Islam abroad. It is assumed that Muslim immigrants have brought all the 
antagonisms and conflicts pertaining to their culture and traditions to their new homes. 
From endorsement of Shari’a law and arranged marriages to blood feuds and honour 
killings, not to mention the “inferior” position of women, Islam’s supposed excesses and 
horrors occupy the gaze of the European public.  In this perception of Islam and Muslims, 
— whether a German-speaking Turk in Berlin, an English-speaking Pakistani in London, a 
Dutch-speaking Somalian or Moroccan in Rotterdam — all Muslim immigrants in Europe 
share the same culture, one assumed to be irreconcilable with western modernity. For this 
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reason, Muslims in Europe are seen to carry the threat of Islamic fanaticism, extremism and 
jihadism, no matter how many generations they may have been living in Europe. Again, as 
Talal Asad observes “on the whole the media confined themselves to two kinds of 
questions: on the one hand, the requirements of national security and the danger to civil 
liberties of the war on terror, and on the other hand, the responsibility of Islam as a religion 
and Arabs as a people for acts of terror.” As Asad’s argument goes, “this has placed the 
‘religious minorities’ in a defensive position.”49 In short, Muslims in Europe are seen as 
connected with transnational religious forces as well as global Islamic resurgence.  
 
1.1.3 European Tolerant Multiculturalism, Its Limits and Borders: 
Turkey’s Image as Wall-cum-Bridge  
 
Inasmuch as the discourse of tolerant and multicultural governance is related to an urgency 
for the West to regulate its Others domestically qua its minorities, the same discourse  comes 
into play when the West interacts with the “non-liberal”/“non-Western Other” in the 
international sphere. Just as Western states depict certain domestic minorities as unruly, 
intolerable subjects and attempt to regulate and tame them, nonliberal transnational forces 
seen as threats to Western tolerant liberalism can be subjected to the same disciplinary 
practices and discourse.50 In terms of how the “nonliberal” Other outside the West is 
tackled, European Union debates involving Turkey’s candidacy are quite revelatory. Debates 
about and contestation of Turkey’s accession lay bare many of the West’s fundamental 
anxieties and fears in terms of both public and elite opinion about non-Western Muslim 
societies.     
 
While Eastern European nations and especially Russia had long been part of the “Eastern 
Question”, the Ottoman Empire and the figure of the Turk constituted the Obscene Other 
well beyond eastern borders, and took on great significance for European identity.51 While 
Ottoman-Turkish imagery had been conceived of as alien and antithetical to everything that 
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makes up European identity, this obscene external other occupied a great deal of influence at 
the very core of European society and its discussions of democracy, monarchy and 
despotism. Relying on this culturally distant Islamic, Asiatic other as a foil for Europeanness, 
whether regarding the essence of good government or women’s liberation, meant making it 
ironically proximate and intimate to European identity. In many respects this image of 
otherness has persisted into the present. Thus, this extimacy is by no means a thing of the 
past; it continues to manifest itself well into the 21st century. Take for instance, the selection 
of Istanbul (once the capital of the Ottoman Empire) as the European Capital of Culture for 
2010 even though Turkey has yet to become a part of the European Union. Or take for 
instance, the 2008 European Cup quarterfinal match that the Turkish national soccer team 
played in Vienna. If the European sports commentators did not openly joke about “Vienna 
being under siege by the Turks once again” it was probably only out of political correctness. 
After all, as all the commentators and spectators well knew, Vienna had been the outermost 
point of Ottoman incursion into Europe, in defense of which European powers had united 
several times. No doubt, this ambivalence of the Turkish-Muslim identity takes on great 
importance when one thinks of Turkish immigrants living in Europe. Since the 1950s Turkey 
has sent a near army, millions of immigrant workers to Europe, primarily to Germany but 
also to Sweden, France, the Netherlands and Britain, fuelling paranoia about a cultural 
siege.52   
  
1.1.4 Inclusive vs. Exclusive Views on Turkey’s Candidacy to the EU 
   
The expansion of Europe has not been limited to question of Turkey’s accession. The 
European Union continually incorporated new members into its body. When it emerged as 
the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, its primary aim was to control the 
production and use of steel as well as coal within Europe. It was thought that, regulated 
otherwise and left to the control of a few countries, monopolized access to coal and steel 
would give rise to another regional (if not world) war.  The establishment of the European 
Community was expected to prevent the possibility of sole control over these resources by 
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any single country (as Germany had done for instance during both World Wars) or the 
possibility of another war caused by nationalist and imperialist motives. In other words, the 
formation of the Community stemmed from the necessity of stopping the bloodshed as well 
as the desire to foster region-wide post-colonial economic prosperity rather than any 
community-building or identity politics.53 Once the dust settled and peace was established 
again in Western Europe, the civilizational project started taking on greater significance. As a 
result of this transformation, the European Economic Community (EEC) was formed in 
1957. 
 
After the inclusion of Ireland, the UK and Denmark into the EEC in 1973, came the 1980s 
accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal, which had left behind regimes of dictatorship. In 
the 1990s, the main question for the EEC became the destiny of the former countries in the 
newly dissolved Soviet Bloc. In 2004, eight countries of eastern and central Europe joined 
the erstwhile European Economic Community (EEC) now the European Union. With the 
integration of Romania and Bulgaria, the number of states within the Union reached 27.  
 
In 1993 the EEC became the European Union and its member states signed the Treaty of 
Maastricht to form a common European citizenship. The Union thus became an institution 
that facilitates the regulation and coordination of member states’ issues, such as health, 
environment, education, security, defence, justice and human rights. It has evolved into an 
organization setting standards and controlling the implementation of its core values, known 
as the Copenhagen criteria, e.g. respect for the rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech 
and movement, human rights and so forth. By the turn of the millennium, the European 
Union had merged as a gigantic entity that makes decisions about domestic and international 
affairs through its own Parliament, controls its vast borders, and provides its citizens with 
closely regulated and high standards of living. 
 
Despite optimism about integration and enlargement, questions remain about the eastern 
borders of the European Union and the membership of Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. So 
far, the EU has seemingly managed to solve a certain part of the “Eastern Question” by 
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incorporating central and eastern European countries into its standards and governance. 
Now the “Eastern Question” has become pushed forth towards the Bosphorous of Istanbul, 
the strait connecting the two continents, which symbolizes the basis of the ambivalence and 
anxiety. In light of this respect, the announcement of the European Union’s 2005 decision to 
start full negotiations with Turkey evoked heated debates, excitement and panic across 
Europe. For some, this expansion was a natural evolution of the partnership between 
Europe and Turkey, which ha been developing since the 1960s when Turkey first made its 
application. Chronologically speaking, Turkey’s candidacy goes further back those that of 
Poland, Latvia or Estonia, which are presently EU member states. Moreover, Turkey’s 
supporters claimed that when it comes to criteria such as the rule of law, democracy and free 
market, given Turkey’s “remarkable historical experience” of modernization, democracy and 
economy, it would be no harder to incorporate Turkey into the EU than it had been to 
incorporate Hungary or Romania. Therefore, the stumbling blocks to Turkey’s membership 
cannot be easily explained by rational calculations and the criteria of realpolitik.  
 
Turkey’s candidacy brought a number of controversial topics and discussions to the fore that 
directly relate to our previous discussion of multiculturalism and tolerance. The main issues 
surfacing in this particular context are about who Turks are and where Turkey belongs along 
civilizational faultlines. Whether for or against Turkey’s incorporation, all the arguments 
made regarding Turkey’s accession mobilize the same set of concepts to make claims about 
the essence of Turkish identity. Images of culture, civilization and historical tradition are 
utilized to describe how Turkey is as seen via the European gaze. What is equally important 
in this process is the construction of European identity; by constructing the imaginary of 
Turkey, Europe is simultaneously forming its own identity. No doubt there are many 
definitions of Europe and Turkey and these views and descriptions are heterogeneous, 
contingent and fragile.54 For the sake of simplicity, however, here we can narrow these views 
on Turkey’s accession down to two main camps.  
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The first of these approaches, which is celebrated by many European scholars, public and 
political figures, imagines a Europe without Turkey. It draws on the classification and 
categories of classic Orientalism and mobilizes them against the Ottoman Empire and its 
successor, the Turkish Republican nation-state. According to this perception of the world, 
Europe and Turkey represent two fundamentally distinct blocks. Europe conjures up the 
image of ancient Greeks and Romans, and signifies the cultural and historical tradition—
including Christianity — that gave birth to the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and modern 
science. Turkey, as far as the argument goes, has no place in this European heritage. On the 
contrary, there exists an insurmountable gap between them because Turkey belongs to the 
world of Asiatic civilizations and its culture pertains to the Orient. It has been the great 
Oriental menace — embodied in the Ottoman Empire — that the Christian European states 
managed to stop in Vienna in 1668. Therefore, Europe should not now surrender its 
borders, but should continue to keep its historical enemy at bay. Otherwise, Europe would 
face the danger of blending two antithetical traditions. Given Turkey’s considerable 
population and unstable political structure, it is also suggested that in so doing, Europe may 
end up trying to bite off more than it can chew. From this perspective, such a cultural 
mixing would water down European identity by incorporating a large populace of 
unbridgeable diversity into its governance. Juxtaposing such diverse and opposing ways of 
life and world-views would constitute a major barrier to the development of a more secure 
and unified European Union.  
 
One of the best exemplars of this particular perception has been Nicolas Sarkozy’s: In public 
speeches as French President in 2007 and 2009, he underlined the geographical and cultural 
difference between Europe and Turkey.55 In his imagination of Europe and the European 
Project, there could be no place for Turkey. However, for him, leaving Turkey outside the 
European Union would not mean for him cutting off all ties with her. Regional trade and 
political cooperation with Turkey as a Mediterranean neighbor or “special partner” must be 
pursued via different platforms, Sarkozy said. His view was backed by Angela Merkel, who 
expressed similar concerns and worries about mixing culturally and geographically different 
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entities, and about the ramifications of this “wrong-doing” for the future of the project of 
Europe. Merkel, too, supported the idea of a special partnership with Turkey. Not only have 
France and Germany resisted the accession of Turkey but public discussions on Turkey’s 
membership in Austria and the Netherlands have also been replete with controversy and 
anxiety. Regardless of whether this discourse is constructed by politicians, intellectuals or 
journalists, the location of Turkey is always one apart. It is through this exclusionary act of 
demarcation that Turkey (and simultaneously Europe) take their identities, as Turkey is 
placed outside Europe’s border56. In that the emphasis is placed on Turkey’s aloofness, the 
border becomes a “wall,”57 analogous to the Berlin wall, which had served to separate 
Western democracies from the Communism state. 
 
The other approach to Turkey’s candidacy highlights its proximity. From this angle, rather 
than radical difference and antagonisms between Turkey and Europe, brought to the fore are 
common political and economic interests and shared histories. The “special geo-political 
location” of Turkey is emphasized in terms of its crucial role in the accession process as well 
as its capacity to enable interaction. Turkey, as it has been pointed out many times by the 
adherents of the inclusionary perspective, is a regional mediator between Europe and the 
Middle East. Should Europe turn its back to Turkey and leaves her to her own devices, 
Turkey might drift into Islamic fundamentalism. It follows that the excluding Turkey would 
only contribute to a rise of Islamic fundamentalism and along with it, increased hatred 
towards the West at regional and global levels. By taking a dismissive attitude and ostracizing 
Turkey, Europe could find itself in the midst of a clash of civilizations rather than a dialogue 
of civilizations. Only welcoming Turkey into the European Union and keeping her close 
could come to benefit Europe. Were Turkey to be internalized, this argument goes, it would 
bring stability to Europe’s eastern border.  
 
This position also maintains that, as a country with a Muslim majority, Turkey would be a 
significant ally — one that successfully synthesizes democracy and Islam in a parliamentary 
system and hence provides an opportunity to establish a dialogue-based and peaceful answer 
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to the doomsday scenarios of the clash of the civilizations thesis.58 The hope is that if Turkey 
had a considerable success in copying the Western model, then other Muslim countries, too, 
could achieve the same goal.59 Just as Europe had managed to incorporate Eastern European 
countries by seducing them with a “secure” democratic and financial system, so too could 
Turkey, be seduced to participate in the project of Europe. Otherwise, Europe may face the 
peril of locking itself inside its rigidly marked terrain. It may result in a Europe where 
xenophobia and ethnic and racial fear prevail. This basically signals, for the critics, that 
Europe would unable to adapt to the realities of the multicultural and transnational world. 
Instead it may well find itself in a severely polarized world, where West and East appear as 
opposing forces. To prevent this scenario, a strategic ally like Turkey must be drawn closer, 
as Spanish president Jose Zapataro and the UK Minister of Foreign Affairs David Miliband, 
contra to critics like Merkel and Sarkozy, stated on a number occasions.60 Mottos such as 
“melting pot of civilizations,” “alliance of civilizations,” and “Istanbul: where the continents 
meet” accentuate the articulation and interwovenness between Turkey and the EU.  
 
In this sense, the ruling pro-Islamic party in Turkey, Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
which has been in power since 2002, is described as a successful model for the rest of the 
Muslim world. Regarding the AKP, U.S. newspapers such as the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, prominent German newspapers such as Die Welt, and officials of the 
European Union acknowledged it as a democratic example for other Islamic movements to 
follow.61 Moreover, it received support from “the East” as Malaysia’s well-known Islamic 
activist Anwar Ibrahim as well as the Palestinian movement Hamas publicly expressed their 
admiration for the AKP model.62 
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Were Turkey to be internalized, this argument goes, it would bring stability to Europe’s 
eastern border. In short, Turkey is seen as a “bridge” that symbolizes the dialogue between 
the West and the Muslim world. This point used to support Turkey’s accession could be 
summed up as the following: Turkey is not as radically different as it has often been 
presented. Further, the argument goes, one can observe a common heritage between Europe 
and Turkey. As the successor of the Ottoman Empire, historically Turkey has always been a 
collaborator in international treaties, coalitions and commerce made with Europe.  During 
the long lasting reign of the Ottoman Empire, Turks had left their imprint in the Balkans 
and the Mediterranean region. The Empire, as a Muslim-Turkish civilization, had harbored 
diverse ethnic and religious communities under its umbrella. If Europe wishes to move 
towards a postnational and multicultural future, commentators claim that Turkey with its 
inherited cosmopolitan and multiethnic social fabric must be incorporated in the EU.63  
 
The point to be noted here concerns the use of the history. Regardless of their position, 
proponents both sides of the debate regarding Turkey’s accession and identity have taken 
recourse to history. In order to account for the current state of affairs, history is always 
invoked. Images of an alien Asiatic culture, a great menace to European states, or a 
cosmopolitan Ottoman-Turkish Empire are recalled and conjured up to explain why Turkey 
should be, or not, incorporated into Europe; in each instance, history serves as a source for 
imaginaries, discourses and collective memories. As we will see shortly, this also holds for 
the discourses produced in Turkey. History is often used to mark Turkey’s authentic identity 
and unique location.  
 
1.2 Turkey as an EU Membership Candidate 
 
While commenting on the historical development and the future of multiculturalism and 
minority rights, Will Kymlicka points to a trend of internationalization in the following 
manner: 
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International intergovernmental organizations [such as UN, ILO, UNESCO, 
World Bank] are encouraging, and sometimes pressuring, states to adopt a 
more multicultural approach. Those states that are prepared to consider 
adopting models of multicultural citizenship will find an array of international 
organizations willing to provide support, expertise, and funding. Those states 
that cling to older assimilationist or exclusionary models find themselves 
subject to international monitoring criticism and sanction. In short, we are 
witnessing the increasing ‘internationalization’ of state-minority relations, and 
the global diffusion of multiculturalism as a new framework for reforming 
those relations.64  
 
Perhaps there is no better case than Turkey’s accession into the EU that could serve as an 
illustration of the paradigm Kymlicka puts forth above. The accession requirements in 
respect to minority rights and culture have made it harder for Turkish authorities to operate 
with their standard “assimilationist” and “exclusionary” policies. It seems the European 
Union sometimes gives Turkey the carrot, and sometimes the stick: the European Court of 
Human Rights provides funding for various projects in Turkey aiming to protect and 
invigorate minority culture while also sanctioning Turkey for human rights and minority 
rights violations. Before going into a detailed analysis of the violations issues that have been 
sanctioned by the European Court of Human Rights, a small detour is necessary. Let’s have 
a short glance at Turkey’s historical path of internationalizing minority rights and 
multiculturalism.   
 
As already mentioned, Turkey’s EU candidacy goes back to the 1960s.65 Turkey and the 
European Economic Community signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963 and initiated a 
collaborative project to harmonize the European Customs Union between the two parties 
and establish Turkey’s full membership to the EEC. By 1996, the long-awaited process 
reached its goal and Turkey became the part of the European Customs Union. With this 
development, the economic relations between Turkey and the EU were to go beyond tariff 
agreements. In other words, their interaction now exceeded the level of a simple trade 
agreement and occasioned coordination of policies for domestic and international markets. 
Moreover, Turkey’s application for full membership in 1987 and the EU Council’s 
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subsequent recognition of Turkey as a candidate state made Turkey and the EU more 
proximate with Turkey’s promise to become European. Overall, this was the closest 
interaction possible between the EU and any non-member country, especially ‘a country of 
Muslim majority’.  
 
No doubt, the ambivalence about the future of EU-Turkey relations was also felt in Turkey. 
There are multiple views in Turkey on the country’s accession to the EU. The idea of 
Europe and Europeanization arouses and mobilizes various feeling from anxiety and fear to 
excitement and hope. Political and public opinion are split. For some critics, the EU is 
nothing more than a dressed up facsimile European imperialism. According to this view, 
interactions with this imperialist supranational power inevitably decrease the power of the 
Turkish nation-state. The main concerns of the national socialist and nationalist left are the 
erosion of national sovereignty, independence and the power of the state. Such imagination 
of accession to the EU underscores the birth of the nation from the War of Independence 
against the European imperial powers of the World War I. It conceives of the European 
Union as a reincarnation of European imperial powers of the early twentieth century and as 
a result, Europe appears as a poison for Turkey. According to opponents of 
Europeanization, internalizing Europe’s capitalist market, capitalist economy, and neo-liberal 
policies and its incompatible culture into a “developing country” such as Turkey would only 
result in a national catastrophe.   
 
This perception also pervades in the imagination of the nationalist front and Islamists in 
Turkey who conceive of Europe as the obscene Other. European integration is imagined as 
a major threat to sovereignty, to the process of independent Parliament decision-making, 
and to the continued possession of Turkish soil.66 Especially in the 1990s, the path to EU 
membership brought up tension-filled public debates and panic-laden prognoses about the 
erosion and loss of Turkish culture, values and tradition. The national hysteria stirred by the 
European “penetration” manifested itself in the parliamentary elections and brought 
considerable seats to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) of that time, who had been 
opposed to Europeanization. This would not come as a surprise when one considers the way 
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in which MHP wove anti-European sentiments into their discourse and became the voice of 
Europhobia. As the common motto of those days “national interest vs. European 
imposition” illustrates, the West was seen a menace encroaching upon the Turkish social 
fabric and threatening Turkey’s national unity, the public good, the moral values of the 
Turkish nation, national character, and sovereignty.67 What is worth noting here, as I 
mentioned above, are the constant references made to the past, where the union of 
European-Christian powers presumably to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and Turks. 
Accordingly, Turkey’s tension-filled encounter began with the reforms that were undertaken 
by the Ottoman authorities in the mid 19th century at the behest of European powers acting 
as the guardians of non-Muslim minorities. Fast-forward to the 21st century and anti-
European discourse once again finds Turkish authorities passing one law after another to 
meet the requirements set by the European Union for full membership. For the adherents of 
this perspective, the promise to adopt EU regulations and reforms concerning human and 
minority rights, as well as to change in the economic, political and legal fields, are different 
than those undertaken in the 19th century.  
 
Of course, to disagree with the right-wing perspective is not to deny that there have been 
certain important changes in both the form and the content of the relationship between 
Europe and Turkey along the way from the 19th century to the new millennium. For 
instance, while Turkey is predominantly a Muslim population, Kurds alongside Alevis and 
their political/cultural rights are high on the current reform agenda. That said, it is difficult 
to read republican Turkish history without a sense of déjà vu taking us back to the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Armenian and the Greek questions, which the 
Ottoman authorities had to negotiate with the European powers of the time, are back on the 
table reincarnated as Armenian genocide recognition and the Cyprus problem respectively. It 
seems that a constant short circuit between the past and the present exists as long as the 
relation between Europe and Turkey is at stake. The present politics and identities are 
haunted by the fears and anxieties of the past. We will examine how this collective memory, 
which shuttles relentlessly between the past and the present, informs the fantasy of 
contemporary Turkish nationalism in the following chapters in detail. For now, suffice it to 
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say that in the anti-European discourse, the image of Europe conjures up disdain, 
humiliation, contempt and exclusion. In what is commonly known as ‘the Turkish-Islam 
synthesis’, which imagines the pedigree of Turkey as essentially Islamic, the founding myth 
pushes the history of European encounters farther back to the Crusades and associates that 
event with the recent accession of the European Union. Therefore, for its opponents, the 
imagery of Europe merges the Greek, Roman and Christian tradition into one linear 
historical continuum, which is deemed by its very nature antithetical to Turkish-Muslim 
society. This resonates almost identically with the Orientalist’s view on Turkey and the image 
of Turk, which again view again the Other as a reified image. The same features of Europe, 
capitalism, science, Enlightenment, democracy and Christian heritages, are deployed – albeit 
in reverse order – to define Europe. What makes Europe a significant civilization becomes, 
for the anti-European discourse, its source of degeneracy and alienness. In sum, all these 
discussions and debates of anti-European sentiment point to fears and anxieties about 
accession. Like its European imaginary twin, the anti-European position sees Turkey’s 
integration and cultural blending as disastrous. This perception of Europe would Turkey 
have be wary of the degeneration, culture shock and alienation that would accompany 
Europeanization.  
 
Some commentators, however, conceive of the European Union as a civilizational project 
that would assure the establishment of certain core universal values, such as, human rights, 
freedom, and the supremacy of the law in Turkey. Here, the idea of Europe is supposed to 
bring the winds of change, or to use another metaphor, the project of Europe is like a train 
that should not be missed. In a “developing” country such as Turkey, where single party rule 
and coup d‘états have become the harsh reality of politics, it is hoped that accession reforms 
would balance and control the powers of the army and the state. In a similar vein, it is 
believed that adjustment to and fulfillment of the EU’s criteria would enhance individual and 
minority rights as well as solve the issues regarding freedom of religion and conscience, 
which remain problematic areas. Indeed, certain powerful factions of Islamists in Turkey 
supported the EU accession process for the aforementioned reason. They hoped that the 
excessive power of the secular state and army elites would be checked and monitored by the 
EU Council. Similarly, the pro-Islamic Justice and Development party (AKP) announced its 
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support for the accession process when it came to power in 2002 and resumed negotiations 
with the EU, promising to actualize the Copenhagen Criteria.  
 
In 2013 it is hard to sense the same level of optimism about Europeanization as shown in 
the previous decades. The debates about accession and the national aspiration for 
undertaking European reforms have lost their momentum. In the news it is commonplace to 
read yet another poll result indicating decreasing public trust and desire for membership. 
After having been shaken by economic crises, the EU and the Euro are no longer considered 
as secure and stable as they once had been, making the accession far less attractive 
economically. It has become a journalistic and editorial cliché to state that Turkey is turning 
its face eastward, and prioritizing political cooperation and commerce with its ex-Ottoman 
neighbors as well as countries in North Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus. Turkey’s 
expectations for economic growth, development and progress are not as fixed to the 
parameters of the EU as they had been some years ago. Despite this pessimism, it would not 
be an exaggeration to suggest that membership in the European Union still constitutes a goal 
and that Europe appears as a horizon, if not a telos. At times the image of Europe emerges 
as that of a harsh super-ego, a disciplinary authority who sets the standards for the conduct 
of behavior, human rights, and democracy. Still, Europe today serves as a significant object 
of admiration, denial, envy, resistance, love and hate in Turkish politics and public discourse. 
For that reason the relationship with Europe cannot be only a matter of rational and national 
interest and realpolitik analysis. The imagery of Europe does not touch only on rationality 
but deeply registered in the collective unconscious and in collective memory in Turkey. 
Europe is still both a significant friend and fiend in the Turkish political and public 
discourse, and Europeanization and the accession of Turkey are important open-ended 
processes and points of reference.     
 
To what degree Turkey will keep its promise to become European is a controversial subject. 
In 2001, it had promised to legislate and implement European Union standards in its 
National program in order to adapt to the criteria of the EU Council. As part of this 
arrangement, the European Council promised to include Turkey if it fulfills the requirements 
of membership. It is through this act of promising to become European that political 
subjectivities of “the European” and “the Turk” are reproduced. Regardless of its immediate 
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results, Turkey’s promise to become European will likely to remain on the horizon for both 
parties. 
 
1.2.1 The Promise to Become European: Respecting Minorities and 
Their Cultural Rights 
 
 
In 2001, the Turkish government announced its road map for reforms and a set of short 
term and middle range plans – known as the National Program. Two years later, the Turkish 
Parliament established a harmonization commission to facilitate this process. Turkey’s 
enthusiasm for reforms was well received by the members of the EU and consequently, in 
2005, the European Council officially started negotiations on Turkey’s membership. Member 
states are required to adopt the European Union “acquis” – the bedrock of European Union 
law, which covers many areas and issues that are addressed in 35 chapters.68 So far, the 
chapters on health, consumer protection, company law, transportation, taxation, free 
movement of capital, intellectual property, science and research and information society and 
media to name a few, have already been opened. What interests us centrally here are the 
negotiations and protocols regarding minority culture and rights. Respect for and protection 
of minority rights is one of the major socio-political criteria on which the EU bases 
candidacy. There are a number of issues such as torture, ill treatment of civilians by the state, 
prison conditions, as well as freedoms of expression, association, thought, conscience and 
religion, that the EU considers the backbone of liberal democratic values and foundational 
individual freedoms. A new and emerging focus for the EU is sensitivity toward minority 
rights alongside individual liberties. The European Convention for Minority Rights was 
designed to set out certain standards for this critical subject of our age. What follows is an 
analysis of certain events and topics that recently occupied pivotal space in terms of Turkey’s 
human and minority rights record as seen from the perspective of the European Council.   
 
The Turkish term for minority, azınlık, is usually applied to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish 
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communities in Turkey, those “national minorities” inherited from the Ottoman Empire. 
The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 brought these minorities under the protection of the League 
of Nations, though this protection was not truly effective. For a long time, the successive 
Turkish governments resisted recognition of any other group as a minority. This state 
tradition was maintained until the last decade of the millennium. In the 1990s, especially as 
the Kurdish movement started to demand recognition and certain rights the government was 
under increasing pressure to broaden this category. With the support of international 
organizations such as the European Council, the nascent Kurdish forces pushed state 
authorities to take measures to recognize the “Kurdish Problem.” To that end, the laws of 
birth registration were changed and the ban on giving certain “non-Turkish” names to 
children was removed.  This change in the law enabled people of different ethnic traditions 
to register their children by using hitherto prohibited native names. Moreover, in 2009 the 
Turkish government came up with a new reform package, the “Kurdish Opening”69 which 
aimed to improve the cultural rights of Kurdish citizens. Amongst these measures, the right 
to education in the Kurdish native language, both at the undergraduate and graduate levels, 
was recognized and broadcasting of Kurdish on TV and radio appeared. The legislation 
permitting education and broadcasting in Kurdish had proceeded from the formal “Kurdish 
Opening,” going back to the years 2002-2003 when state authorities first initiated the 
European Union reforms. The “Kurdish Opening” is the revised and extended version of 
the promises given in the National Program.  Since then education and communication in 
Kurdish have been the topics of contention.  
 
Recent history abounds with examples of improvement of Kurdish cultural rights, especially 
when compared to previous decades. In December of 2012 the Council of Higher Education 
(YÖK) approved an application by Tunceli University for the foundation of a Department 
of Eastern Languages and Literatures, which would include Zaza and Kumanji Kurdish.70 
Similarly two universities in eastern cities, Muş and Mardin, offered post-graduate and 
graduate courses in these languages. The new curriculum of the Ministry of National 
                                                
69 The year 2009 also witnessed the “Alevi Opening” and the “Roman Opening”. These two openings like their 
sibling the “Kurdish Opening”, aimed to guarantee and improve the cultural rights of Alevi and Roma citizens 
of Turkey. However, as though throwing them into a dusty drawer in a governmental office building the 
government suspended almost all the openings before it seriously implemented them.  
70 European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report (Brussels, 2012), 32, accessed Feb 12, 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm. 
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Education has made possible the opening of primary school courses in living languages such 
as Kurdish or Circassian, with an enrollment minimum of ten students.71  
 
The attempts to improve and protect the rights of minorities are not limited to Kurds. The 
reform program also regards national non-Muslim communities and laws that regulate their 
educational institutions, property rights or newspapers. In the area of education, efforts have 
been made in favor of minority schools and some public schools have been issued new 
textbooks that addressed these communities’ demands. In the 2010-2011 academic year 
mathematics and introductory science textbooks were translated into Armenian and 
distributed free of charge.72 In an effort to address terms of property rights, the government 
reorganized the General Directorate Charitable Foundations and related laws on 
endowments between 2002-3 which made it easier for non-Muslim community organizations 
to own and register property.73 To give a concrete example, “in March 2011, Turkey 
implemented the ECHR judgment of March 2009 on the property rights of the Kiminis 
Theodoku Greek Orthodox church on the island of Bozcaada (Thenodos), by transferring 
the property titles to the Bishop of Imvros and Tenedos.”74 Another promising case cited in 
the report of the EU Council was that “in November 2010 the Ecumenical Patriarch 
received the deeds of the Büyükada orphanage from the deeds office in Istanbul, following 
the ECHR ruling in the Ecumenical Patriarchate vs. Turkey case.”75 Overall, according to 
progress report, “the law on [charitable] foundations continued to be implemented, albeit 
with delays and procedural problems, enabling the return of 181 properties to community 
foundations. 76  
 
In light of all this, one can detect considerable improvement in the issues facing minorities, 
changes which would have been unimaginable even a few years ago. Compared to the laws 
and policies of the twentieth century, those of the new millennium can be considered more 
inclusive and progressive. What would have been impossible to expect in the official 
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ideology of the 80s and 90s began to be uttered and demanded. Dozens of laws were passed 
and reconfigured to extend rights to citizens from different ethnic and religious groups in 
Turkey. This case allows us to analyze how minority rights are demanded domestically as 
well as how multiculturalism is negotiated transnationally between Occidental/European and 
Oriental/Turkish sides. 
 
1.2.2 The Failure of Multiculturalism and Minority Rights in Turkey 
 
Despite all its promises to reform multicultural policies and develop a new model for 
Turkish citizenship, Turkey faces a serious crisis in terms of achieving a harmonious social 
order. When it comes to the implementation of recently legislated laws addressing minorities, 
one observes the half-heartedness of Turkish state authorities. From the right to education 
in one’s native tongue to the management and ownership of non-Muslim community 
endowments, legal procedures are carried out with resistance from authorities at the local 
and national level. Perhaps it is the same resistances that have made Turkish state authorities 
thus far defer becoming signatories to the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minority Languages. Another symptom of reluctance to seriously address the issues 
of minorities is evidenced by the general failure to prosecute media for hate speech towards 
minorities.77      
 
Resistance against Kurdish radio and television broadcasting has persisted in the state-run 
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) and the Radio Television Supreme Council 
(RTUK) even after the “Kurdish Opening” has made Kurdish broadcasts a possibility. The 
state authorities initially announced that TRT would not air any program in Kurdish. 
However, in 2004 the state television channel softened its line and started devoting a small 
portion of the broadcast of shows of within a 30-minute to one-hour duration, to Kurdish 
programming. This, by most standards, is a token gesture at best. Private, non-governmental 
radio and television channels choosing to broadcast in non-Turkish languages are subject to 
constraints on how much non-Turkish programming they can broadcast in a day:  languages 
and dialects other than Turkish can be broadcast, for a maximum of one hour a day and five 
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hours a week whereas TV channels are allowed to show cultural programs of at most 45 
minutes a day, four days per week. Such constraints on the format and content of the 
programs are significant in revealing the government’s reluctance towards improving cultural 
rights as promised by the National Program.  
 
It comes as no surprise that the EU Council’s report concludes:  
Overall, Turkey has made some progress on cultural rights, and fewer 
restrictions on the use of Kurdish in prisons during visits and exchanges of 
letters were reported. However, some legislation still restricts the use of 
languages other than Turkish, including the Constitution and the Law on 
Political Parties. Also, the judiciary took a number of restrictive decisions on 
the use of languages other than Turkish, including the use of Kurdish in 
court cases concerning Kurdish politicians and human rights defenders.78  
 
And finally, referring to Turkish state authorities’ human rights and minority issues record 
over the last three years, the report finds that the 2009 democratic opening that intended to 
address both the “Kurdish issue” alongside other reforms to state dealings with minorities 
was actually not implemented as planned.79  
 
It is not only Kurds and Alevis who cope with the failure of recognition of minority rights in 
Turkey; non-Muslim communities such as Greeks, Jews and Armenians also face these 
difficulties. For instance, the EU council report affirms the continued oppression of the 
Greek minority within Turkey by suggesting they continue to “encounter problems regarding 
access to education, property rights” even on the Turkish islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and 
Bozcaada (Tenedos) where they represent a significant portion of the population. Similarly, 
the 2008 law on charitable endowments and land ownership aimed at returning formerly 
confiscated minority assets has suffered a number of delays and procedural difficulties.80 The 
difficulties minorities face holding land is further evidenced by the State’s confiscation of a 
large number of properties held by the Catholic Church across the country.81 
 
In terms of promises made to reform education, the report found that the management of 
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minority schools “remained an issue, pending an implementation regulation.” With minority 
schools in Turkey facing “procedural and bureaucratic difficulties with registration, budget 
problems and sustainability issues due to the number of students enrolled” and the 
restriction of these schools, by Turkish law, to offer education only to those students of the 
same minority.82 Another concern that faces these schools is that the state sponsored 
textbooks are required to use often feature rhetoric against the very minority groups such as 
Christian missionaries, the schools target.83 
 
In the case of reforms to the media, the report found ample evidence of anti-Semitism and 
other culturally-based hate crimes perpetrated through film and television which have gone 
unpunished. In response to the commonality and the lack of response to those most 
offensive representations the report states that they feel it represents a “culture of 
intolerance against minorities.”84 In addition to these concerns, three prominent cases 
underscore the lack of seriousness with which the court system views hate crimes against 
minorities: the recent killings of three Protestants, a Catholic priest, a Bishop and Armenian 
journalist Hrant Dink remain unprosecuted.       
Overall... Turkey’s approach to minorities remained restrictive. Full respect for 
and protection of language, culture and fundamental rights in accordance with 
European standards have yet to be achieved. A comprehensive approach and 
further efforts are needed to enhance tolerance, security and promote 
inclusiveness vis-à-vis minorities. There is a need for revision of existing 
legislation, the introduction of comprehensive legislation to combat 
discrimination and the introduction of protection mechanisms or specific 
bodies to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance.85 
 
I argue that the restrictive approach of Turkish state authorities stems from their perception 
of minorities in Turkey. That is to say, the state offers an infantilized portrayal of minorities 
as groups of individuals who share a culture but are in capable of making decisions for 
themselves. The state strives to become the sole authority in determining what would be 
“good” for their interests and to decide which cultural and social rights are to be granted 
through multicultural policies such as the Kurdish Opening. The existence of diverse ethic 
and religious communities is celebrated inasmuch as these minority cultures in the official 
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narrative of Turkish-Ottoman mosaic. In other words, as long as they represent Turkey’s 
Turkish-Muslim tolerance, peace, and hospitality, and signify the “richness” of the country’s 
cultural spectrum to the rest of the world, some Greek Churches might be restored or 
certain Christian and Jewish religious ceremonies might be allowed. Yet, the same minorities 
are depicted as collaborators of malicious foreign powers and internal threats to the unity of 
the nation when they formulate their own political and cultural demands and push for 
official recognition of their own agenda The Turkish state authorities fear that if they 
recognize these “excessive” demands, the nation will disintegrate. When their demands 
diverge from the official multicultural projects, minority groups’ cultural and political claims 
are seen as divisive and sectarian. When minorities push for the recognition of their 
perception of culture and difference, they become intolerable for the state and may face 
disciplinary and violent treatment (torture, imprisonment, or murder). What we should bear 
in mind is that the Turkish state defines itself as sovereign and as the host in a multiethnic, 
multicultural homeland, where religious and ethnic minorities are defined as the guests. In 
the next three chapters I will critically examine just how Turkish historians put the Ottoman 
history and legacy into use to construct an image of Turks as the benevolent host of Turkey, 
and ethnic and religious Others as their guests. 
 
The European enlargement debate is an important process that allows us to analyze the 
internationalization of multiculturalism and how Western liberal multiculturalism is 
negotiated and contested with the European-to-be, the supposedly Oriental Muslim Turkish 
Other. Both the European Union and the Turkish nation-state are deeply affected by certain 
antagonisms, failures and impossibilities cast up by questions of how to peacefully 
accommodate a plurality of ethnic and religious communities. Europe is encountering this 
open-ended process as the European states strive to integrate minorities and immigrants into 
secular liberal public space. Turkey, too, is going through a process of reforming itself to 
become more democratic, liberal and tolerant in accordance with European standards. In so 
doing, state authorities are trying to formulate solutions to the demands, in particular, of 
Kurdish, Alevi, and Armenian communities. What interests us here in this dialectic between 
the EU and Turkey is how governing difference/minorities becomes a nodal point of 
contestation in the global age of liberal multicultural politics.  
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It is against this backdrop of EU accession debates, and Turkey’s aspirations to European-
ness, that we should analyze the recent nostalgia for the golden days of the Ottoman rule. 
Only then we can appreciate the recent glorified accounts of the Ottoman past as 
symptomatic of the identity crisis that Turkey faces. In my view, Ottoman tolerance is a 
crucial point of investigation at a juncture in which European nations and Turkey look for 
solutions and models of harmonious accommodation of minority populations and negotiate 
the principles of these future transformations. Will Europe be able to genuinely learn from 
other cultures like Turkey without too readily perceiving Turkish Europeanism as the 
oxymoronic? 
 
Similar questions are relevant for contemporary Turkish national identity: can Turkish state 
authorities deal with questions of Otherness and democracy without a nostalgic and 
melancholic attachment to an assumed Golden Age whose downfall is blamed on minorities 
and Europe? Will the imaginary of Ottoman tolerance for the minorities remain as a nativist 
nationalist reaction that tries to beat its European other at its own game by proclaiming: “we 
were already multicultural!” Or can the remembrance of the Ottoman past serve as a genuine 
model through which the limits on human and minority rights are pushed to their limits? We 
will address these knotty questions of our times in the following chapters where we 
thoroughly discuss the pitfalls of Ottoman historiography and the fantasy of the Golden Age 
it produces.    
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Chapter Two  
Making Identity and the European Enlargement Project: Ottoman 
Historiography 
 
The fantasy, useless as a tool to explain its object, can shed light on its producers and adherents.  
  Mladen Dolar, introduction to The Sultan’s Court: European Fantasies of the Ottoman Empire86  
 
 
The discussions over Turkey’s candidacy for European Union have demonstrated once again 
that a debate on identity is always a debate about history and how to remember the past. All 
of interlocutors in the debate over Turkish and European identities invoke traditions, 
lineages, and legacies to support their arguments. Whether in an effort to demonstrate the 
symbiosis and confluence between these two cultures or the irreconcilable differences 
between them, historians, politicians and other public figures use history as a repository for 
their imagination. History is the battleground on which contemporary identities of 
Europeanness and Turkishness are contested and negotiated. An important terrain on this 
battleground is the Ottoman Empire and its legacy. As I will try to elucidate in this chapter, 
the recent surge of interest in this topic is not just a matter of scholarly pursuit by Turkish 
“native” scholars and historians of Ottoman historiography, for whom the Ottoman Millet 
System is not only the epitome of past multiculturalism and harmonious coexistence, but also 
a viable solution to the domestic and international challenges facing Turkey today. My goal 
here is not to disprove or debunk this historiography or debunk it as irrational, untruthful, 
emotionally biased etc. Others have already presented a more truthful and scientific version 
of Ottoman history and I will analyze the core of their discussions in the second part of this 
chapter, where I discuss scholars whose works offers counter narratives to that of Ottoman 
tolerance and Millet. Some of these critics, such as Marc Baer ad Joseph Hacker, will 
examine narratives of the Jews who had been victims of the expulsion, forced migration and 
confiscation under Muslim rule. Similarly Macit Kenanoğlu and Daniel Goffman will give 
reasons as to why one should be suspicious of the proximity of the narrative of Ottoman 
tolerance and Millet system to realist historiography. In this dissertation my primary focus 
                                                
86 Mladen Dolar, introduction to Sultan‘s Court: European Fantasies of the East, by Alain Grosrichard (New York: 
Verso: 1998), xiv. 
49 
will be to analyze the role of nativist Occidentalist historiography in the consolidation of 
Turkish identity and nationalism over the last twenty to thirty years vis-à-vis its 
European/Western Other as well as domestic minorities. In other words, I am interested in 
the Ottoman past only insofar as it is put to the service of re/formation of today’s Turkish 
identity. In order to understand how discourse surrounding Ottoman peace and tolerance 
has influenced the recent phase of Turkish nationalism, one must deploy, as I will argue 
below, the concept of fantasy. I particularly draw on Lacan’s notion that fantasy should be 
assigned the central role in sustaining its adherents’ affective energies and social reality. 
Elaborated further and applied to analysis of formation national group psychology, by 
scholars such as Sigmund Freud, Slavoj Zizek and Reneta Salecl, this conception of fantasy is 
a crucial tool for me to investigate the narratives of Ottoman tolerance with which its 
producers and public audience sustain their Turkish-Ottoman identification, as well as how 
they deal with the impossibility of a harmonious nation and with the loss of the Empire. 
 
Before sketching the broad contours of this recent historiographical literature on Ottoman 
Millet System and its putative tolerance and multiculturalism, I would like to start off with a 
detour and introduce the deeply rooted image of the Turk and The Despotic Ottoman 
Empire/Sultan in Western historiography and social and political thought. This brief 
exposition is necessary to set the stage to which recent Turkish-Islamic historiography 
responds. By juxtaposing these two images of the Empire and the Turk as historically both 
“despotic” and “tolerant” my aim is to better aid our interpretation of the EU and Turkey’s 
debates and the issues surrounding them as well as of how a considerable number of Turkish 
historians speak to these debates by deploying a nativist historiography that glorifies a pre-
colonial multicultural and tolerant society.  
 
2.1 Oriental Despotism and the Image of the Turk and the Ottoman 
Sultan in Western History 
 
The Ottoman Empire has long been an intriguing object of analysis, arguably ever since 
Ottoman territories expanded into the Balkans.  Unlike other oriental empires of the ancient 
times, be they Mogul, Persian or Chinese, the proximity of the Ottoman Empire made it an 
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important and integral part of the formation of European identity.87 At least from the 
sixteenth century onwards, the Empire troubled many prominent social and political 
thinkers. From Machiavelli, Locke and Weber to Montesquieu, Hume, Marx, Goethe and 
Nietzsche, it specifically has occupied a substantial space in the accounts of many authors of  
the Enlightenment.88 In their accounts, the Ottoman Empire mostly figured as the “other” of 
Europe. For centuries, it was thought of and studied as a monolithic Islamic civilization, 
which was “essentially” different than its European counterpart.  
 
In myriad representations of otherness, the Empire frequently came to denote the barbaric 
and demonic other of Europe. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottomans 
were commonly referred to “as the barbarian, the infidel, the public enemy or the present 
terror of the world.”89 To put it in Said’s words, “‘the ‘Ottoman peril’ lurked alongside 
Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilization a constant danger, and in time 
European civilization incorporated that peril and its lore, its great events, figures, virtues, and 
vices, as something woven into the fabric of life.”90 However, it was especially around the 
eighteenth century that tendencies to depict the Empire as a “despotic,” “corrupt,” 
“stagnant,” and “backward” sovereignty gained momentum and wide discursive purchase.91 
In the writings of well-known figures of the time, especially those of Montesquieu,92 the 
Ottoman Empire’s despotism designated that extreme form of political structure where the 
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ruler reigns supreme over his slavish and obedient subjects.93  
 
Certainly, the image of the Despot played a crucial role in giving shape and form to that 
regime, against which the European subjects defined themselves – as “liberal,” “republican,” 
and “democratic.” The Western conception of citizenship has a lineage that weaves together 
different times and spaces across the West, and traces the origin of citizenship and 
democracy back to ancient Greek and Roman civilizations.94 Drawing from this heritage, 
Enlightenment republicans were struggling with absolute monarchies for greater rights to  
political  participation and more representative institutions in Europe states, despotism being 
the “dire threat, the smear term” used against those monarchies that were understood to be 
antithetical to those ideals.95 Thus, it was against the inverted mirror image of the Oriental 
other that the European identity was constituted and sustained. Oriental despotism was 
merely a stronger version of the hostility, directed at European kings primarily, which 
invoked fears of the dreaded Turk and more distant oriental “tyrannies” by implication.96 
Description of the absolute and excessive power of the Ottoman sultan and of the lack of 
autonomy and civil society in the Empire accompanied almost every discussion of despotism 
and patrimonialism.     
 
Insofar as this “unbridgeable” gap between the Oriental and Occidental political structures is 
concerned, one should not miss another critical aspect of European accounts/narratives of 
the excessive power enjoyed and wielded by the Empire. It is impossible to read these 
accounts without taking note of how imbued they are with their “object” of study. As Alan 
Grosrichard has vividly illustrated in Sultan’s Court, it was the unfathomable and boundless 
enjoyment of the despot that was so riveting for the European gaze. Grosrichard’s 
genealogical work on the creation of the monster showed that even the smallest details of the 
Sultan’s enjoyment were highly captivating for Europeans as evinced by their prominence in 
a wide-ranging literature. Grosrichard insightfully demonstrated that the will to know the 
Empire was inextricably mixed up with fascination with the Other’s (the Despotic Sultan) 
                                                
93 Çırakman, From the ‘Terror of the World’ to the ’Sick Man of Europe’, 118-9.  
94 See Engin F. Isin.“Citizenship after Orientalism,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, ed. Engin F. Isin and 
Brian S. Turner (London: Sage, 2002); and Patricia Springborg, “The Contractual State; Reflections on 
Orientalism and Despotism,” History of Political Thought 8, no.1 (1987). 
95 Patricia Springborg, “The Contractual State; Reflections on Orientalism and Despotism,” 414. 
96 Ibid. 
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enjoyment.97 As the hidden abode of this enjoyment, the seraglio has become a recurrent 
theme in the accounts of Oriental Despotism.98 In the introduction to Grosrichard’s seminal 
study, Mladen Dolar does a splendid job of capturing this eroticized and exoticized image of 
the Despotic Sultan and his lavish and hedonistic lifestyle as seen through the gaze of its 
European spectators:  
the subjects who abase themselves before a despot, the sole possessor of all 
political power; the despot’s utter capricious arbitrariness, unbounded by any 
law or predictability; summary executions, tortures, mutilations, confiscations 
[…] an incredible lust for goods, which constantly stream into a black hole, 
that supposed paradise of supreme enjoyment; the unfathomable structure of  
the despot’s court, with the seraglio at its centre, displaying a highly codified 
hierarchy of viziers, janissaries, mutes, dwarves, eunuchs, and countless 
despot’s wives […] the immense sexual lust, […] the despot’s endless 
copulation with an endless number of women.99  
 
Dolar also reminds us that this deep European fascination was by no means incidental. For 
European subjects in the age of Enlightenment, all these unconditional and one-way flows 
of services and material wealth to the Sultan were utterly illogical and forbidden; the Sultan’s 
despotic exuberances were antithetical to everything the incipient liberal and democratic 
political regimes of the occident stood for. Seen in these terms, the inaccessible and 
unreasonable and hence excessive enjoyment of the oriental other constantly caught the 
envious eye of European subjects and played itself out in their writings of the period quite 
conspicuously and frequently. It is important for our analysis to bear in mind that enjoyment 
of the other plays a pivotal role in different domains of politics. I will return to the 
discussion of these psychoanalytical insights about enjoyment and its centrality in the 
                                                
97 Mladen Dolar, introduction to Sultan‘s Court: European Fantasies of the East, by Alain Grosrichard (New York: 
Verso: 1998), xii-xiii. 
98 Seen from this angle, Sigmund Freud’s story presents an interesting case. On the one hand we find a Freud 
who, in his brief correspondence with Einstein, Why War?, underrated the conquests of Turks ‘bringing only 
disaster’ vis-à-vis Romans and French kings contributing to ‘the transformation of force into lawful order’ 
(Sigmund Freud, Why War? (Chicago: Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, 1978), 2). On the other hand, 
according to some commentators, it was the same Freud, according to some commentators, whose indulgence 
in the Ottoman divan, (a typical object in Orientalist paintings of harems that eventually became Freud’s 
psychoanalytical couch), had to do with his fascination with Turks’ polygamous sexuality and with his affair 
with his sister-in-law (Sebnem Senyener, “How the ‘Divan’ become the ‘couch’?” Eurozine February 03, 2004, 
accessed November 4, 2013, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-03-03-senyener-en.html). Whether his 
affair was really related to his envy for Turkish polygamy and harems is a controversy I will leave to Freud 
experts to resolve. What is important here to note is his dismissed the Turks’ barbarian conquests (with a 
gesture informed by oriental despotism) in favor of Roman and French civilizations, while bringing an object 
of this ‘alien’ culture, laden with sexual connotations, to the core of his office. 
99 Mladen Dolar, introduction to Sultan‘s Court: European Fantasies of the East, xii-xiii.  
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constitution of our socio-political reality and of forms of otherness in chapter three.  
 
Thus, the emergence of the interest and fascination with the despotic enjoyment of the 
Ottoman sultan was concomitant to the deep crises and anxieties of the western political 
regimes. Writings on Despotic Sultan’s enjoyment proliferated as the European states began 
to feel their impasses more acutely.100 Therefore, despotism, despite its radical alien-ness, was 
very intimately connected to the worries, crisis, and struggles of European states. In other 
words, the discourse of the Oriental despotism ‘was a reflection of basic political anxieties 
about the state of political freedom in the West’.101 Under these conditions where fear, 
anxiety, and discontent were widespread, the enjoyment of the Sultan fascinated the 
European subjects all the more. This fascination with the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan-
cum-Oriental Despot is more revealing about the Occidental subjects and their predicaments 
than the Oriental object of their gaze.    
 
To be sure, the trope of Oriental Despotism is not a thing of the past. It is not hard to find 
echoes of Oriental Despotism in contemporary discourses: one need not look further than 
the titles of some books: The Bloody History of the Ottomans102 or Turkish Turanism: From 
Fundamentalism to Fascism.103 Or as a certain body of work demonstrated recently, many 
scholars and authors in Balkan and Arabic nation-states are very much vested in similar 
portrayals of the Ottoman Empire. In their nationalist perception of historiography, it is the 
Ottoman Empire with its Despotic regime that is believed to have held these geographies 
back from keeping apace with `developed` civilizations. While these ex-Ottoman territories 
were stagnant under the archaic and capricious rule of the Sultan, their counterparts in the 
West were caught up in an innovative fervor and making strides in democracy, human rights 
                                                
100 For instance, discontent with the socio-political structure was very common in France, where there was an 
ongoing struggle between republicans, aristocracy and the Absolute Monarch. In the end, was not it 
Montesquieu who used the term Asiatic despotism to explain the degeneration of the Roman Republic: ‘The 
failure of rule in an overgrown French Republic, expanded by military conquest, and inability of the magistracy 
to curb growing extremes of wealth and poverty, luxury and power’ (Springborg, 1987: 414-5). However, as 
Springborg emphasizes, rather than reflecting the features of the Oriental states, these aspects were more 
related to the social conditions in the French society under absolute monarchy (Sprinborg, 1987: 414-5). 
101 Miriam Hoaxter, “The Waqf and the Public Sphere” in The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, ed. Miriam 
Hoexter, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Nehemia Levtzion (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 
119. 
102 İsmail Metin, Osmanlı’nın Kanlı Tarihi [The Bloody History of the Ottamans] (Istanbul: An Yayınları, 1996). 
103 Saleh Djihad, Turkish Turanism: From Fundamentalism to Fascism (Beirut: As-Sadaqa Publishing, 1987). 
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and other domains. As Todorova puts it:  
The arrival of the Ottomans was thus a calamity of unparalleled 
consequences because […] Ottoman rule left the Balkans untouched by the 
great ideas and transformations, the Renaissance and the Reformation. The 
Ottomans have been unanimously described as bearers of an essentially 
different and alien civilization characterized by a fanatic and militant religion 
[…] This picture of ‘the saddest and darkest period’ in Balkan history makes 
the five centuries of Ottoman rule the historiographical counterpart of the 
Western European ‘Dark Ages’ before the advent of historical revisionism.104  
 
These discourses on Ottoman despotism broaden and deepen our perspective on the 
particular economy of enjoyment at play when the Ottoman Empire is investigated and 
remembered. Whether they are from the seventeenth century France or the twentieth 
century Balkans, we see these authors orienting themselves towards the image of the Turk 
and the Ottoman Sultan, almost mesmerized by the excessive power enjoyed by this Oriental 
Other, which had been all the more fascinating for its inaccessibility in their own 
sociopolitical regimes.105 
 
Having said all this, one should bear in mind that image of the Ottoman Empire did not 
always evoke fear, hatred, absolutism and terror. Apart from the enjoyment of the Despotic 
Sultan and his excessive power, some other aspects of the Ottoman life were brought into 
the European narratives and exoticized, eroticized, and jealously desired and aspired to. In 
this chapter, I now move in this direction and elaborate on these other images and 
depictions coexisting with those of Oriental despotism. In other words, I want to turn to the 
other side of the image of Despotism and delve into how the Ottoman Empire is also 
appropriated into other principles, such as tolerance and peace.   
                                                
104 Maria Todorava, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans 
and the Middle East, ed. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 70-1. 
 Albert Hourani and Karl Balbir accentuate that the same discursive strategies are deployed by some authors of 
the Arab nation-states in their retrospective reconstruction of Arab history and the Ottoman legacy. Here we 
again confront the same depiction of the Empire as an alien intruder and oppressor. See Albert Hourani, The 
emergence of the Modern Middle East (Berkley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981) and Karl K. 
Babir, “The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans,” in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle 
East, ed. Carl Brown (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
105 On the representations of the image of the Turk and the Ottoman Sultan in various sources ranging from 
16th century French poetry to Russian literature and 20th century cinema see the edited book composed of 
symposium presentations delivered between 13-14 May, 2005, in Pera Palas, Istanbul. Dünyada Türk İmgesi, [The 
Image of the Turk in the World] ed. Özlem Kumrular (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005). See also the editor’s own 
work on the same subject: Özlem Kumrular, Türk Korkusu [Fear of the Turk] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008).   
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To desire these different aspects of the Ottoman life was not a new inclination or 
phenomenon. It could be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when some 
European authors fixed their admiration on certain things in the Empire – especially in its 
Capital. For instance, they cherished “the absence of nobility and private property,” “slaves 
serving as bureaucrats,” “meritocracy,” “religious toleration,” “multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural nature of the Empire,” and lastly “the concern for amenities” (e.g. fountains and 
lodging places for the poor).106 Life in the Empire was praised for its religious rituals, 
kindness, generosity, lawfulness and toleration of other religions.107 Seen in these terms, in 
contradistinction to the image of the Ottoman Sultan and his despotic reign, these authors 
were fascinated with a number of distinguishing features of the Empire, wherein with which 
the Orientals/subjects of the Empire were endowed with a desirable, harmonious enjoyable 
society. In other words, many European subjects became fascinated with the other’s 
enjoyment but this time with different aspects and objects of the Empire as their focus.  
 
In this dissertation, however, I want to focus on contemporary reflections of this different 
orientation and its accompanying images. Furthermore, instead of European thinkers and 
authors of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, I want to dwell on contemporary Turkish 
historians, who are presently writing similar descriptions of the Empire. This dimension was 
not elaborately discussed yet and has still been waiting to be explored. To that end, I will 
investigate what one would call narratives of the Ottoman Peace – Pax-Ottomana. To be 
sure, its instant resonation with Pax-Romana is not accidental here.  
 
2.2 The Ottoman Empire and the Millet System: A Land of Peace and 
Tolerance 
 
The Ottoman Empire has been the object of fascination for historians and social scientists 
from various schools of thought both in Turkish social sciences and humanities as well as 
                                                
106 Aslı Çırakman, ‘Terror of the World’ to the ’Sick Man of Europe’, 53-61. 
107 Michael Curtis, Orientalism and Islam, 62. 
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international academic circles for a long time.108 The state elites in the first decades of the 
new Turkish Republic attempted to erase the memory and heritage of the Empire, by 
creating a sanitized official version of history, effacing or trivializing the traces of the 
Ottoman era. Büşra Ersanlı eloquently captures and lays out the tenets of this official 
Kemalist historiography, which has been invented between the late 1920s and late 1930s.109 
The Republican elites perceived the Ottoman Empire through the lens of Oriental 
Despotism and portrayed it as an archaic and traditional civilization, which was, by its 
essence, antithetical to the rule of law, democracy, the Enlightenment and modernity in 
general. In the perception of the early Republican historians of Kemalist historiography: 
1. Ottoman history is insufficient to explain the origins of the people of the 
new Republic; for while modern Turkey is a national state, Ottoman society 
consisted of a wide variety of ethnic groups. 2. Turkic history goes back to 
pre-Ottoman and the pre-Islamic times; Central Asian Turks migrated to 
Anatolia and the Middle East in general, thus establishing links between their 
old and new homes. 3. Turkic peoples have created the most ancient 
civilization of the world, which has influenced all other notable cultures. 4. 
The Turks have no connection with the ‘yellow race‘ or with the Mongols; 
quite to the contrary, as Aryans, they belong to the white race. 5. Except 
during the period of expansion between 1450-1600, Ottoman political life 
showed grave defects; in the later stages, and especially during the last two 
centuries of the Empire’s existence, ‘corruption’ was rife. 6. A revolutionary 
break therefore become necessary, politically as well as culturally.110          
 
These attempts to burn the bridges with Ottoman past, however, failed to fully erase its 
legacy. It seems the ghost of the Empire returned (if ever left) shortly after the Second 
World War.111 Especially in the 1960 and 70s, the Ottoman legacy and the idea of 
Ottomanism aroused excitement in Turkish nationalist scholars and became the icon of the 
nationalist historiography. What is commonly called the Turk-Islam synthesis, pioneered by 
İbrahim Kafesçioğlu, brought the Ottoman (and the preceding Muslim state, the Seljuk 
                                                
108 See the work of Cemal Kafadar and Suraiya Faroqhi for eloquent analyses of different ecoles in the 
Ottoman historiography in the 20th century: Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman 
State (California: University of California Press, 1996); Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman History: An 
Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge: The University Press, 1999).  
109 Büşra Ersanlı, “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal 
Decline,” in The Ottomans and the Balkans: A discussion of Historiography eds. Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002).  
110 Ibid., 115-6.  
111 The 1950s, the return of the Empire manifested itself with the opening and establishment of organizations 
such as The Community of Istanbul’s Conquest, The Istanbul Conquest Society, and the Istanbul Institute in 
once Ottoman Empire’s glorious capital.  
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Empire) legacy and identity to the front and praised the Ottoman’s ‘historical success’ in 
ruling the world and its military expertise. Not only Kafesçioğlu but also generations of 
Turkish scholars (Nihat Banarlı, Mualli Cevdet, Nuri Ergin, to name a few) were equally 
inspired by the other central figure, Yahya Kemal, who located the basis of Turkish identity 
in Ottoman past and its history.112 They also underscored the continuity between the 
Ottoman and Turkish states. In contradistinction to the Kemalist ideology which tried to 
severe all ties with the Ottoman past, these scholars argued for a direct lineage between that 
past and the Turkish Republic. The return to the Ottoman legacy, therefore, was seen as the 
only proper way to come to terms with Turkish culture. No wonder then that they zoomed 
in on the 15th century and Istanbul, where Turkish Muslim Emperors ruled non-Muslim, as 
they believed that this was the golden age of Turks.  
 
All this teaches us an important point: the admiration for the Ottoman past and legacy has 
been with us for a long time. The above-mentioned strata of the history of Ottomanism in 
Turkish social and political thought up until the 90s has been studied and documented well. 
What I particularly want to investigate in this chapter and dissertation in general is the recent 
surge of interest in the topic by the Turkish scholars of Ottoman-Turkish historiography 
with an emphasis on multiculturalism, peace and tolerance.113 I am aware that the Ottoman 
Empire and its ways of negotiating difference are also of international interest. Political 
philosophers such as Slavoj Zizek, Wendy Brown, Michel Walzer and Will Kymlicka have 
already mentioned the Ottoman Millet system as a historical case to reflect on when 
considering issues of human rights, freedom of conscience, minority rights, liberalism and 
(multicultural) tolerance.114 International historians who study the multicultural, tolerant and 
plural aspects of the Ottoman Empire abound.115 Canonical figures in the Ottoman history 
                                                
112 Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi’nde Osmanlıcılık,” [Ottomanism in the Republican Turkey] in 
Muhafazakarlik [Conservatism], eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003). 
113 Mithat Sertoğlu’s 1969 article on the Minority Issue in the Ottoman Empire for instance one cannot 
encounter the lexicon of multiculturalism and tolerance. This lexicon is used by the more contemporary 
scholars who are the main objects of this dissertation. Mithat Sertoğlu, “Osmanli İmparatorluğunda Azınlık 
Meleselesi,” [The Issue of Minority in the Ottoman Empire] Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 25, (1969).    
114 Slavoj Zizek, “Against the Human Rights,” New Left Review 34 (2005), 115-6; Wendy Brown, Regulating 
Aversion, 2006, 33-4; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 156-8; Michael Walzer, On Toleration, 17-8.  
115 Daniel Goffman, “Ottoman Millets in the early 17th Century,” New Perspectives on Turkey 11 no. 4 (1994); 
Maurus Reinkowski, Ottoman ‘Multiculturalism’? The Example of the Confessional system in Lebanon a 
lecture given at Orient Institute of the Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, Istanbul 17 February 1997; 
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such as Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Marc Epstein, Avidgor Levy, and Bernard 
Shaw had already written books praising on Ottoman peace, tolerance and the pluralist 
Millet system.116 These books came into high in demand among Turkish historians and were 
perceived and appropriated as the bone reference point for the creation of Turkish nativist 
historiography over the last two decades. I will refer to this “foundational” Western literature 
and incorporate it into my work, but only insofar as it is appropriated by the Turkish nativist 
intellectuals in the service of creating a counter image to the Western perception of the 
Ottoman Turkish Empire as the land of despotism and barbarism.117  
 
2.2.1 The Medina Vesikası (Covenant) as the Origin of the Millet System 
 
Even a cursory look at the literature should suffice to provide a sense of the significance in 
studies on the Ottoman Empire of the Medina Covenant for the Millet System. As will be 
discussed below, the Millet System is understood to be the bedrock of the state apparatus 
with which the Sultan and Ottoman authorities negotiated the question of otherness. 
Scholars estimate the non-Muslim population before the Ottoman conquest around the 
number of 30,000. In the aftermath of the conquest on 1453, years of state ordered 
transportation of non-Muslim populations had brought thousands as a new labor force. As 
of the year 1477, according to Imperial census, the number of non-Muslims rose to 
70,000.118 The same census indicates that Orthodox Greeks had 3151 households, 1500 
Jewish household, and all other communities – Armenians, Latins and Gypsies – combined 
owned 3,905 households whereas Muslims had 8951 household.119 These are striking 
                                                                                                                                            
Karen Barkey, “Islam and Toleration: studying the Ottoman Imperial Model.” International Journal of Politics, 
Culture, and Society 19, no.1/2. (2005). 
116 Marc A. Epstein, The Ottoman Jewish Communities and Their Role in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Freiburg: 
K. Schwarz, 1980).; Benjamin Braude, “Introduction”; “Foundation Myths of the Millet System.” in Christians 
and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., (New 
York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982); Avidgor Levy, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Darwin 
Press, 1994); Stanford Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Hong Kong: MacMillan 
Academic and Professional Ltd, 1991). 
117 Similarly in this chapter I engage with the minor literature such as Joseph Hacker and Marc Baer insofar as 
they pose a counter narrative to the fantasy narratives of the Ottoman historians and intellectuals. 
118 Donald Quartet, Ottoman Empire 1700-1922 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000), 21. 
119 Halil İnalcık, “The policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek population of Istanbul and the Byzantine 
Buildings of the City,” in The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy (London: Variorum Reprints, 
1978), 247. 
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numbers. Ratios in the new Ottoman capital demonstrate how rapidly the city had been 
revitalized by encouraged, welcomed and forcefully moved non-Muslims.  
 
There is a wide consensus in the literature that the origin of this system can be traced back 
to the Medieval Islamic States, especially the reign of the prophet Muhammad, who made a 
pact called Medina Vesikası, with non-Muslim groups in Medina in 622.120 Many scholars 
consider this agreement to be the first document in the history of Islam to explicitly lay out 
the principles for a peaceful coexistence of different religious communities.121  
 
The Medina Covenant was brought to the attention of the public in the early 1990s, 
primarily by Ali Bulaç, in conjunction with the discussions of Islam’s compatibility with civil 
society and pluralism in Turkey. In terms of plurality, at the turn of the twentieth century, 
the multi-religious demographic distribution for the period before WWI was one out of 
every five persons was non-Muslim: Jews made up 0.81 percent, Greeks 9.67 and Armenians 
7.5 percent of the population.122 After the atrocities of the war, this number fell from 20 
percent to 2.5 percent.123 Currently scholars suggest that the Greek population varies 
between 1500-3000, Armenians 50,000-60,000 and Jews around 25,000 in metropolitan 
Istanbul, which has populated by approximately 15 million inhabitants.124 
 
In addition to the non-Muslim communities, one cannot ignore the situation of 
demographically peripheral Muslim communities in Turkey. Kurds are estimated to have a 
population of 12 to 15 million, mostly comprised of Zazas and Kirmanci Kurds. The 
number of Alevis in Turkey is also estimated around 12 million.125 One fourth of Kurds are 
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estimated to be Alevis and Alevi belief combines selected elements from shamanism, 
Zoroastrianism and Islam, which makes it the Other of orthodox Sunni Islam.   
 
According to Bulaç, the Medina Covenant is essential because it is a political contract 
regulating the governance of a functional partnership the Muslims, polytheist Arabs, and 
Jews in Medina. This contract was meant to be participatory and differed little from J.J. 
Rousseau’s social contract.126 The importance of the Medina Covenant lies, in other words, in 
the fact that it was a document written in 622, whose codification and implementation came 
out of mutual dialogue and consensus among three different religious and social blocs.127 
More significantly, for some scholars, this pact also constitutes a blueprint for contemporary 
societies. In Bulaç’s words, “based on certain abstractions and generalizations derived from 
the Covenant’s provisions one can use it as a reference point for the principles of a pluralist 
social project.”128 
 
Laudatory reactions notwithstanding, Bulaç’s study came under some criticisms.129 All these 
criticisms are definitely worth a close reading but I would like to particularly focus on one of 
them. Although this covenant was in effect for only six months to one year at most, Ragıp 
Ege has pointed out, it nonetheless marks a pure and pristine reference point for future 
generations who wants to use history.130 This perception of the pristine origin in the Islamic 
society may be very inspirational to scholars and politicians praising the Ottoman Golden 
Age. However this sort of understanding of the past also becomes a troubled memory and 
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huge burden for the future in as much as the discourse (myth) of beginning imposes the duty 
of reincarnating of the past in the present and the future. In other words, as long as the 
Medina Covenant signifies the origin of a harmonious past, it will remain a utopian challenge 
for the imagery of Islamic society.  We will come back to the detailed analysis of the issues of 
the remembrance of the past in the final chapter of this dissertation. For the time being it is 
important to bear in mind that these assumed principles of the Medina Covenant are 
believed to be ideal for successive Islamic states to follow thereafter as the basis for dealing 
with non-Muslim communities. From this perspective, in medieval Islamic states non-
Muslim groups, dhimmis,131 are granted considerable autonomy in that they are allowed to 
practice their religion, maintain their own places of worship, and, to a very large extent, run 
their own affairs.132 It is argued that the Ottomans had adopted this system from the Selcuks, 
the preceding Islamic state established in Anatolia.133  
 
2.2.2. The Millet System as Multiculturalism, Tolerance and Peace 
 
Thus, researchers commonly hold that the legal pluralism of the Ottoman Empire was 
neither a historical coincidence nor a simple result of the Ottoman tolerance and 
benevolence. Rather it emerged out of religious duty and obligation. In parallel to the 
perception of difference qua non-Muslims in the Islamic law, the Ottomans embraced 
pluralism and considered it a virtue.134 That being said, it is Mehmed II who is considered to 
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have given these diffuse practices and policies an institutional coherence for the first time.135 
To that end, he founded a nexus of institutions in the new center of the Ottoman Empire, 
Constantinople. The System conferred on certain non-Muslim communities (people of the 
book and monotheistic religions) autonomy in organizing their administrative, fiscal and 
legal affairs.136 After establishing the institutions of the Orthodox Patriarch (1454), the 
Armenian Gregorian Patriarch of Constantinople (1461) and later the Chief Rabbi of the 
Jews (1454), the Sultan appointed a chief leader to each of these institutions and recognizes 
their community status. These institutions arranged “ecclesiastical matters such as ownership 
and maintenance of religious and educational building, conduct of religious services; and 
operation of millet schools”.137 Under this setting, the Catholic Armenians, the Orthodox 
Greeks and the Jews were designated as constitutive millets and their religious leaders and 
ecclesiastical cadres became entitled to regulate their communal activities as they deemed fit. 
They became fully in command of “matters concerning the personal status of millet 
members such as recording births, marriages and deaths, the collection of taxes according to 
the state’s records; adjudication of heritance cases, and other civil cases that might arise 
between members of the same community”.138 To put it differently, under the auspices of 
this structure, non-Muslims enjoyed a great deal of religious and cultural freedom and self-
appointed their leaders within their administrative and legal jurisdiction.139 Autonomy enabled 
various communities to sustain and develop themselves without being exposed to undue 
pressure or interference. As a result, the argument goes, the non-Muslims’ acceptance of the 
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Ottoman reign was based on consent140 and the minorities within the border of the Empire 
were permitted to retain their religious identities in peace and order in the Millet System.141  
 
According to the presentation common in the literature, this period of relatively stable and 
peaceful co-existence lasts until the 19th century when the Empire begins to crumble under 
drastic fiscal and political problems, which strained the Millet System as well. The Empire’s 
to capacity to control the security and property of the subjects gradually eroded as new rival 
groups rose to power and challenge the incumbent religious leaders. Moreover, the 
emergence and the spread of nationalism among the different communities in the Balkans 
pose a grave threat to the functioning of the Millet System, which had been predicated on 
compartmentalization of non-Muslim communities along the lines of their religious 
affiliations. During the nineteenth century, under the influence of the era’s modernization 
and centralization movements, the Ottoman authorities launched a series of reforms known 
as Tanzimat Reforms that substantially transformed the way the Empire governed its subjects. 
At this point, it is important to note that, according to this pervasive interpretation in the 
literature, these reforms were not only unable to bring stability to the Empire, but had 
fomented its disintegration.142 The harmonious order of the Millet System was bygone. Up 
until the 19th century non-Muslim subjects of the Empire had a serene life within the Millet 
System. 143 
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2.3 The Jewish Experience and Ottoman Hospitality 
  
The image of the Jewish immigrant setting foot at a port of Istanbul in the year of 1492, 
weary of the past exodus but joyous at the prospect of the lying ahead, figures prominently 
in the contemporary scholarly discourse. As we will see later, glorification of this figure is 
not limited to academic literature but can also be found in textbook(s), poems, newspapers 
and commemorations. It is considered emblematic of Ottoman hospitality that the Ottoman 
Empire had graciously extended a welcoming hand to massive influxes of Jews at their time 
of need. According to narrative common in the literature, concomitant with the 
homogenization of populations in the European states, the turn of fifteenth century 
witnessed huge flows of migratory Jews migrating across and beyond the continent. After 
being expelled from Europe (especially from Spain and Portugal), Jews had been welcomed 
settlers in geopolitically strategic regions of the Ottoman territories. Amongst other cities, 
Istanbul – the Capital of the Empire already home to a myriad religious and ethnic groups – 
hosted a considerably large Jewish community. As we will see shortly, in the literature on the 
Ottoman Jews, it is widely believed that Jews had secured and entrenched their position in 
due course within the Millet System as their influence over the Empire grew rapidly -be it in 
the form of high-ranking administrative posts or lucrative mercantile activities. Moreover, 
against this background we are often told that the trajectories of the Ottoman Jews 
epitomize the Empire’s hospitality, tolerance, and peaceful co-existence. It is those aspects 
of the Jewish history that are gratefully remembered and commemorated today. Therefore, 
an investigation of the particular trajectory of the Ottoman Jews, as narrated and described 
by contemporary Turkish scholars may well serve as an illustrative entry point into narratives 
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of Ottoman tolerance and peace. As one of the constitutive communities of the Millet 
System along with Armenians and Greeks, the depictions of the Ottoman Jewish experience 
in the academic literature is key to our investigation of the Ottoman peace and tolerance. In 
this chapter, I discuss these depictions of the Jewish life and analyze how they present an 
“idyllic” image of the Ottoman society as one in which Muslims and non-Muslims are 
peacefully and harmoniously accommodated. Before, however, delving into the new adventure 
they embarked upon in the land of the Empire, let’s first take a brief look at the historical 
conditions, which gave rise to the large scale displacement of Jews and made 1492 a moment 
in history, 1492, so memorable.144  
 
2.3.1 Jewish Life in Europe Before 1492 
 
The literature on the Ottoman Jews, often emphasizes that the persecutions the Jews 
suffered in the hands of their European rulers dated back to well before 1492. In tandem 
with the emergence of religious homogenization movements in the European states, anti-
Semitism was rampant across the continent. In 1078, for instance, the Pope issued a decree 
stating that “Jews should not occupy important positions in Christian countries and that no 
Jew could be superior to any Christian”.145 This and many similar denouncements same sort 
by higher echelons of the clergy not only jeopardized the professions of Jews influential in 
the economic and political arena in France and Germany but also paved the way to the 
confiscation of the assets of Ashkenazi Jews in Trier, Worms, Regensburg, Mainz, Speyer, 
and Cologne during the preparations for the first Crusade, and especially after 1095.146 
Massacres had taken place in Frankfurt in 1241, in Munich 1285-86, and Amleder in 1336-
37”.147 Jews were targeted, blamed and held responsible for the spread of the Black Death 
across the Western Europe and fell victim to massacres, particularly between 1348 and 
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1350.148 In 1394, the Jews expelled by King Charles VI took refuge in the Ottoman Empire.149 
Ashkenazi Jews in 1470 became subject to expulsion from Bavaria at the behest of King 
Ludwig.150 We are told that alongside confiscations and expulsions, Jews had also been 
subjected to humiliation, exclusion and forced conversions in these lands. In Europe, 
especially Spain, some of the convert Jews – called “converso” – continued practicing 
Judaism clandestinely while pretending to be Christian in public life. In response, the 
Spanish State and the Church form commissions in 1480s to investigate whether ‘new 
Christians’ ha truly converted.151  
 
Their plight in the preceding era notwithstanding, it is the marriage of King Ferdinand of 
Aragon and the Queen Isabella of Castile in 1469 that is widely believed to have ushered in 
the demise of European Jewry. With that marriage King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella not 
only consolidated their lands but also unite their powers against the “Jewish problem.” To 
that end, they first established a special court to bring religious purity to their countries and 
punish “deviant” acts of Jews. The court, i.e., the Spanish Inquisition, was founded with the 
express purpose of identifying and punishing “all heretics, particularly those like the 
‘conversos’ who were accused of remaining Jews in secret and thus corrupting not only the 
Church but also the Kingdom.”152 To bring the Jewish problem to a definite end King 
Ferdinand and Queen Isabella ultimately ordered, in March 1492, the expulsion of Jews from 
Spain and thereby set in motion one of the largest migratory flows in the history of this 
people, who were granted only three months for preparations and allowed to take only them 
their movable assets only–except gold, silver and the other forbidden ones.153 
 
The Ottoman Empire did not immediately appear as a designation for many of the expelled 
Jews in Spain. Rather, most of them initially moved to neighboring countries such as 
Portugal and the small Kingdom of Navarre to other proximate ports of Europe such as 
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those in Italy and Sicily.154 It was only after they realized that their new destinations were not 
much more hospitable than their former “homeland,” for instance in their 1496-7 expulsion 
from Portugal that the displaced Jews begin to converge on a preferred destination, the 
Ottoman Empire. Their migration from the Iberian Peninsula to the Ottoman territories had 
taken many decades.155  
 
Scholars point out certain important reasons why conditions were particularly conducive to 
the welcoming of the Jewish immigrants by the Ottoman territories.156 First, European 
Christendom was the common enemies of both; the Ottoman authorities were confident 
that the enemy of their enemy would be their friends157 and that the displaced and homeless 
Jews would not attempt to revolt against their gracious saviors.158 Further this common 
enemy, their knowledge of Europe and its languages and their medical, financial, diplomatic 
experience and skills made the Jews important actors and beneficial to the Ottoman 
interests.159 It is important to note, however, that the strategic advantages gained from the 
influx of Jews notwithstanding, the scholars under study here are typically at pains to make 
the case that the integration of Jews into the fabric of the Ottoman society was not 
motivated by any utilitarian calculations, but was essentially a manifestation of the Ottoman 
tolerance and leniency.    
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2.3.2 Jewish Life in the Empire 
 
The literature on Ottoman Jews often emphasizes that the Empire had attracted a 
considerable number of Jewish immigrants well before 1492.  It had became a new home to 
many Jewish communities fleeing from European anti-Semitic bigotry:  
Ashkenazi Jews from Germany, Sephardic Jews from Spain and Portugal […] 
settled in the major Ottoman centers in Southern Europe where there were 
already flourishing communities of Ottoman Jews, such as Istanbul, Salonica 
and Edirne, others settled among their co-religionists in Anatolia as well as in 
the Arab provinces, at Cairo, Damascus, Beirut and Tripoli in particular, as 
well as in the Holy Land at Safed and Sidon more than at Jerusalem.160  
 
Besides this steady stream of migratory flows from Europe, the Empire had been populated 
by Jews who once lived in the regions incorporated gradually into Ottoman rule, going as far 
back as 1326 when the Ottoman State conquered Bursa and assimilated a Jewish community 
for the first time.161 As the Empire continued to expand in three continents, so did the 
Jewish population brought under the Ottoman rule. This demonstrates that the Ottoman 
Empire already had in place institutions to deal and negotiate with the members of this 
religious community prior to 1492.  
 
An important milestone in that respect was the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, 
although what this epochal event brought about was not so much an engulfment of new 
Jewish communities as the reconfiguration of those already under Ottoman rule. As 
historians point out, the Conquest brought about a surge of interest in Jews, as evinced by 
Ottoman authorities proactive initiatives aimed at redeploying them to Constantinople.162 In 
particular, Romaniot Jews (native Greek speaking Jews of the former Byzantine Empire) 
brought from Anatolia and northern Greece played a significant role in repopulating of the 
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new Capital.163 Jews took over many abandoned houses and entire districts and many settled 
in the business center of the city, i.e., the port area formerly occupied predominantly by 
Venetians.164  
 
Historical accounts of the period abound in stories of Jews thriving under Ottoman rule. An 
exemplary story is that of Italian born Jacopo (Yakup), who, after serving both Murat II and 
his son, Mehmed II – Fatih the Conqueror – as a physician and thriving as a businessman 
gained the favor and the trust of the Sultan and was promoted to the rank of vizier.165 
Another Jewish figure frequenting the Palace had been the Chief Rabbi, who on certain 
important occasions took his place besides the Sultan along with high-ranking state officials 
such as Seyhulislam.166 Historians take this as a testament that Fatih recognized Jewish 
religious leaders and institutions on par with those of the Armenians and the Greeks; that he 
did so also captured the essence of what has come to be known as the Millet System. It is 
widely accepted that in this formation, religious leaders of non-Muslim communities and 
their ecclesiastical cadres were authorized to carry out many important functions within 
communities under their jurisprudence (e.g. collecting tax, assigning Rabbis, implementing 
communal court trials). In addition to the socio-political autonomy they enjoyed in their 
internal affairs under the Millet System, it is commonly accepted that Jews had also 
commanded economic influence far beyond the confines of their immediate religious 
community throughout the fifteenth century and onwards. In Istanbul Jews had been 
goldsmiths, silversmiths, moneychangers, purveyors of turbans and headwear, dealers in 
wool, silk, and linen, bookbinders, coin-minters, and collectors of fees and taxes.167 
 
I will re-visit the issue of communal and religious autonomy and tolerance later. Here it is 
worth underscoring scholars’ wide consensus that Jews had taken their place within the 
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Millet System and thereby enjoyed relative autonomy within their communities since at least 
the mid-fifteenth century.  
 
2.3.3 1492: Expulsions and Arrivals  
 
With their co-religionists living under these favorable circumstances, Jews fleeing 
persecutions in Europe threw themselves on the mercy of the Ottoman Empire beginning in 
1492. The narrative has it, the Empire extended its hospitality to the new immigrants and 
integrated them within the Millet System. They were allowed to maintain their traditional 
community organization and autonomy in their internal affairs and were to be protected 
against acts of fraud and oppression.168 It is also commonly accepted that together with their 
co-religionists who already lived in the Empire, the newcomers contributed to the many 
aspects of economic, social and political life in the Empire and found in their new 
destination a suitable milieu in which to exercise and take advantage of them.169 Among such 
‘know-how’ are “printing and a range of new technologies and methods of production 
utilized by the Ottomans in the exploitation of mineral resources and the manufacture of 
textiles, arms, munitions and other products.”170 In addition to transferring knowledge of 
European applied sciences, Jewish immigrants also breathed fresh air into the social sciences. 
Jewish social historians, such as Yasef Hak-Kohen and Eliyahu Kapsali, gained prominence 
in the sixteenth century.171 In general, owing to the transplantation and revitalization of 
Iberian Jewish culture, Salonica, Istanbul and Safed emerge as new and vibrant centers of 
Jewish intellectual life.172 Jews also brought dynamism to the economic sphere of the Empire. 
They contributed to the development of the Empire’s industries, especially to the 
manufacture of woolens in places such as Salonica, Safed, and Istanbul.173 In the textile trade, 
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they served as middlemen between Europe, local, and Middle Eastern merchants.174 The 
Marrano Jewish family of Mendes, for instance, became highly influential via its wide 
network of agents and came to control a large portion of commerce between the Empire 
and Europe.175 All in all, the literature highlights that the ascendance of the Jews gained 
momentum during the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481) and reaches its peak in the sixteenth 
century. 
 
2.3.4 Five Hundred Years of Friendship 
 
Although Jews had immigrated to the Ottoman territories, well before, the year 1492, this 
date assumed such a symbolic significance in recent years that one can be excused for 
believing that 1492 marked the very first encounter between Jews and Ottomans. Even the 
scholars who ascribe such significance to the date 1492 acknowledge, sometimes in the same 
breath, that the Ottomans’ favorable treatment of Jews predated 1492, oblivious to the 
somewhat contradictory nature of these two statements.176 From the outset 1492 is posited to 
be the pivotal moment in the history of the Ottoman Jewry whose importance is matched by 
no other. It is the epochal event that ushers in the Ottoman Jewish history in all its glory. 
Jewish prosperity under the Ottoman rule, the narrative goes, lasted for a long time, even if 
it may have not been for five centuries. It is admitted that the conditions of the Ottoman 
Jews began to take a turn for the worse towards the end of seventeenth century, but this 
development is deemed natural and inevitable because it paralleled the decline of the 
Empire.177 And in any event, as long as it lasted, the Ottoman Empire was a safe haven for 
Jews  
 
To be sure, this view is not held solely by the scholars of the Ottoman history under study 
here. Rather it is possible to find the reflections of this glorified image of Ottoman society in 
many other domains, reproduced and disseminated through newspapers, textbooks, 
conferences, etc. The glorification of 1492, however, eclipses much of what transpired 
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before and, as much of what was to come. For instance, in one newspaper article regarding 
the 500th anniversary of the arrival of the Sephardic Jews, we read Elena Neuman saying – in 
reference to the speculation that “Christopher Columbus was a Marrano, a Jew forced to 
convert to Catholicism in 15th century Spain” —that “thousands of other Jews who fled […] 
in 1492 had a better sense of direction [… [because] in the same year that Columbus 
discovered the New World, thousands of Sephardic Jews […] found a safe haven in the 
Ottoman Turkish Empire.”178 Neuman is by no means the only person who thinks Sephardic 
Jews had the good fortune to choose the most hospitable refuge at that time. In the same 
article, Naim Güleryüz, one of the prominent leaders of the Turkish and international Jewish 
community, similarly comments on Ottoman tolerance: “I think Turkey is the only country 
in the world where Jews have lived for five centuries peacefully and continuously.” In 
another newspaper article on “Living as Jews in Turkey for 500 Years” the author echoes the 
warm sentiments above and writes that Turkey’s Jewish community “had lived for almost 
500 hundred years in harmonious coexistence with its predominantly Moslem neighbors.”179 
Elsewhere, a textbook designed to teach secondary level students about the 500 years of 
Turkish Jewish experience promotes a similar view.180 The book mentions that there existed 
discriminatory restrictions for all monotheistic non-Muslim ethnic and religious communities 
and they had always been second-class citizens vis-à-vis Muslims. However, it states: 
“nonetheless, the privileges and freedoms enjoyed by the Jews in Ottoman lands clearly 
outweighed the restrictions, especially in comparison to what was happening to the Jews of 
Europe during the same time.”181 Even this minor caveat is drowned by sweeping 
generalizations such as: “[B]y allowing non-Muslims cultural and religious autonomy and the 
freedom to practice their own way of life under the Millet System, the Ottomans eliminated 
many of the sources of dissatisfaction and unrest usually felt by minorities.”182  
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Nowhere has Ottoman hospitality been exalted as unconditionally and ecstatically as it was 
during the official commemoration of Jewish life in the Empire and, by extension, Turkey.183 
For example, in 1991 Türkiye’nin Yahudi Dostları Derneği (Association of Jewish Friends of 
Turkey) convened in Florida to show their thankfulness for Ottoman hospitality in 
celebration of the then forthcoming five hundredth anniversary of 1492.184 A newspaper 
report indicated that the common message of the speeches delivered during the event was 
that Turkish hospitality and the rights granted to the Jews would always be gratefully 
remembered. Similar events took place elsewhere. As a part of the activities organized by the 
Quincentennial Foundation to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Spanish Jews 
in Turkey, an exhibition entitled “In the Court of the Sultan” was displayed in New York.185 
The resemblance to the title of Grosrichard’s aforementioned book Sultan’s Court should not 
be missed here. However, the resemblance goes beyond the titles. As was mentioned before, 
the Sultan’s Court was a site of European fascination for its wealth of objects of desire, 
ranging from desirable objects took place, ranging from exotic animals to precious fabric. 
Similarly, “In the Court of the Sultan,” over 300 hundred objects from recreated ritual baths 
to folk art pieces (e.g., wedding contracts) to traditional clothes (e.g., silk brocade jacket for 
the circumcision ceremony) were showcased. The articulation of these objects in the 
exhibition, as is typical in modern museums, makes them objects of aesthetic appreciation 
and molds them into conveyors of a certain image. In this particular case, the image that the 
assemblage of objects conjures up is that of the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire where 
the Jews enjoyed peace, tolerance, and cultural/material prosperity. 
 
Academic literature, newspapers, textbooks, panels and exhibitions do not exhaust the list of 
domains in which Ottoman tolerance, hospitality and Jewish life are interwoven. But these 
cases suffice for the far-ranging nature of these passionate attachments to the glorious past 
and its peaceful negotiation of difference to be grasped. I will discuss the logic of this 
nostalgic remembrance of the past and its functioning in contemporary societies in chapter 
three. For now, however, it is important to note that the nostalgic remembrance of Jewish 
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life in Ottoman society has been enacted by the Jewish community in Turkey and abroad. In 
my reading, they depict an image of a loyal minority whose integration into the state 
exemplifies a story of success. Although I mostly focus on the narratives created by Turkish 
historians in this dissertation, I want to emphasize that these depictions are constitutive of 
the broader theme of Ottoman peace and tolerance. Thus they too are subject to the 
criticism, discussed below as well as in third and fourth chapters, that depictions of history 
are over-saturated with Ottoman tolerance of the pitfalls of over-saturation of history of 
Ottoman tolerance.    
 
2.4 Silenced and Trivialized Histories and Moments of Hostility: 1660 
 
In the previous section, I have shown how Jews figure in narratives of Ottoman hospitality 
and tolerance. These accounts constantly accentuate and remind us of the expulsions of  
Jews from Europe; their arrival in the Empire, the hospitality with which they are received, 
and the ensuing era of Jewish prosperity. In contrast, in this section, through Marc Baer’s 
study, I will turn our attention to different facets of Jewish life that are all too conveniently 
left out in the narratives depicting the Ottoman Empire as the blueprint for multiculturalism. 
Baer’s text brings those suppressed traumatic aspects to the fore: (i) the expulsion of Jews 
from the core areas of Istanbul and confiscation of their assets; (ii) erosion in the positions 
of the Jewish physicians in the seventeenth century; (iii) the fundamentalist animosity 
exhibited by Kadilizade movement, especially toward Jews; and (iv) the attitudes of the 
Sultan and the prominent figures in the Palace regarding conversions of non-Muslims and 
names of villages. These elements appear to break the unity of the fantasy that had peaceful 
coexisted Muslim and non-Muslim groups in the Empire.  
In July 24, 1660 a fire starts in Istanbul. It begins in the west of Eminonü and spreads 
quickly over a vast area. It devastates almost two thirds of Istanbul, including the New 
Mosque and the nearby Jewish neighborhoods in Eminönü and Bahçekapı. Approximately 
40,000 people lose their lives and 280,000 homes are burnt to ashes. In his historical 
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investigation, Baer argues that this event marks a turning point for the Jews in Istanbul.186 
According to Baer, in the aftermath of the event, the fire is blamed on the Jews: “Ottoman 
historians, writers, palace preachers and royalty accused and cursed Jews for residing where a 
mosque was to be constructed, blamed Jews for starting the fire, and viewed the destruction 
of Jewish homes as divine punishment.”187 The Palace also orders Jews to evacuate the area 
for the restoration of the New Mosque. With no other choice but to abide by the decree, 
they leave their old neighborhoods. However, Baer points out that for many years to follow, 
Jews are not allowed to re-settle there. The Palace takes advantage of the fire and the 
renovation of the mosque to put their antipathy toward Jews into action. The state 
authorities confiscate Jewish assets and synagogues and hand them over to Muslim waqfs.188 
Jews are expelled from the center of the city to peripheral areas (e.g., Balat, Hasköy, 
Ortaköy), which ruins the economic and social network of many. In Baer’s analysis, the 
Ottoman state authorities view “the expulsion of the Jews and the construction of the 
mosque as ‘reconquest’ of ‘infidel’ space.”189 The great fire of 1660 wreaks havoc with 
Muslim and Christian neighborhoods as well, particularly churches. Nevertheless, Christians 
manage to resettle in their neighborhoods and retain their assets whereas Jews face 
incomparable losses.  
From the 1660s onwards, Baer explains, Jews faced significant erosion in their positions as 
high-ranking administrators and as business owners, and their overall social positions took a 
sharp turn for the worse. He underscores that it is a commonplace in the literature to 
attribute this erosion to a few factors such as the rivalry between the Jews and Orthodox 
Christians; changes in global political and economic conditions which had negative effects 
on the lucrative connections of the Jews; and finally a perception that Jews were incapable of 
adapting to change.190 Without neglecting these possibilities, Baer point outs that the role of 
the Ottoman Sultan and State authorities in the deterioration of conditions of the Jewish 
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community has been overlooked in the literature. Rather, he argues, ‘anti-Jewish sentiment’ 
in the Palace was highly effective in altering the determining trajectories of the Jews. Baer 
emphasizes the policies and the attitudes of the State that played a crucial role in the Jewish 
loss of influence and social position. This point is very pertinent to our discussion of the 
fantasies and the depictions of the Ottoman tolerance and therefore deserves special 
attention and elaboration here.  
 
2.4.1 Ottoman State attitude toward Jews and the Kadilizade Movement 
 
Taken in isolation from their historical context, the events of 1660 might strike one as 
puzzling, arbitrary and senseless. How is it that Jews, who had found a safe haven in the 
Ottoman Empire, could be treated so cruelly in the aftermath of a tragedy that was not of 
their making? Baer argues that knowledge of the Kadılızade movement is key to answering 
this question as it puts in perspective the political atmosphere in the seventeenth century. 
According to Baer, this movement emerged in the early seventeenth century during the reign 
of Sultan Murad IV (1623-40), but reaches its pinnacle between the 1660s and early 1680s.191 
Basically, the Kadılızade movement attributed financial crisis, military defeats, and socio-
political instability facing the Ottoman State, to a deviation from ‘proper’ Islam. The 
members of the movement believed that a return to piety and ‘proper’ Islamic reforms 
would restore order and save the Empire.  
What distinguishes the later cadres of the movement, who had become active under the 
leadership of Vani Mehmed Efendi between the late 1650s and early 1680s, was that they 
directed their hostility against unorthodox Muslims, Jews, and Christians abroad and within 
the Empire: “Whereas earlier Kadılızade leaders aimed to reform Muslim behaviour alone, 
Vani Mehmed Efendi sought to change both the beliefs and practices of Muslims and public 
position of Christians and especially Jews as well”.192 Baer emphasizes that Vani Mehmed 
Efendi and people in his circle directed their hostility more strongly toward Jews for two 
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main reasons. First, since Vani Mehmed Efendi and his bankers were of rural origin and 
lived in relatively austere conditions in Erzurum for a long time, they were shocked by the 
conspicuous consumption, wealth and positions of Jews in the Palace when they came to 
Istanbul. Secondly, Jews were more vulnerable than the other non-Muslim group, namely, 
Orthodox Christians, who comprised the largest non-Muslim group in the city, had a 
Patriarch, international backing from Christian powers, and increasing financial strength.193 
Nonetheless, Baer cautions against placing all responsibility for the new attitude toward Jews 
on Vani Mehmed Efendi. Rather, Baer suggests that Vani Mehmed Efendi had found a very 
“receptive audience for his ideas” in Sultan Mehmed IV, grand vizier Köprülü Fazil Ahmed 
Paşa and Valide Sultan (the Sultan’s mother).194 Through the rapport he establishes with 
these highly influential figures, Vani Mehmed Efendi became the chief preacher in the 
Sultan’s mosque and one of the Sultan’s most trusted advisors.195 
In his investigation, Baer shows that the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed IV directly involved 
himself in proselytizating non-Muslims and played an an increasingly ‘solicitous role’ in that 
respect, especially during the second half of his reign, from 1661 to 1687.196 According to 
Baer, “converts appeared at the sultan’s traveling court whether he was on military 
campaign, or at a palace or royal pavilion.”197 Baer states that while some converted at their 
own valorization, others were compelled to convert by the Sultan and his retinue.198 In one 
case, Sultan Mehmed IV offered a monetary reward to a non-Muslim drover to convince 
him to change his religion. Besides the conversion of the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, the 
Sultan’s interest in converting the names of certain villages was indicative of his attitude 
regarding non-Muslims. Baer points out that Sultan Mehmed IV and his retinue convert the 
names of villages for instance from Priest Village – Papaz köyü – to Islamic – Islamiyye –.199 
Also emblematic of the anti-Semitic attitudes of the sultan and the prominent figures in the 
Palace in the second half of the seventeenth century was their treatment of Jewish 
physicians. According to Baer, serving as a physician in the Palace has been a highly 
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prestigious position, dominated by Jews especially in the sixteenth century. However, in the 
seventeenth century, the number and the proportion of the Jewish physicians shrink 
considerably and many of those who remain in their position convert to Islam.200 Although 
Baer detects a common tendency in the literature to attribute this change to the factors other 
than the Sultan and Ottoman State authorities, his historical investigation shows that the 
Sultan and state officials had no small part in the process. Baer contends that Jewish 
physicians felt pressured to convert to Islam to maintain their positions, the common belief 
in Palace circles that a Jewish physician would have to “clean himself of the ‘filth’ of 
infidelity and ‘distinguish’ himself from the Jews.”201 While Jewish Palace physicians of the 
previous century had not faced such attitudes, Baer argues, the leading physicians of the late 
seventeenth century, such as Hayatizade and Nuh Efendi, had felt feel the pressure to 
convert to Islam.202  
Baer’s historical investigation provides us with an entry point to thinking about the limits of 
narratives of Ottoman peace and tolerance. But it is surely not the only one. One can find 
similar examples, which undermine the consistency of the narratives of the Golden age. For 
instance, Joseph Hacker, a well-known scholar of Jewish history, offers similar historical 
material and insights, illustrating how Jews in the Empire underwent forced resettlements 
called Sürgün. Moreover, he similarly illustrates how these aspects of Jewish life are silenced 
and trivialized in the literature. 
 
2.4.2 The Sürgün System and Its influence on Jewish Communities 
 
Joseph Hacker shows that the Ottoman Sürgün system was deployed for different 
purposes.203 Two main objectives it served were punishment of individuals or groups and 
repopulation of newly conquered areas in the Empire. Without neglecting the former 
motivation, in his historical investigation, Hacker dwells on the latter and shows how certain 
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Jewish groups suffered from Ottoman state authorities and the Sultan’s Sürgün policies, 
which were aimed at developing and repopulating selected regions in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. According to Hacker, although these policies and operations did not 
exclusively target the Jews in the Empire, a disproportionate number of Jews were involved 
in the Ottoman Sürgün system in these centuries. Hacker contends that these processes and 
policies enormously influenced the structure and the composition of the Jewish communities 
in the Empire especially Romaniot Jews, i.e., native Greek-speaking Jews of the former 
Byzantine Empire who had been living in the islands of the Mediterranean Sea under Latin 
rule. 
 
According to Hacker, 1453 – the year of the conquest of Constantinople – constituted 
another milestone for the Jews. It is well known that, after the conquest, Mehmed II wanted 
to make the city the new hub and the Capital of the Empire. However, many inhabitants fled 
for fear of their lives and the conquest disrupted the economic and social life in the City, 
The Emperor took certain measures and implemented policies to revitalize and repopulate 
the city. Relying on Muslim and Christian sources, Hacker points out that Mehmed II 
resorted to methods of releasing certain amount of captives to use them in the rebuilding 
process.204 He also promises previous inhabitants who fled during the conquest to give them 
tax exemptions and their property back if they return by a given date. In addition, he asks 
foreign states to send back escapees.  
 
In addition, Mehmed II used the method of population transfer, relevant to our investigation 
of Jewish life since it had manifold repercussions for the Jews living in the Empire. Hacker 
contends that the Sürgün system gained momentum between 1454-1459 and it was used 
during the reigns of the successors of Mehmed II, namely Selim II, Süleyman the 
Magnificent, and so on. Population transfers continued to bring many Muslims, Jews and 
Christians to Istanbul from Anatolian, European, as well as Middle Eastern territories of the 
Empire. Amongst these peoples, Jews were particularly targeted by these policies since they 
were well known for their expertise in commercial activities. In this period we see Jews being 
resettled from Egypt to Istanbul; from Salonika to Rhodes; or from Buda, Hungary to the 
Empire.  
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Hacker argues that these Sürgün policies, which spanned long periods of time, brought about 
serious consequences for the Jews subjected to them. Drawing from various sources (such as 
writings of contemporary Byzantine Jews and persons living in the Latin colonies), Hacker 
illustrates that these events have had deep impacts on the Jews and resulted in much 
suffering “just as the exiling process led to the development and the flourishing of Jewish 
Istanbul, so it also led to the decay and eventual obliteration of many Jewish communities 
throughout the Empire, particularly in Anatolia and the Balkans.”205 The Sürgün policies and 
the social status accompanying it involved certain obligations that, in many cases, applied for 
life. According to Hacker, none of them “was able to free himself of this status, which 
obliged him – first and foremost – to be vassal of his place of residence, without the ability 
to leave it before first having obtained the permission of the authorities.”206 Further Hacker 
underscores that the Sürgün process itself causes many complications. In some cases, 
resettlement itself created certain conditions endangered the lives of migrants, such as  
starvation and epidemics. Moreover, loss of financial networks, abandonment of property, 
and loss of emotional ties – such as to homeland – pose highly serious problems for the 
Jews in exile. Compared to other Jewish communities in the Empire, Byzantine Jews become 
remarkably subject to the Sürgün processes and bore the brunt of deportations and 
compulsory resettlement, struggling with plague as well as economic and cultural crises.207  
 
These aspects of Jewish life, Hacker contends, are mostly glossed over in the literature and 
overshadowed by the migration of the Spanish Jews. Many authors, he argues, rely on the 
historical accounts of a Jewish scholar from 16th century, Eliyah Capsali, whose favorable 
descriptions of the Ottoman rule are commonly accepted by modern Jewish scholarship and 
the historians of the Ottoman Empire. According to Capsali, Mehmed II appointed and 
recognized the Chief Rabbi and entitled him to attend the meetings of Divan-ı Humayun 
(Imperial Council) and to collect taxes from Jewish communities. Moreover, Capsali’s 
writings conveyed positive images of Constantinople where the invited Jews enjoyed tax 
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exemptions and were granted houses where their culture flourished.208 Overall Hacker finds 
Capsali’s descriptions of the period too rosy. For Hacker, Capsali’s portrayal of Jewish life is 
skewed; he stresses certain of Mehmed II’s policies, which provided particular Jewish 
communities with protection, economic and social development, but omitted deportations, 
plague, and Jewish discontent. Hacker notes that Capsali wrote in 1523, in a period wherein 
many exiled Sephardic Jews from Spain settled in important cities of the Empire and felt 
sympathetic towards Ottoman authorities. Hacker argues that Capsali’s “picture of the 
Ottomans contained only praise, the worst deeds of the sultans held to be admirable and 
just”.209 Hacker states that in the late fifteenth centuries and throughout the sixteenth 
centuries, Sephardic Jews outnumbered Byzantine Jews and occupied important positions 
both in the Palace and the society. While Sephardic Jews became highly influential, the 
newly-emerging community structure eventually incorporated the Byzantine Jews and their 
tragedy. As a result, the expulsion of the Iberian Jews, extension of the Ottoman hospitality, 
and the improvement of the conditions of Jews within the Empire eclipse the situation and 
the suffering of the Byzantine Romaniot Jews. In Hacker’s view this narrative gained wide 
purchase, being commonly accepted in the scholarly literature of the sixteenth century and 
onward, and still pervasive in contemporary literature.  
 
2.4.3 Silenced and Trivialized Traumatic Moments and Events  
 
Indeed, a close look at the sources I have discussed so far supports Hacker’s conclusion. The 
trajectory of the Byzantine Jews is not mentioned in many writings, which almost exclusively 
focus on the favorable aspects of Jewish life in the Empire, highlighting Ottoman hospitality 
and Jewish prosperity. In other narratives, the situation of Byzantine Jews is given trivial 
attention, or, quickly deemed an exception proving a rule. The authors praising Ottoman 
tolerance indeed mention Sürgün policies of the Sultan and state authorities in their works. 
They agree that the Ottoman state authorities resorted to “forceful settlement” and “forced 
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migration.”210 Nor is it denied that “driven from their homes under the resettlement (Sürgün) 
system;” many groups -especially the Jews- were “transferred” - and “forced to resettle in the 
new capital” by Ottoman state authorities.211 Or elsewhere we are told that compared to his 
immediate predecessors and successors, Sultan Bayezid II (who reigned between 1481-1512) 
took a “conservative” and “rigorously devout” stance and tightened the interpretation of 
Islamic law for the non-Muslim population.212 Thus, “the privileged were assailed, recently 
constructed synagogues were closed, and pressure was exerted on Jewish physicians and tax 
farmers, important figures in the life and commerce of the Empire, to adopt Islam and, 
indeed, some did.”213  
 
While admitting that all was not well for Ottoman Jews, these authors put forward 
explanations that play down the significance of these “incongruous” moments. They tend to 
deem these events as aberrations or exceptions that prove the rule. In other words, as soon 
as these authors near a traumatic moment, they immediately employ certain discursive 
strategies to hold us within the bounds of the narrative of tolerance and peaceful 
coexistence. In the case of Sürgün system of the fifteenth century, Inalcik concedes “[Fatih 
Sultan Mehmed] Conqueror resorted to forced Jewish resettlement from Balkan and 
Anatolian towns to Istanbul [and] the measure caused disruption in the economic well-being 
of these towns.”214 However, Levy immediately stresses that the evacuations brought about 
the opportunity for the new Jewish communities from Spain to settle in those towns.215 In 
another instance, Levy reminded us that the Ottoman authorities provided various incentives 
to motivate immigrants.216 Or in another instance, Epstein highlights that the Jews had 
become preferred by the Ottoman authorities for their skills and that this motivated the 
authorities to force them to immigrate.217 Epstein tells that Sultan Bazeyid II’s era was a 
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temporary setback and that his strict practices subsequently gave way to “policies of 
tolerance.”218 Thus, even when it is accepted that in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Jewish communities went into serious decline, the role of Muslim Ottoman 
authorities is obscured. As Marc Baer’s discursive analysis maintains, this turn in the 
trajectories of the Ottoman Jews is explained (away) by external factors.  
 
In addition to such discursive maneuvers, one can notice further overarching generalizations 
in narratives regarding Ottoman attitudes toward non-Muslim groups. After their detailed 
accounts of hostile attitudes, tragic experiences and sufferings of certain Jewish groups in the 
Empire, these narratives, nonetheless, invite us to believe that the Ottoman Empire and its 
dealing with its non-Muslim subjects deserve to be seen as “relaxed” and “pluralist,” 
especially when compared with most European societies.219 After taking stock of three 
centuries of experience, the narrators have no qualms about concluding that the life in the 
Empire for the Jewish groups was overall desirable.220 One can detect similar generalizations 
and orientations in different sources that belong to the same plane of thought, tantalizing 
with depictions of a society that one cannot help but desire:  
For the most part, then, all these marks of discrimination were relatively 
minor, they applied to all groups, and they were dictated more to prevent 
conflict among individuals and groups than they were to manifest feelings of 
superiority or inferiority […] What real misrule there was in the Ottoman 
system in the Golden Age took place within millets by religious leaders 
whose powers over their followers were more absolute than that of members 
of the Ottoman Ruling Class over the subjects, and where there was little 
remedy from abuse, either from Ottoman or millet laws (emphasis original).221 
The Ottoman Jews also knew periods of material and spiritual 
impoverishment, reflecting the general decline of the Ottoman state and 
society. What makes their experience unique, however — is that over a 
period lasting six centuries, in good times or bad, Jews were never singled out 
for persecution or oppression because of their religion. In fact, for much of 
this period they enjoyed the status of a favored minority. Most Jews 
appreciated the security that they enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire and the 
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plural character of its society, and these evoked among them sentiments of 
loyalty and patriotism.222      
 
“In brief,” Halil İnalcık contends, “Islamic law and the state generally accepted non-Muslim 
communities, including Jews, as part of the larger Islamic society.”223 This last aspect of 
narratives about Ottoman Jews along with the other common discursive strategies 
mentioned above are of interest to us since they exemplify how contemporary 
representations of the Ottoman Empire and the past are shaped by narratives of the 
Ottoman peace and tolerance This chapter discussed certain traumatic incidents in which 
Ottoman Jews were subjected to expulsions, confiscations, forced migrations and 
conversions. My interest in these events is motivated by the question of how they are – and 
have been – reconciled with narratives of a Golden Age of glorified Ottoman hospitality and 
generosity toward the Other. 
 
In the beginning of the chapter, by focusing on a certain moment in the Ottoman history, 
namely 1492, I have attempted to delineate a certain discourse, which, in tribute to the 
Ottoman tolerance, idealizes and romanticizes the life of Ottoman Jewry. The prosperity of 
Ottoman Jewish communities in general and the turn of fortune for exiled Jews in their new 
destination in particular are familiar motifs that figure in the historical narratives as the 
unmistakable tokens of Ottoman benevolence and hospitality. Titles from the scholarly 
literature like the Ottoman-Jewish symbiosis or Jewish allegiance to the Ottoman State say it all.224 The 
academic texts are at pains to drive home the point that the extent and the depth of the 
Jewish influence in the Empire could have reached nowhere near their level had it not been 
for Ottoman tolerance. We are consistently reminded of the autonomy and equal treatment 
enjoyed by Ottoman Jews. Such celebratory accounts of Jewish life under Ottoman rule are 
by no means confined to scholarly literature but, as exemplified in this chapter, are widely 
circulated in popular culture. As illustrated above, not only academic discourse, but also 
popular discourse (textbooks, newspapers, exhibitions and so on) memorialize and celebrate 
the golden age of peace and tolerance. Themes of prosperity and tolerance have repeatedly 
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played themselves out in these historical accounts, which offer a relatively coherent and 
untroubled narrative about Jewish life.  
 
Later in this chapter, on the other hand, I investigated historical cases and events, which 
disrupt the unity of narratives of Ottoman tolerance. These included: (i) confiscations, 
expulsions and erosion of prestigious office-holding of the Jews, coupled with hostile 
attitudes of the Sultan and state elites in the seventeenth century; (ii) “forced” migrations and 
their consequences – such as loss of financial network and emotional ties, or danger of 
plague – in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; (iii) strict interpretations and applications 
of the Islamic law during the reign of Bayezid II; are the ones we encountered up until now.  
One might expand this list by adding the often-neglected trajectory of Ottoman slaves who 
had been captured during the conquest of Constantinople. Prominent Ottoman scholar 
Ömer Lütfi Barkan’s work on these slaves reminds us that the same Fatih Mehmed who 
granted minority rights and autonomy to non-Muslim communities also used captured 
Christians to reconstruct and revitalize villages surrounding Istanbul.225 Can we still call the 
Empire tolerant and peaceful after having learned that around the beginning of the 16th 
century more than one hundred villages had become populated by the Christian slaves? 
Similarly, if one lends an ear to scholar Selçuk Akşin, one can come across further narratives 
of socially and politically peripheral communities.226 According to Akşin, due to their 
religious and cultural peculiarities, the Alevi and Zaidi Muslims who did not accept the Sunni 
version of Islam, or the Yezidis and the Crypto-Christians who mostly were not seen as 
Muslims, and, lastly, nomadic and tribal communities such as Kurdish tribes and Bedouins 
became the target of the Ottoman administrative and political interventions (such as 
Sunnification and sedentarization) especially in the 19th century.  
 
Not surprisingly, these traumatic events and hostile moments hardly find a place in the 
accounts of Ottoman scholars hailing the Empire’s peace. On the rare occasions that they 
are not completely silenced, they are treated as marginal, sporadic or exceptional, the 
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underlying message being that, save for some unfortunate and short-term aberrations, Jews 
lived in happiness and peace for centuries under the Ottoman rule.  
 
In juxtaposing “peaceful” and “violent” moments of the Empire, my goal in this chapter is 
not so much to supplant the narratives of Ottoman tolerance with those of Oriental 
Despotism as to shed some light on the discursive strategies deployed by ardent believers in 
Ottoman hospitality in the face of all the ‘evidence’ to the contrary. To put it differently, I 
want to draw attention to the ways in which the fantasy of the Ottoman peace and tolerance 
mediates and shapes our representation and remembrance. This work is necessary to have a 
clue as to how passionate descriptions of Ottoman peace and tolerance address and conceal 
traumatic elements to make the narratives of Ottoman peace coherent. In other words, my 
goal here is to illustrate the ways in which these narratives mediate our perception, and 
silence and trivialize traumatic events, in order to leave the “idyllic” image of Ottoman 
society intact. This gives us significant insights into what kind of strategies these authors use 
to hold us within the bonds of Ottoman peace and tolerance and narratives of the desired 
age. 
 
2.5 Is It Enough to Dispel the Myth? 
 
Of course, narratives about the Ottoman Millet System and Ottoman peace and benevolence 
have not gone unrivaled. Many scholars have called them into question repeatedly. These 
criticisms, while mostly taking issues with misuses of the term “millet,” sometimes can go so 
far as to deny the very existence of the Millet System as such.227 For example, in his oft-cited 
piece, Bernard Braude finds many scholars guilty of jumping to hasty conclusions on the 
basis of a highly limited number of special cases where the term ‘millet’ appears in the 
official correspondences.228 In his analysis, up until 19th century, the Ottoman officials did 
employ the term millet but rather reserved it for “themselves, Christian sovereigns, rare 
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Jewish favorites but not for the mass of their non-Muslim subjects.”229 In his critique Braude 
is joined by Goffman,230 who points out that some historians tend to conceive the millets as 
“religious estates, or perhaps better, guilds, undergoing only slightly internal evolution […] 
but remaining basically unaltered and even ‘unpolluted’ from the fifteenth (and perhaps even 
from seventh) until the nineteenth centuries.”231 For Goffman, the Ottomans put the ‘millet’ 
signifier to so many different uses across time and space that it is virtually impossible to 
arrive an operating definition of the term. Moreover, as Braude and Goffman demonstrate, the 
Ottoman authorities typically used a variety of nomenclature to designate non-Muslim 
groups.232 Goffman also points out “in the first half of the seventeenth century, the most 
common Ottoman word for a ‘group’ or a ‘community’, whether religious, social, military, or 
political, was not millet at all, but taife.”233 It was not until the nineteenth century that “millet” 
came to denote the European understanding of term, i.e., a non-Muslim protected 
community.234 Hence both Braude and Goffman warn us against the fallacy of looking at the 
Ottoman history retrospectively through the lenses of contemporary usages of the term.   
 
However, Braude takes the criticism further and calls into question the very existence of the 
Millet System as a “system,” i.e., as an institutionalized, stable and structured framework. 
Instead he suggests “it was not an institution or even a group of institutions, but rather it 
was a set of arrangements, largely local, with considerable variation over time and place.”235 
Kenanoğlu on the other hand, characterizes as “myth”236 the autonomy that the religious 
communities are believed to have been granted under the Millet System. In place of this 
“myth,” he tries to show that non-Muslim religious institutions were firmly embedded within 
the state organization and exercised hardly any autonomy in their administrative, fiscal, 
judicial and punitive affairs.237 According to Kenanoğlu, the Ottoman authorities appointed 
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and used religious leaders of non-Muslim communities as tax-collectors (mültezims) and took 
advantage of their positions and spiritual authority to command control over administrative 
and fiscal matters. This way, he goes on to argue, the Empire successfully assimilated non-
Muslim religious organizations within its administrative structure.238  
 
In a somewhat similar vein, other scholars have argued that the writings on the Ottoman 
peace and tolerance in the Classical Age should be taken with a grain of salt either because 
they are “optimistic readings,” “extremely sympathetic reactions,” or  “ideologically biased,” 
and “based on emotions.”239 Instead, we are invited to take a more nuanced and balanced 
approach toward the Ottoman history and the relations between the Ottoman authorities 
and non-Muslim communities. For Rodrigue, “reconceptualizing this relationship requires 
moving away from the nationalist historiography of an almost idyllic, harmonious 
coexistence in the Ottoman Empire.”240 According to Rodrigue, in order to gain this proper 
distance we need to unmoor ourselves from the post-Enlightenment-Europe-centered 
perspective, which views history through the lenses of the minority/majority duality and 
modern notions such as “equality” or “discrimination.” He finds this kind of 
conceptualization “fundamentally wrong” and maintains that minority/majority issues and 
concerns about discrimination and equality are based on the principle of demographic 
majority, which in turn is coterminous with the rise of modern European nation-states and 
therefore can not be used to understand the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
the Classical Age.  
 
Doubtlessly, the literature correcting and criticizing Pax-Ottomana provides a broader 
perspective on the subject matter. That being said, I want to underscore a problematic aspect 
and a shortcoming of this literature, which is key to our investigation of Ottoman tolerance 
and peace. Authors such as Braude, Goffman or Kenanoğlu (and in this sense, Baer and 
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Hacker as well), who correct the “myth” with a more truthful account of the Millet System, 
still maintain that there exists a more realistic representation of the Ottoman Empire and of 
how it dealt with its non-Muslim subjects. For them, this misperception and myth can be 
avoided to the extent that we get closer to the historical “truth.” Similarly, scholars like 
Keyder, Aral, Soykan and Rodrigue, who find the descriptions of Pax-Ottomana to be 
“optimistic,” “extremely sympathetic,” or “ideologically biased” still assume that these 
pitfalls can be shunned with the help of a more realistic approach. Thus, whether they 
purport to dispel the myth altogether or amend it, the critics of the Pax-Ottomana are 
informed by the same realistic episteme according to which it is historical 
misconceptualizations that hinder historians from grasping the truth of Ottoman history and 
the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims therein.   
 
However, we are still left with an important question as to how one can achieve  “proper” 
distance from emotional distortions and ideological biases as one analyzes the Ottoman 
history —or for that matter, any historical period. In other words, the critiques above still 
beg the fundamental question of to what extent and in which ways we can attain this 
nuanced and balanced approach. One would search the said literature in vain for a 
satisfactory answer. Of the authors mentioned above, Rodrigue comes closest to providing 
an answer but even his admonition against the (mis)conceptualization of the millets as 
minorities and his call for a break with the post-Enlightenment-Europe-centered perspective 
do not amount to a positive prescription; as with the other scholars, his criticisms expound 
only what is wrong with the historiography of Ottoman history but fall short of delineating 
what a “good” historiography should look like.   
 
Ironically, one can hear similar charges of anachronism voiced by the adherents of Pax-
Ottomana themselves. These authors also warn against the fallacy of confusing millets of the 
past with the minority groups of today. Eryılmaz, for one, argues that it would be a mistake 
to conceive of Ottoman history in contemporary terms such as multiculturalism.241 Yet, it is 
none other than Eryılmaz himself who, only a page later, contends that “it was a 'deliberate' 
choice on the part of the Ottoman State not to have recourse to the kind of homogenization 
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of diverse cohorts undertaken by modern nation-states and colonial administrations.”242 
Likewise, Ortaylı points out the error in equating the non-Muslims of the Millet System with 
minorities in the modern nation-states.243 Nevertheless, as I have seen above, Ortaylı 
commits the very anachronism he is critical of: “there is no fuss and fight with the 
neighbors, identitarian claims, resistance to being assimilated or assimilation, i.e. the kind of 
quarrelsome conducts typical of minority members in modern societies.”244 Yet, all these 
substantivist critiques, be they sympathetic to the idea of Pax-Ottomana or dismissive of it, 
fail to provide us with any insights as to what is at stake in these heated debates on the 
treatment of non-Muslims under the Ottoman rule. It is the contention of this dissertation 
that the issue at stake is not simply a matter of being faithful to historical truths in our 
representation of the past—as the realist episteme informing the debate would have us 
believe—but one of affective investments, which, in turn, are inextricably intertwined with 
our contemporary predicaments. As discussed above, although the literature correcting and 
criticizing the descriptions of the Pax-Ottomana and the Millet System offers us their 
realistic models and more truthful accounts of the Ottoman history but this does not offer 
us much insight into the logic of nostalgic remembrance and affective investments in 
“myths,” “misperceptions,” “favorable readings,” or “erroneous accounts.” We are still left 
wondering why proponents of Pax-Ottomana, such as Turkish intellectuals and scholars, so 
passionately orient themselves in the present toward the idealized and romanticized 
Ottoman past, a long gone era, and draw parallels between the situation of millets and that of 
the minorities in the modern societies. Why this passionate attachment to Ottoman nostalgia 
in the face of all the corrections and criticisms? The last twenty years have seen the 
publishing of a considerable number of books and articles sharing almost the same titles, 
themes and chronologies on the Ottoman minorities. To be able to even begin to address 
these questions, we need to shift our perspective and change our vocabulary from ‘myths, 
and ‘misperceptions’ to that of “fantasy” as understood in Lacanian theory.  
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2.6 The Role of the Fantasy of Ottoman Tolerance  
  
As soon as we realize that critics fail to explain why passionate attachments to the idealized 
image of the past are pervasive, how emotive and affective investments mediate writing 
history and remembering the past (despite all attempts at demystification and debunking), we 
are in the terrain of Lacanian fantasy. In this framework, fantasy coordinates our desires and 
affective/emotive investments. It does so by offering to cover up the fractures and fissure in 
socio-symbolic order and by enabling subjects circumvent traumatic elements and impasses. 
Rather than assessing it in terms of its proximity to “better knowledge” and “truth,” fantasy 
assessed by its functioning for its adherents and what it promises for its producers. In 
Lacanian perspective, fantasy appears as a vital element in subjects’ constitutions of reality 
and is related to how subjects deal with their ultimate impasse. In Lacan’s framework, reality 
is constructed (rather than covered or curtailed) by our symbolic and imaginary capacities, 
which mobilize signifiers and discourse: “the reality with which psychoanalysis is concerned  
‘is upheld, woven through, constituted, by a tress of signifiers’; reality, in other words, 
‘implies the subject’s integration into a particular play of signifiers.’ ”245 According to the 
Lacanian framework, after their entry into language and the symbolic order, subjects as the 
slaves of language begin to desire with and through signifiers and their interplay in the symbolic 
order.246 Rather than satisfying their “pure needs,” subjects express their needs through the 
medium of language and signifiers, which results in the domestication of our pre-symbolic 
enjoyment –jouissance.247 In other words, not only do subjects experience lack, but also the 
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symbolic order/the big Other is lacking. Jouissance becomes the condition that makes 
possible these relentless attempts to symbolize and tame constraining limits (economic 
crises, AIDS virus, environmental disasters, wars, genocides) and to attain a whole and ideal 
state. Subjects continue to take part in the socio-political reality as desiring subjects. But how 
is that possible? How does the subject cope with that tension, the tension between reality 
and the enjoyment?248 Fantasy is a central concept in tackling this question. From the Lacanian 
perspective, it is fantasy that makes subjectivity bearable for us, in as much as it promises to 
fill out the lack in the symbolic. This defensive character of fantasy is of pivotal place in 
Lacan’s theoretical apparatus (as well as Freud’s).249 Rather than opposing reality, in its 
Lacanian appropriation, it is fantasy that supports reality by offering our lost real jouissance.250 
In Zizek’s words, “a fantasy constitutes our desire, provides its coordinates; that is, it literally 
‘teaches us how to desire.”251 And yet, the promise of this fantasy nevertheless falls short of 
attaining and recapturing our real jouissance. To put it in Lacan’s words, “the real supports the 
fantasy, the fantasy protects the real.”252 One fantasy frame after another attempts to fill in 
and tame this fundamental impossibility. 
 
A important body of literature in social and political thought puts these psychoanalytical 
insights to the service of social and political analysis of nationalism and (post)colonialism. 
The psychoanalytic perspective enables us to analyze how national and imperial formations 
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organize the libidinal bonds and energies of their subjects through rituals, conducts, 
entitlements, etc., while simultaneously displacing the failure and antagonism at their core. 
As far as this psychoanalytical conception of social fantasy goes, depiction of harmonious 
representation of the reality is always accompanied by a demonic element, which explains 
and justifies why things went wrong and who is responsible for our failure, loss, psychic 
wounds and affective injuries.   
 
This perspective draws from Sigmund Freud and particularly his work on group psychology. 
Although Freud did not make nationalism and the nation the object of direct inquiry, his 
work contributes significantly to an understanding of nation as a group formation process. 
What primarily interested Freud as he investigated Church and Army were primarily the 
affective and libidinal aspects of the group formation which go beyond – or at least cannot 
be reduced to – the symbolic and discursive register of our identification. Thus, Freud 
underscores the importance of the body’s libidinal energies of and the significance of 
affective investment in orientation toward a group (e.g., race, nation, caste, profession and 
institution), firmly asserting “a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind” 
which he call Eros or emotional ties.253 He argues that identification with a group and object 
cathexis (i.e., orientation toward a love object such as a chief commander in an army) enable 
subjects to organize their libidinal investment. In this collective formation, “the individual 
gives up his distinctiveness in a group […] because he feels the need of being in harmony 
with them rather than in opposition to them.”254 
 
While Freud underlines the significance of love and in-group psychology, he does not 
overlook the roles of hatred and aggression. He states “it is always possible to bind together 
a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to 
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receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness”.255 In other words, a group is constituted 
by love as long as inherent aggression is displaced onto the other(s) of the group. It is 
important to note that Freud’s caution came during the rise of Nazism which would see 
certain groups such as Jews and Gypsies being targeted by the German nation-state. 
 
Raneta Salecl and Slavoj Zizek drew upon these Freudian insights in the early nineties by 
mobilizing the Lacanian concepts of jouissance/enjoyment, the symbolic and fantasy.256 
According to this framework, fantasy, in the psychoanalytical sense, relates to how the 
subjects sustain their realities and identifications in the face of the impasses of the socio-
political order. In the Lacanian framework, fantasy promises this state of fullness and 
harmony by covering over the central impossibility that is indelibly inscribed both in our 
bodies and our socio-symbolic order. This is a crucial aspect of how Salecl and Zizek 
understand and deploy fantasy. To hammer the point home, they use the concept of fantasy 
not in its common, vernacular sense, as something that opposes or distorts reality. Rather, it 
is conceived of as a fundamental and indispensable formation, which sustains subjects’ 
coherence and desire by promising full closure, harmonious order and offering a road map 
to ‘lost’ enjoyment. In that sense, there is no reality that is not mediated through fantasy. As 
far as this perception of fantasy goes, harmonious representation of the reality is  always 
accompanied by a demonic/dark underside, which justifies why things went wrong and 
identifies who is responsible for our failure and dissatisfaction, or to put it in 
psychoanalytical terms, for the “theft of our enjoyment.” 
 
According to Zizek and Salecl, there are important insights to be gained from this 
perspective in relation to nation-state formations, for these formations are not merely 
symbolic constructs of harmonious belonging but also the way the subjects deal with the 
impossibility of harmonious nationhood by channeling their affective attachments and 
libidinal energies. While national fantasies sustain our reality and desire by teaching us how 
to deal with our enjoyment, they also frame our representations of the other. This aspect of 
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fantasy is so important that eminent scholar Jacqueline Rose daringly agues that “there is no 
way of understanding political identities and destinies without letting fantasy into the frame” 
since  “fantasy – far from being the antagonist of public, social being – plays a central, 
constitutive role in the modern world of states and nations.”257 In other words, our 
representation of the other (e.g. ethnic, racial, oriental) is always mediated by fantasy 
scenarios and through the way that we deal with our enjoyment. While fantasy attempts to 
cover the impossibility of full real enjoyment, it also brings forth the Other’s enjoyment.  
 
Seen in these terms, our fascination with the other’s ‘excessive’ enjoyment, which is denied 
to us, is linked to our impasses and the fundamental lack in the symbolic order, the Nation. 
In their analyses, Zizek and Salecl show that the other’s enjoyment and its inaccessibility to 
us/our society/our way of life take on a crucial importance in our fantasy scenarios of 
nationhood. As Zizek puts it, “we always impute to the ‘other’ an excessive enjoyment: he 
wants to steal our enjoyment (by running our way of life) and/ or he has access to the some 
secret, perverse enjoyment.”258 When the other is constituted as the radical Other (ethnic, 
religious, etc.) and seen as completely alien to ‘our’ society/species, the enjoyment of the 
other can all too easily turn into an object of hatred and fascination and fuel antagonisms.  
In short, what really bothers us about the ‘other’ is the peculiar way he 
organizes his enjoyment, precisely the surplus, the ‘excess’ that pertains to 
this way: the smell of  ‘their’ food, ‘their’ noisy songs and dances, ‘their’ 
strange manners, ‘their’ attitude to work.259  
 
Jokes, slanders, stereotypes, political speeches, and ethnic and national mythologies are often 
replete with and symptomatic of this ambivalent fascination with the enjoyment of the other. 
The eruption of ethnic conflicts between Albanians, Croatians, Serbians, and Bosnians in ex-
                                                
257 Jacqueline Rose, States of Fantasy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 4.   
258 Slavoj Zizek,  “Enjoy Your Nation As Yourself,” 203. 
259 Ibid.  
     Jean-Paul Sartre’s reading of the passion economy between the Jew and Anti-Semite highly resonates with 
Zizek’s conception of the theft of enjoyment. Almost half a century earlier than Zizek, Sartre similarly 
demonstrated how positing the Jews as robbers makes possible for the Anti-Semites to constitute themselves as 
proprietors “since the Jews wishes to take France from them, it follows that France must belong to them” (Jean 
Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jews (New York: Schocken Books, 1948), 25). Thus, Sartre argues, “the anti-Semite 
is in the unhappy position of having a vital need for the very enemy he wishes to destroy” (Ibid, 28). Although 
Sartre points to the psychic aspects of Anti-Semitism in French nation-state such as disgust and hysteria, he 
nonetheless does not cut to the core of the issue as much as psychoanalytically influenced literature does. This 
is why it is more fruitful to read the work of Sartre alongside that of Freud, Zizek, Salecl, and so on.   
96 
Yugoslavian territories of 1990s is a good case in point. As Salecl and Zizek illustrate, in 
these geographies enjoyment became entangled with ethnic conflicts as Serbian nationalist 
groups blame the Others of stealing their wholeness and of having unreasonable, inhuman 
attitudes260. The following passage from Salecl gives us a clear idea about the articulation of 
the theft of enjoyment into the eruption of ethnic conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia: 
A clear example of this ‘theft of enjoyment’ is Serbian authoritarian populism 
which has produced an entire mythology about the struggle against internal 
and external enemies… In Serbian mythology, the Albanians are understood 
as pure Evil, the unimaginable, which cannot be subjectivized; beings who 
cannot be made into people, because they are radically Other. The Serbs 
describe their conflict with the Albanians as a struggle of ‘people with non-
people’. The second enemy — the bureaucrat — is presented as a non-Serb, 
a traitor to his won nation who is also effeminate. The Croats are portrayed 
as the heirs of Goebbels, i.e. as brutal Ustashi butchers who torment the 
suffering Serbian nation, whose fate is compared to that of Kurds in Iraq. 
And the Muslims are named religious extremists who would like to expand 
their religion all over the world.261     
 
What Salecl and Zizek demonstrate is that our enjoyment is always implicated in a psychic 
economy and it is always constituted vis-à-vis the enjoyment of the other. In other words, in 
the fantasies of the nation the other’s enjoyment is “extimately” connected to that of our 
very own. In light of the insights of Freud, Salecl and Zizek, we can argue that fantasy 
formations of nationhood single out immanent and external others as causes of the failure to 
attain and recapture wholeness, the pristine state of being. The significance of these studies 
for our investigation is that they illustrate how our representations (e.g., of the ethnic other, 
the woman) are always mediated by fantasy scenarios. These social fantasies depict the other 
as enjoying more than us and the inaccessible enjoyment of the other comes to occupy what 
we lack. In other words, enjoyment is a political factor and, as Zizek puts it, it is always 
entangled with the constitutions and representation of alterity. Therefore, fantasy scenarios 
mediate our representation (of the other) when we deal with our traumas and impossibility 
                                                
260 Arendt’s analysis of tribal nationalism and its construction of its others/enemies echoes Zizek and Salecl’s 
psychoanalytical approach to national enemies and “the theft of enjoyment”. According to Arendt, tribal 
nationalism always insists that its own people is surrounded by “a world of enemies,” “one against all,” that a 
fundamental difference exists between this people and all others. It claims its people to be unique, individual, 
incompatible with all others, and denies theoretically the very possibility of a common mankind” (Hannah 
Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken Books, 2004[1951]), 293). Although Arendt argues 
that this is the essential character of tribal/romantic nationalism, her observation may yield insights into how  
and nationalist hatred operates in other forms of nationalism and nation formation, such as civic nationalism.    
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of full enjoyment. This aspect of nationalism and citizenship, however, is mostly overlooked 
in the Western conception of the rational, unencumbered citizen. In that respect, it should 
be noted that stigmatizing and scapegoating certain communities as thieves of enjoyment is 
characteristic not only of virulent forms of nationalism, but is deeply ingrained in even the 
seemingly most benign forms of nationalism such as civic nationalism, multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
As far as the fantasy of the Ottoman peace is concerned, we must explore its relevance and 
functioning in today’s Turkey. Social fantasies qua the Ottoman Millet System and Tolerance 
are very much related to how their producers, Ottoman historians, and their public audience 
sustain their Turkish-Ottoman identifications and how they deal with the impossibility of the 
harmonious nation as well as the loss of the Empire,. As was mentioned above, to answer 
properly requires a shift in focus from the object-cause of desire –the Ottoman Millet System and 
its desired elements– to the socio-political context in which these authors and adherents are 
situated. In other words, rather than focusing exclusively on fantasies of the Ottoman 
tolerance and their veracity (or lack thereof), we should also try to shed light on their 
producers and adherents and ask what fractures, fissures, losses these fantasies cover up in 
the socio-symbolic fabric of contemporary Turkey. This also means shifting the debate from 
an epistemological terrain to an ontological one. That is, rather than problematizing whether 
narratives are faithful to the historical truth, we need to investigate the contemporary 
significance of these narratives of the Ottoman tolerance and peace for their contemporary 
champions. In order to understand how Fatih the Conqueror’s Istanbul in the 15th century 
and its purportedly peaceful and harmonious denizens are very much alive in the new 21st 
century, we need to investigate the historicity of the fractures and impasses of the current 
socio-political context.  
 
The fantasy of Ottoman tolerance,262 as I will show, is an important narrative for its 
adherents, the Turkish state authorities, nativist historians, pro-Islamic political parties and 
movements, to consolidate the Turkish identity through Ottoman history and collective 
memory. This fantasy produced by the Ottoman historians provides its supporters with a 
                                                
262 From my perspective, this fantasy weaves together many themes and concepts, such as peace, 
multiculturalism and the Millet System. For the sake of simplicity and clarity from now on I refer to it as the 
fantasy of Ottoman tolerance.    
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social script of collective memory, which they can appropriate for national and identity 
formation. This historical (collective) memory of the glorious tolerant and multicultural 
Empire enables its subjects to sustain their individual- autobiographical memories. It allows 
the subject of nationalism to picture and imagine itself by relying on the social memory of 
the nation. As one of the pioneer thinkers who noticed this important connection between 
personal and national memory, Maurice Halbwachs contended that:  
{T}he individual memory is not completely sealed off and isolated. A [man 
must often appeal to other‘s remembrances to evoke his own past. He goes 
back to reference points determined by society, hence outside himself. 
Moreover, the individual memory could not function without words and 
ideas, instruments the individual has not himself invented but appropriated 
from his milieu.263  
 
In terms of the words, ideas, and instruments that the individual appropriates from his/her 
milieu, I conceive of the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance created in Ottoman historiography as 
a vital reservoir for its adherents’ and individual memories. Through its historians, it is 
Ottoman historiography that allows the subjects of the nation to speak, write and read these 
narratives and therefore remember themselves as part of a victorious people who once 
conquered Constantinople in 1453 and transformed it into a harmonious multicultural 
Empire.       
 
I will delve into the working of the Turkish-Ottoman nationalist fantasy and the ways in 
which it appropriates collective memory and legacy of Ottoman Empire in especially in 
Chapter Four.  In the mean time suffice it to say that the discourse of Ottoman Tolerance 
undergirds “the Neo-Ottoman” Islamo-Turkic social fantasy through which Turkish nation-
state comes to terms with the loss, belatedness and melancholy ensuing the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and the concomitant question of Europeanization/Westernization. In the 
next chapters I will elaborate on this new phase in Turkish nationalism and the pitfalls of the 
fantasy of Ottoman Tolerance in rehabilitation of the Turkish identity vis-à-vis the Western 
gaze and domestic antagonism. 
                                                
263 Maurice Halbswachs The Collective Memory trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1980), 51. 
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Chapter Three: 
Psychoanalysis, Fantasy, Postcoloniality: Turkish Derivative 
Nationalism and Historiography as the Emerging Global Order 
 
 
If becoming becomes something, why has it not finished becoming long ago? If it is something, 
which has become, then how could it have started to become?  
 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy264  
 
 
 
On January 11, 2011 a new TV series, The Magnificent Century, made its debut on Turkish TV.  
Named after the Ottoman Emperor Süleyman the Magnificent who is synonymous with the 
so-called Golden Age of the Empire between the 15th-17th centuries, the TV series, even 
before its premier, fomented hot debate amongst journalists, academics, politicians and film 
critics. At the core of the polemics was whether the diagetic reality of the TV show did 
justice to the historical truth or misrepresented it. According to a considerable number of 
proponents of the latter camp, portraying Süleyman the Magnificent as a lecher man 
engaging in untold debauchery in the Harem did not reflect the reality of his era.  The critics 
also found the depiction of Süleyman as a tyrant maltreating non-Muslims unacceptable. 
Distorting the truth about a Turkish ancestor as “magnificent” as Süleyman meant not only 
insulting Ottoman-Turkish history but also spreading – as a member of the Radio Television 
Supreme Council (RTUK) argued – an “Orientalist perception” of Turkey. If we consider 
the fact that the show has not only nationwide popularity but has a following in many 
countries in the Middle East and the Balkans, the magnitude of the paranoia about this 
“Orientalist perception of Turkey” may appear even more threatening to its critics.   
 
The debate became even more heated recently when the Turkish Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan became actively involved in it. Appointing himself as a historian, the Prime 
Minister condemned the depiction of the Sultan as someone who was highly indulged in 
debauchery and spent most of his time in his Harem. Instead, he corrected, Süleyman had 
spent tens of years on the back of his horse on the way to conquering new lands. In a media 
                                                
264 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Continuum, 1983), 47.  
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conference condemning the portrayal of the Sultan, the Prime Minister reiterated his earlier 
comments, with heightened fervor. Alluding to the producers of the TV show, he stated, 
“some people claim that our history is all about war, swords, intrigues, power struggles and 
unfortunately the Harem. Although some people who are not part of us keep deliberately 
telling us our history in this particular way, we can not and will not see our history in that 
way.”265  
 
He corrected this despotic and barbaric image of the Turk and the Ottoman Sultan with his 
own illustration: 
Conquest is not an attempt at seizing new lands to colonize by war-making, 
chopping off heads or invasion; on the contrary it is an attempt of 
conquering the hearts first before the gates. Conquest means carrying the 
civilization of compassion (sevgi) to near and distant realms. It is believing in 
the rule of the pen rather than the sword. This is why when the ladies of 
Byzantium welcomed Fatih Sultan Mehmed  and Akşemseddin, they said ‘we 
wish to see the Ottoman turban on our head of our state rather than a 
cardinal’s hat.’ They had this preference because one finds justice under the 
former and the cruelty under the latter. When our history is at stake, only 
wars are being brought to attention.266   
 
Furthermore he condemned those who disseminate this history of despotism as a means to 
destroy the Turkish nation and civilization. This part of Erdoğan’s speech is reveals the dark 
side of Ottoman-Turkish nationalism and its obsession with internal and external enemies:  
In our country they have tried it. First, they wanted to exterminate the 
members of this civilization. We waged the war of independence, struggled 
for our existence and confidently took our place on the stage of history.  
However, the ones who could not thwart our civilization then strove to do 
so with the help of our own hands. Frankly speaking, for years they wished 
to inject an inferiority complex into the nation. This nation’s own executives 
have done it as well. They worked hard to have us accept backwardness and 
underdevelopment. They wanted to straitjacket us into certain models and 
moulds. Whenever this nation attempted to break its shell and broaden its 
horizon, various external and internal plots have been set up to disable those 
attempts.267    
                                                
265 “Erdoğan: Tarihimiz savaş, entrika ve haremden ibaretmiş gibi gösteriliyor,” T24, December 6, 2012, 
accessed January 17, 2013, http://t24.com.tr/haber/Erdoğan-tarihimiz-savas-entrika-ve-haremden-ibaretmis-
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The backlash the show provoked (“we were not like that, we were actually like this”) is, I 
argue, a symptom of the broader process of recuperation of a national identity and tied to 
and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey. It serves, therefore, as an important entry 
point into the analysis of the recent restoration of Turkish national identity through the 
fantasy of the pre-modern Ottoman Golden Age, in contradistinction to the Western 
Orientalist construction of Turkey and Turk. Against this backdrop, in this chapter I want to 
focus on and analyze the recent surge of scholarly interest in Ottoman tolerance and the 
Millet system as the new foundational myth of nationalism in Turkey. What interests me is 
the way in which the debate around these topics puts Ottoman historiography to in the use 
of the restoration of national identity and the fantasy of harmony. There exist multiple arrays 
of interdependent domains. This Turkish-Islamic identity recuperation is being undertaken 
in multiple interdependent domains: arts, city planning, commemorations and monuments, 
municipal politics, just to name a few. 268 In what follows, I will delve into the ways in which 
this history is used and misused to cement a national identity around this fantasy.   
 
If the historians’ discourse of Ottoman tolerance and peace is a social fantasy of Turkish-
Islamic nationalism, the most urgent question to confront is: what is problematic and 
dangerous about this longing for the Golden Age of an Empire in which a peaceful, 
multicultural coexistence prevailed? What is so troubling about celebrating ones’ Turkish-
Muslim national heroes and Ottoman-Turkish ancestral roots? Why should we think twice 
when we correct the Western hegemonic discourse of Oriental Despotism with a discourse 
of Ottoman glory and tolerance? Towards the end of the previous chapter, I already touched 
on the perils of fantasy, particularly of nationalism, when considering the pivotal role of 
fantasy in producing representations of alterity and in concealing the impossibility of 
harmony at the social and individual level. This chapter, I will discuss specific pitfalls of a 
fantasy of Ottoman Tolerance that strives to invert the Western Orientalist imagery of 
Turkish-Ottoman past. Let me unpack this critical argument through an in-depth reading of 
the obverse of Western Orientalism in the Turkish historians’ fantasy of Ottoman tolerance.  
                                                
268 While reinscribing the Ottoman legacy and its glory in the collective memory of Turkish public, over the last 
decade the Turkish state authorities and the ruling party, AKP, have been also undertaking reforms regarding 
the judiciary, health and education system, army and police forces to redesign modern Turkey. All these efforts, 
including setting harsh restriction on abortion and on alcohol sales, aim to create a Turkish-Islamic society that 
returns to its source to revive its essence.  
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3.1 The Dark Side of the Fantasy of Nation: Precoloniality and Enemies 
of the Ottoman Civilization 
 
A recurrent theme in narratives of Turkish historians is the menace of the West. When 
historians try to prove the existence of the Golden Age and to disprove the stereotype of 
Oriental despotism, they do so in tandem with rewriting the image of the West. Europe then 
appears as a specter of darkness encroaching on the world.   
 
One of the best-known examples of Turkish historians’ imaginings of the West comes in 
reference to the situation of Ottoman Jews, in comparison to that of Jews who lived in 
Europe. For instance, one of the popular names of the literature on Ottoman Jews, Ahmet 
Eroğlu, while elaborating on the practice of discrimination through dress, offers the 
following comparison:   
The practice of dress code restrictions had different results in Europe and 
the Ottoman State […] These restrictions purported to ostracize, assimilate, 
socially segregate the Other [in the former]; in the Ottoman State these 
restrictions were deployed to establish the public order. As a matter of fact, 
this discrimination [in the former] led to the expulsion of the Jews in the 15th 
and 16th centuries and their forced transportation to the gas chambers in the 
20th century. Whereas in the Ottoman Empire it made possible coexistence 
of different religious and ethnic people living together in a tolerant 
environment.269  
 
Within the confines of a short paragraph, the author so compresses both time and space as 
to suggest that gulf of five hundred years and five hundred kilometers between societies can 
be causally spanned apart as though they were sharing the same social setting. Similarly, 
Karpat and Yıldırım put forward the following similar comparison: 
 
The Muslim world has a good history with the Jews. There has been almost 
no discrimination nor a Holocaust -- violations of basic human rights or 
GENOCIDE did not exist. On the contrary, after they had been exiled from 
                                                
269 Ahmet H. Eroğlu, Osmanlı Devletinde Yahudiler (XIX Yüzyılın Sonuna Kadar) [Jews in the Ottoman State( Up Until 
the End of the Nineteenth Century)] (Ankara: Alperen, 2000), 15. 
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Andalusia, the Ottomans welcomed them and always accepted them in their 
times of need.270   
 
While these authors invariably link history of European genocide is invariably linked with 
Germany and the Holocaust, the authors remind us that other European nations are also 
culpable for similar atrocities. Spain, as one of the earlier European colonial powers, is 
believed to have played a crucial part in the sins of European colonial racism. According to 
Yuluğ Kurat Tekin:    
None of the non-Muslim communities [in the Ottoman Empire] were 
exposed to oppression and cruelty, nor torture due to their language, 
customs and traditions. Spain which conquered most of Central and South 
America in the 16th century, not only used the natives as slaves, but also 
forcefully converted them to Christianity and exterminated those who 
resisted. It was the Spanish Catholic culture that destroyed the Inca 
civilization in Peru. However, it was the Ottoman Empire who saved the 
Jews from the hell of the Inquisition in Spain and allowed the Jewish 
community to settle in Istanbul on March 31, 1492.271      
 
Elsewhere, the prominent Ottoman historiographer İlber Ortaylı, turns the mirror towards 
North America. Using Ottoman peace as a foil, he takes issue with the myth of America as a 
tolerant society for immigrants:    
There are actually alliances, engendered by emigration and migration, such as 
the United States of America. There is no ethnic and religious clash there.  
This country is as precious as gold when it comes to tolerance and living 
together. Especially the Jews who turned into soap in Europe, are so content 
with their life so as to cheer “This is such a sweet country.” On the other 
side of the Atlantic, Poles and Ukrainians slaughtered each other, when they 
emigrated to this side, they do not do it anymore. So far everything goes well 
for them. Germans and Jews, too, are doing well here. But if you ask the 
same question to the blacks, would they say ‘yes’? Let’s assume that they are 
somehow dealing with their situation (though this is surely not the case), 
what about these Mexicans, where did they come from? What percentage of 
the country’s population is speaking Spanish? Recognition of Spanish as a 
language is still a big point of contention.272 
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Ortayli goes on to discuss British and French colonial powers, in contrast to which the 
Ottoman Empire, once again, shines as a beacon of tolerance:  
The Ottoman Empire was the last Empire that adapted to the new world 
order and was a catalyst for nationalization. In contrast to the colonial 
empires that wiped out local cultures (i.e., the Brits destroyed the Hindu class 
system as the French did to the Magreb Arab civilization). The Ottoman 
state safely carried local cultures and minority populations into the age of 
nation-states.273    
  
Hikmet Özdemir’s description of the socio-political structure of the Ottoman Empire 
resonates with that of Ortaylı. Özdemir argues that through successful initiatives aimed at 
accommodating non-Muslims, Mehmed II set an example vital for our contemporary world, 
which is engulfed by bloody genocides and many other human catastrophes.274 Similarly, 
Abdurrahman Küçük points out that Ottoman tolerance and the Millet System enabled 
people of different creeds and races to co-exist in harmony within the framework of Islamic 
culture and civilization. According to Küçük, it was thanks to the brilliance of this scheme 
and the prowess of its administrators that peace and security prevailed for ages in the Middle 
East, Caucasus, and the Balkans where religious and ethnic strife seem to have become the 
new law of the land after the demise of the Ottoman rule.275  
 
Parallel to this dark image of the West that historians depict, they portray the pre-colonial 
Ottoman Empire in an idyllic light. Hasan Güzel seems to entertain this idyllic image of the 
Empire when he argues “it is widely accepted that within the framework of Pax-Ottomana 
(Ottoman Peace) human rights and freedom, almost on a par with modern standards, were 
granted.”276 We encountered these sorts of generalizations about the classical times in chapter 
two where Turkish historians reiterated that up until around the 19th century, life in the 
Empire was harmonious. But then what? 
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The Golden Age, as these historians lament, did not last forever.277 Despite the state 
authorities’ attempts to modernize and adapt the Millet System with extended rights and 
freedom for non-Muslim communities, the social rubric of the Empire and the Millet System 
along with it, began to shatter around the 19th century.278 The decay of the tolerant Ottoman 
civilization has been ascribed to various causes and culprits, chief among them Western 
imperial powers, as in this account of Güzel:   
With the Tanzimat Reforms the Millet System was reconfigured. 
Nonetheless, towards the end of the XIX century the imperial powers began 
to incite non-Muslim minorities with their hideous plans […] Russia for 
instance was behind the incitement of Armenians especially after 1885.279   
 
Likewise, Bilal Eryılmaz explains the fall of the Ottoman Millet system with the 
overwhelming power of Western imperial powers, as in those accounts of Güzel and Bilal 
Eryılmaz:  
The interventions of foreign powers such as England, France and Russia and 
their eagerness to act as the protectors of minorities had a negative impact on 
the relations. Nationalist movements expended considerable effort to erase 
minorities’ affection towards the Empire. Panicked by the conquest of the 
Balkans by the Ottomans, the Western states accused the Ottomans of being 
barbarians and this image became a part of their tradition and culture.280 
 
It is important to note that vastly different times and spaces are subsumed under a holistic 
category of the “West”. Although Western powers and imperialism are seen as the main 
external forces with which the Empire could not cope, the list of threats to the multicultural 
fabric of the Empire does not end here. The non-Muslim subjects of the Empire take on a 
crucial role for the fall of this paradise, as argued by these historians. We will revisit the 
perception of non-Muslims as the immanent threat in the next chapter. In the meantime, the 
passages below clearly reveal the dark side of the fantasy of the Ottoman Millet System, in 
                                                
277 Bilal Eryılmaz, “Osmanli Devletinde Farkliliklar,” 416. 
278 Yavuz Ercan, “Osmanlı Devletinde Müslüman Olmayan Topluluklar (Millet Sistemi),” [Non-Muslim 
Communities in the Ottoman State (The Millet System)] in Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Ermeni Sorunu, ed. Hasan 
Celal Güzel (Ankara: Yeni Turkiye Yayınları, 2001), 335. 
279 Hasan Cemal Güzel, “Giriş,” [Introduction] 12-3. 
280 Bilal Eryılmaz, “Osmanli Devletinde Farkliliklar,” 416. 
106 
which virtuous non-Muslim communities turn into sinister ingrates who betray their 
benefactors:  
The collaboration between the Christian minorities, who chase after the idea 
of independence and autonomy, and the Great Powers willing to use them as 
strategic allies and means towards their plans against the Ottoman lands goes 
back to the end of the 17th century where the Empire entered its period of 
decline […] Missionaries injected revolutionary ideas into the minds of the 
Ottoman Christians. The existence of these missionary groups offered fertile 
ground for the Great Western Powers to intervene and plot amongst the 
minorities.281      
Non-Muslim communities’ unrest and rebellion against the state continued 
[in the 19th century]. The reason is that what they really wanted was not more 
extensive rights and freedom but to become fully independent.282  
Those governed by the Millets [the Ottoman non-Muslims] who carefully 
retained their national identities did not hesitate at all to use them against the 
Ottoman Empire. Greek, Bulgarian and Armenian riots were the most 
distinctive examples of this picture.283  
 
It is quite possible to extend the Ottoman historians’ list of reasons for the disintegration of 
the Empire. However, the narratives we’ve delved into so far have revealed certain common 
discursive strategies. It is important to recognize that through correcting the perception of 
the Turk as barbaric, the historians reverse the positions of East and West. In narratives of 
Ottoman peace and tolerance, the West emerges as the global force of havoc wreaking 
racial/ethnic strife and genocide both within its own borders and globally, and as the 
saboteur (both directly and through alliance with non-Muslims in the Empire) of a pre-
colonial paradise. At the same time the fantasy of the Ottoman Millet System narrates a 
Golden Age where Turkish ancestors were the respected rulers of the world, this pre-
colonial paradise was sabotaged due to both resident Non-Muslims and European colonialist 
powers.   
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3.2 Postcolonial Theory and the Question of Turkish Nativist 
Intellectuals 
 
The glorification of the pre-colonial past before the arrival of Western hegemony and 
modernity, which is typical of “colonized intellectuals,” has been problematized by various 
(post)colonial voices: Nativism (Fanon, 2004[1961]), Orientalism-in-Reverse (Al-‘Azm, 2000), 
Occidentalism (Chen, 2002; Bruma & Margalit, 2004) and Postcolonial Melancholy (Khanna, 2003). 
These concepts of postcolonial theory and criticism were coined to analyze the dynamics 
and conditions in which non-Western/Oriental societies and their intellectuals (be they from 
Africa, the Middle-East, South Asia or the Far East) responded to their image as reflected in 
the Western hegemonic gaze and discourse.284 The reaction of the Third World intelligentsia, 
as Xiamei Chen eloquently describes, is “a discursive practice that, by constructing the 
Western Other, has allowed the Orient to participate actively and with indigenous creativity 
in the process of self-appropriation, even after being appropriated and constructed by 
Western Others.”285 Seen from this perspective, the Western construction of the non-
West/Orient and the non-West’s reaction to this construction go hand in hand. The 
Western discourse on the Orient and the Orient’s reversal of this discourse—which 
essentializes and celebrates its pre-colonial and pre-modern native self—form a symbiotic 
relationship. These two subjectivities, the colonial and the colonized, implicate one another.  
 
Nonetheless, Chatterjee sees the “active participation” and “indigenous creativity” in anti-
colonialist nation formations in Asia and Africa as inventive forms, as opposed to 
incomplete and failed replicas. In his well-known depiction of these derivative nationalisms, 
Chatterjee points out that the nation is composed of material and spiritual spheres.  For him, 
the former is “the domain of the ‘outside’ of the economy and of a statecraft, of science and 
technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had 
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succumbed.”286 Whereas the latter, the spiritual domain, he states, “is an inner domain 
bearing the essential marks of cultural identity” [such as Turkish-Muslim].287 While 
Chatterjee’s attempt to write the colonized subject back into the history of the nation state, 
and to depict where non-European populations and countries appear as concurrent actors 
and territories, is illuminating, his making of derivative nationalism through self-
appropriation comes with certain consequences and perils. In this dissertation, I analyze the 
contemporary Turkey, mindful of the warning of postcolonial critics against such perils of 
derivative nationalism 
 
The dynamics at play in the slave-master dialectic between the West and the Rest has been 
studied extensively in the context of African, Asian and Eastern European societies. 
Following in the footsteps of influential early critics of colonialism such as Cesaire, Fanon, 
Memmi and other more contemporary sources of inspiration such as Said, Spivak and 
Bhabha, postcolonial scholars critically investigate how African, Latin American, Caribbean 
and Asian cultures are implicated in European colonialism and nation-state and empire 
building. We know well, for instance, how colonies such as India, Antilles, Jamaica, Tunisia 
and Algeria have been constitutive of the Western self and as a result European subjectivity 
and vice versa. However, the Ottoman Empire and its successor Turkish nation-state, have 
been curiously and conspicuously missing from postcolonial studies.288. If the task of 
postcolonial criticism is to investigate and deconstruct the uneven dynamics of social 
authority and cultural representation during the colonial encounter between the West and 
non-West from which subjectivities of nation, gender, ethnicity, class, race and empire have 
emerged, Ottoman-Turkish culture ought to be an interesting province for such criticism. 
The Ottoman Empire’s geographical proximity to Europe, which made the encounter 
between the two civilizations all the more intimate and the threat from the other side all the 
more imminent. Thus the figure of the Ottoman was at the same time very close to and very 
far away from Europe. Or, to put it differently, it was an extimate Other of Western identity. 
This extimacy was mutual also haunting Ottoman-Turkish state authorities and elites, who 
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regarded Europe as simultaneously to be emulated and as the archenemy. Despite the mutual 
extimacy of European and Turkish collective unconscious, the Ottoman-Turkish case has 
until recently typically remained a lacuna in postcolonial criticism.    
 
This lacuna has been noted by the scholars in Turkey who have registered the ambivalence 
of prominent scholars of Orientalism toward the Ottoman-Turkish state. The heavyweights 
of subaltern studies such as Said and Chakrabarthy have been criticized for omitting the 
Ottoman-Turkish case in their work.289 That they have done so stems from certain 
complications in properly locating the features the Ottoman-Turkish experience. On the one 
hand, the Ottomans were a colonizing force that continued to wield power over many 
colonies in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans until the late 19th and early 20th 
century. On the other hand, the Ottoman state authorities and elites witnessed the 
hegemony of Western colonialism in their minds as it tore the social fabric of the Empire by 
inciting minorities and by beginning to seize Ottoman territories. The Ottoman authorities 
went to extreme lengths to maintain the sovereignty of the Empire even when its survival 
necessitated the mimicry ad adoption of the very model of Western modernism that they 
simultaneously despised and admired. The Ottoman-Turks, once colonizer, had themselves 
become the subjects of the European imperialism. This once-colonizer-then-colonized status 
is arguably what renders the Ottoman-Turkish case ambiguous for postcolonial scholars, 
who typically pass over it in silence.  
 
Since the late 1990s there has been robust dialogue and engagement in Turkey as some 
scholars mobilized the critical analysis strategies of Orientalism and postcolonial critique of 
Said, Bhabha, Chatterjee, and Chakrabarhty to inscribe the Ottoman-Turkish experience into 
the history of modern colonialism. The melancholic intellectual and political climate that the 
encounter with Western hegemony and Westernization had given rise to in the Ottoman 
Empire and modern Turkey have been designated as Internalized Orientalism, Occidentalism, 
Ottoman Orientalism, Belated Modernity, etc.290 They strove to demonstrate that the Ottoman 
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Empire and its heir, the Republic of Turkey, are manifestations of the transnational 
processes of modernity and modern colonial history. The insightful works of scholars who 
bridge the Ottoman-Turkish and postcolonial criticism illustrate how Ottoman state 
authorities and intellectuals as well as their Turkish heirs struggled to cope with the Western 
hegemony, a struggle which was constitutive of their identity as well as the people they 
governed. From the founding fathers of Turkish nationalism, such as Kemal Atatürk and 
sociologist Ziya Gökalp, to one of the most important figures of Turkish modernist 
literature in the 1930s, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, to the late nineteenth century Ottoman 
statesmen struggling to defend the peripheral territories in Tripoli, Hejaz, Yemen and Beirut 
against, what they deemed, “savage” nomadic populations, the Turkish elites’ encounters 
with the European imperialism, modernity, and culture have now been well documented.    
 
Thanks to these contributions, we are now well informed about the ways in which Ottoman-
Turkish governors and elites constructed a self-image in response to the Orientalist 
perception of themselves. Insightful as these studies are, they nonetheless mostly remain 
focused on the period of late Ottoman Empire to early Turkish Republic (1870-1930). 
Instead, in this study, I investigate both the more recent and distant past; more specifically, 
the post-1980s surge of scholarly and popular interest in Ottoman minorities, a surge, I 
argue, that is part of a larger process of the reconstruction of national identity, particularly 
during the last decade. The emergence of this new Turkish-Ottoman imaginary and 
discourse of Turkish nativism and Occidentalism, with its emphasis on minority rights, 
tolerance, and harmonious coexistence of plurality remains an under-explored territory for 
postcolonial criticism. The public discourse on Ottoman multiculturalism and the Millet 
System has been only tangentially examined and, even then, the phantasmatic and affective 
dynamics at play are often left unanalyzed. Or, in the rare cases where the concept of fantasy 
is employed, the hazards of this sort of Turkish-Ottoman nationalist historiography and 
remembrance are not probed. Yet this discourse could and should constitute a pivotal object 
of investigation in postcolonial studies; scholars must analyze how Turkish nationalism deals 
with the melancholy and affective injury which arose from the loss of the Ottoman Empire 
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as well as how colonialism gave rise to contemporary ambivalence towards a European 
identity and hegemony.  
 
As was mentioned above, the Turkish case is not the first time a nation is dealing with the 
anxieties of encountering the Western hegemony and the loss of a presumed authentic and 
idyllic age. The question of identity and culture in the context of the West and the Rest 
dialectic has long been explored. The postcolonial theory and practice constitutes an 
invaluable source of critical heritage to examine how the ways in which Turkish 
historians/intellectuals deal with the past involve certain traps. One of the most relevant 
concepts for problematizing the discourse deployed by colonized people, in general, and the 
Turkish historians, in particular) in reaction to the Western hegemony, is nativism,. As Said 
puts it,  
Nativism, alas, reinforces the distinction even while revaluating the weaker or 
subservient partner. And it has often led to compelling but demagogic 
assertions about a native past, narrative or actuality that stands free from 
worldly time itself. One sees this in such enterprises as Senghor's negritude, 
or in the Rastafarian movement, or in the Garveyite back to Africa project 
for American Blacks, or in the rediscoveries of various unsullied, pre-colonial 
Muslim essences.291  
 
For Said this came with a series of severe consequences:  
As in the case of negritude trapped itself in what was primarily a defensive 
role, even though its accents were strident, its syntax hyperbolic and its 
strategy aggressive [...] Negritude stayed within a pre-set system of 
Eurocentric intellectual analysis of both man and his society, and tried to re-
define the African and his society in those externalized terms.292  
 
This mode of oppositionality, conceptualized as Orientalism-in-reverse, manifested itself among 
the Arab nations as well. As al-‘Azm puts it: “it simply imitates the greatest Orientalist 
masters – a poor imitation at that- when seeks to unravel the secrets of the primordial Arab 
mind, psyche or character in and through words.”293 Furthermore, because these ideal 
constituents and perfect character of the Arab nation had once attained a long time ago, 
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adherents of nationalism energized by a reversed form Orientalism believe that it will remain 
as the chosen one in future. According to al-‘Azm, Arab nationalists based their struggle 
against the West, and used this image as their opponent, instead of relying on the old figure 
of imperial powers as national liberation movements did.   
 
Among the most influential figures to criticize this form of opposition to the Western 
hegemony is Franz Fanon, whose critique of reactionary nationalism holds tremendous 
significance for the analysis of oppositional political and identity movements, especially in 
relation to the colonized intellectuals. In Fanon’s reading, the colonized intelligentsia – be 
they, scholar, artist, writer, of African, Mexican or Peruvian descent –, furiously struggled to 
renew contact with their people’s oldest essence, the farthest removed from colonial times. 
For Fanon, the intellectuals of Third World nationalisms have done so “since there is little to 
marvel at in its current state of barbarity, they have decided to go further, to delve deeper, 
and they must have been overjoyed to discover that the past was not branded with shame, 
but dignity, glory, and sobriety.”294 This move is, Fanon argues, is very crucial for psycho-
affective equilibrium of the colonized. We will revisit this crucial point in a minute. It uses 
the racialized discourse of the colonialism and the same rules of logic only to invert it to 
prove the praiseworthiness of the colonized race and culture.295 The Negritude movement, 
for instance, while affirming African culture in contradistinction to old Europe, did so by 
attributing to it a series of positive features such as poetry, exuberance, naïveté, and freedom, 
which old Europe not only lacked, but was in essence antithetical to through its dull reason, 
stifling logic, protocol and so on.296 The colonized intellectuals, in an urge to rebuke the 
colonial regime’s understanding of the pre-colonial era as the dark ages, come to exoticize 
and glorify their pre-colonial past and culture unquestionably reclaimed customs and revived 
hitherto neglected traditions. Fanon, along with many prominent thinkers of his generation 
such as Albert Memmi, Aime Cesair, Amilcar Cabral, found this tendency to run the risk of 
reifying culture and freezing the past by reducing everything to an inert imagery of a Golden 
Age. In other words, Fanon, criticized the elevation of custom into culture since this locked 
culture into a past detached from positive effects of contemporary events: “A national 
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culture is not a folklore nor an abstract populism that believes it can discover the people’s 
true nature.”297 When the past is used in such a way, it would be a disservice to one’s people 
and the nascent nation rising from the ashes of colonialism.298 
 
To be sure, Fanon’s critique of national history and identity should not come as a surprise if 
we think of the Nietzschean influence in his philosophy. In 1873, almost 100 years earlier as 
Nietzsche wrote “On the Use and Abuse of History” and as Germany – a latecomer to 
imperial power – to create a robust culture, he has parallel worries about the future of 
national identity and culture.299 At this point, according to Nietzsche, historians and history 
took on a great significance to produce a unified national self, of which Nietzsche was very 
wary. Great lessons can be drawn from his detailed analysis of remembrance of the national 
memory and past through history writing for the analysis of any form of reactive nationalist 
discourse, be it nativist, occidentalist, reverse-orientalist etc.  
 
In his musings on the topic, Nietzsche confronted the question of to what degree an 
individual, a people and a culture are supposed to remember or forget national history. For 
him, history, when left to misuse, can be a very overwhelming and excessive force and there 
are certain basic strategies to constrain this potentially destructive power. In the problematic 
mode of remembering history engages with the classics of earlier times and “learn from it 
that the greatness that once existed was in any event once possible and may be possible 
again.”300 Used to fuel national imagery and unification/consolidation, monumental history 
deceives by analogies:  
[W]ith seductive similarities it inspires the courageous to foolhardiness and 
the inspired to fanaticism and when we go on to think of this kind of history 
in the hands of gifted egoists and visionary scoundrels, then we see empires 
destroyed, princes murdered, wars and revolution launched.301  
 
He adds, this form of monumental history is a way in which the weak displaces its hatred 
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and jealousy in present for the power of the great of its times onto its mighty ancestors of 
past eras. This troublesome mode, Nietzsche quips, is based on the motto of let the dead bury 
the living.  
 
Nietzsche sensed a great danger in this mode of remembering the past because therein the 
dead buries the living as long as we expect from glorious ancestors to reincarnate somewhere 
in the future. Wherever one looks at, one only longs to see is the great times of the bygone 
civilization and the bodies of the great leaders and soldiers of the nation fleshed out in the 
monuments. In this perception of history, one turns its face toward the past and draws a 
linear continuity between the past and the present so much so that the creative energies of 
human life fade away as one perceives everything in the present as supplement to the 
original, essential, historical bedrock. In this mode, the past is overbearingly present, sapping 
the present life potentialities, energies, and forces:  
The oversaturation of an age with history seems to me to be hostile and 
dangerous to life in five respects such an excess creates that con weakens the 
personality; it leads an age to imagine that and thereby weakens the 
personality; it leads an age to imagine that it possesses the rarest of virtues, 
justice, to a greater degree than any other age; it disrupts the instincts of a 
people and hinders the individual no less than the whole in the attainment of 
maturity; it implants the belief, harmful at any time, in the old age of 
mankind, the belief that one is a latecomer and epigone; it leads an age into a 
dangerous mood of irony in regard to itself and subsequently into the even 
more dangerous mood of cynicism: in this mood, however, it develops more 
and more a prudent practical egoism, through which the forces of life are 
paralyzed and at last destroyed.302 
 
Nietzsche was much disheartened by whose abuse of history to consolidate German identity 
by commemorating of stagnant national tradition, folk, continuous replica of conversations, 
clothing and habitations. This perception of national culture, according to him, weakened 
individuality and impeded individuals’ instincts and creative capacities of individuals. This 
point regarding instincts and visceral forces and energies was emphasized by Fanon too, who 
recognized the significance of the national history and national culture for the colonized 
intellectuals and their psychic affective equilibrium. Colonized intellectuals used history as a 
shield from the racist and colonialist gaze and discourse of the Western hegemony.   
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In terms of the analysis of this inferiority complex and the psychic economy of colonialism, 
Fanon offers a nuanced and sharp psychoanalytical analysis of “the juxtaposition of the white 
and black races” and a collective psychological complex he hopes to undo by analyzing it.303 
Drawing on the insights of psychoanalysis, Fanon’s crucial intervention was his emphasis on 
affect and libidinal economy in the colonial relations. He contends that this colonized 
subject (e.g., the black man) is produced “as the result of a series of aberrations of affect.”304 
Fanon’s emphasis on the affect, the emotion, the passion is crucial here. What Fanon 
attempts to illustrate in Black Skin White Mask is that colonialism not only operates at the 
symbolic level of representation of the other as the inferior, but it is also embedded in 
affective and libidinal economy. From this perspective, affects are not generated in one body 
but are flows among colonial bodies and psyches of colonialism that constitute an intricate 
libidinal economy.305  
 
This concept of the psychic economy of colonialism recalls Zizek and Salecl’s 
psychoanalytically influenced analysis of nationalisms. As they have illustrated in their study 
of the nationalism(s) in territories that splintered from the former Yugoslavia, in which 
excessive enjoyment and affects are always attributed to the national and ethnic other. In 
their argument, one can hear the echoes of Fanon’s analysis of how the enjoyment of the 
colonized people, e.g., “their strange attitude to work” and “their uncontrollable sexual 
behavior,” enabled the constitution of European subjectivity and management of its libidinal 
economy. In the colonial racist fantasy, these strange and inaccessible affects and drives were 
projected onto the colonized people who were deemed uncivilized and subhuman. Thanks 
to this colonial racial libidinal economy, the white European subject holds an ostensibly safe 
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position uncontaminated by these negative affects and enjoyment. And there lies Fanon’s 
central contribution to the study of nationalism: that European nation-formation (e.g., 
French nationalism) cannot be understood without taking into account the colonized people 
and their locus in European colonial racist fantasies. The reversed form of this racist libidinal 
economy is its influence on the colonized (i.e. Third World intellectual/historians) and anti-
colonial nationalism. Thus, we have a portrayal of the colonizer and the colonized who are 
deeply intermingled and implicated in each other’s psyches. This reading of Fanon means 
that the parties in colonial relations are not distinct but enmeshed as the emotional 
economies and desire of each of the colonizer and the colonized relies on the projections of 
each other. Although the Turkey-Ottoman Empire experience is not typically considered an 
example of colonization in the same way, for example, as are Ghana, Indonesia or Algeria, 
this mutually constitutive affective economy is no less relevant in the relationship between 
Turkey and Europe.  
 
In terms of this alterity and colonial affective economy, the West is not deemed the only 
enemy of the nation. There are other Others that take part in the national politics of emotion 
in the colonial situation. Having come to see themselves through the categories of biology 
and race, anti-colonial movements and derivative nationalisms were quick to find internal 
enemies and threats to the unity of the nation. Fanon gives an example in the context of 
Ivory Coast, where Dahomeans and Upper Voltans controlling the business sector were 
targeted in outright racist riots and demonstrations where the participation of the urban 
proletariat, the unemployed masses, the small artisans characterized, what Fanon called, 
“ultranationalism, chauvinism and racism.”306 In Fanon’s analysis, the inhabitants of Niger in 
Ghana and Sudanese in Senegal were similarly singled out as scapegoats, or “thieves of 
enjoyment” to use the lexicon of Zizek and Salecl. Moreover, Fanon discerns similar 
economy of theft of enjoyment between the White and Black Africa:  
In some places you hear that White Africa has a thousand year-old tradition 
of culture, that it is Mediterranean, an extension of Europe and is part of 
Greco-Roman civilization. Black Africa is looked upon as a wild, savage, 
uncivilized, and lifeless region. In other places, you hear day in and day out 
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hateful remarks about veiled women, polygamy, and the Arabs` alleged 
contempt for the female sex.307   
 
In sum, anti-colonial experiences of nationalism and nativism became not only responses to 
the Western Other but were equally directed against immanent others and enemies. Xiaomei 
Chen duly underscores such a tendency in the experience of Chinese Occidentalist 
imagination of the nation, where the image of the West serves not to dominate the West: “as 
a means for supporting a [Chinese] nationalism that suppresses its own people.”308 Chen’s 
study particularly can also yield useful insights into how postcolonial nations other than 
China elsewhere manage their domestic and transnational politics. This is a crucial point for 
my understanding of Turkish postcolonial nationalism and the fantasy of the Ottoman 
tolerance.   
 
3.3 The Use and Abuse of Ottoman History in post 1980s Turkey 
 
In light of the aforementioned lessons, I read the recent surge of interest in and the 
discourse on Ottoman peace, multiculturalism, and the Millet system as the backbone of the 
Turkish-Islamic fantasy of the nation. It is through this fantasy that the Turkish native 
intellectuals strive to overcome the hegemony of the Western Orientalist perception of the 
Turkish-Ottoman civilization. In this resentful discourse, The European civilization is 
considered synonymous with discrimination, the Holocaust, violation of the human and 
minority rights since it systematically persecuted and oppressed its minorities and colonial 
populations. It is not difficult to detect the reversed form of the European image of 
Ottoman Despotism and the barbaric Turk at play here. In these accounts of the Turkish 
scholars, all the bad qualities and affects are displaced onto the West/Europe. 
 
Meanwhile, the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance described in chapter depicts precoloniality, i.e., 
the time preceding the demise of the Millet system, as permitting people of different ethic 
religious communities lived side by side in harmony. Note that the fantasy’s jargon is 
borrowed from Western/European liberal multicultural discourse and reversed only in that it 
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is cast the Ottoman-Turkish Empire in a positive light. Concepts developed for European 
socio-political analysis, e.g., multicultural, liberal, plural, and cosmopolitan, etc., are used to 
describe the Ottoman-Turkish civilization.  
 
Insofar as the assumed glorious Ottoman-Turkish history and culture are celebrated, their 
erasure are seemed lamentable. According to the Turkish historians and intellectuals, the 
great powers of Western imperialism along with non-Muslim communities within the 
Empire, such as Greeks and Armenians, conspired against the Ottoman state. In addition to 
the imagination of a harmonious pre-modern age as well as external and internal threats to it, 
narratives of Ottoman tolerance and multiculturalism offer a highly problematic conception 
of culture and history. The historians’ discourse on the Ottoman Millet system runs the risk 
of unconditionally affirming the Ottoman past elevating the Millet system to the level of 
essential Turkish-Muslim culture, and then reifying this culture.  
 
The discourse of the native intellectuals’ works on the Millet system and tolerance 
obsessively refer to the same historical events, e.g., the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople 
and figures such as Sultan Fatih the Conqueror or Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. Only 
spectacular moments and heroic Ottoman Turkish ancestors are remembered; everything 
else fades into the background. We neither hear the voice of the minorities directly and nor 
do we read about the pain of the Others. The stories of the African slaves recruited during 
the revitalization of the newly conquered Constantinople, or of the Jewish migrants forced 
from Anatolia to the new Ottoman capital to deal with the shortage of labor are silenced and 
trivialized, as Chapter Two has discussed.  
 
The Other qua the non-Muslim minorities in the Empire is invoked only when its existence 
serves the Ottoman-Turkish founding fathers’ interests. The Ottoman Jews are accorded a 
place in the imagined glorious past because they brought their trade and artisanal skills, and 
scientific and medical knowledge to the Empire. The Orthodox Greeks play a role in the 
fantasy because their existence in the Ottoman Empire fueled the rivalry between the 
Vatican and the East Roman Church authorities. The case of Armenians is invoked as an 
example of a “loyal nation” (millet). Other “Others” are omitted. This selective attention, 
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which heavily influences the Ottoman historians’ understanding of the past and the Other, 
also shapes their approach to the perception of the state of affairs in the present.  
 
Prominent Kemal Karpat expressly states that his object in studying Ottoman state history 
and governance is to use the resulting knowledge to solve today’s socio-cultural problems.309 
This approach, although not always articulated so explicitly, is typical of the use of the 
Ottoman history and legacy in the service of the contemporary challenges facing the nation, 
e.g. relations with the neighbors, minority issues, modernization and reforms and so on.  
This is important because although my dissertation primarily investigates recent nationalist 
Ottoman historiographic discourse as a component of the Turkish nationalist fantasy and 
group identity, these intellectuals’ fantasies emerged in the context of social processes and 
class transformations in modern Turkey and are shaped by many. 
  
These transformations are of particular interest to us because they illustrate a lot about the 
use of the Ottoman history to energize and mobilize certain classes. In order to have a better 
grasp of the dynamics of class transformations in Turkey and the rising appeal of the 
Ottoman revivalism, our analysis must turn to the 1980s as presently written. This decade 
witnessed the collapse of the statist economy and its import substituting industrialization 
regime along with the crisis of the modernization project based on secular-Turkish identity.310 
After the coup d’etat of 1980, the state (under the supervision of the army) attempted to 
solve the impasse in the economy by structurally readjusting it to the globalized economy by 
means of export-oriented trade and a neo-liberal market. Yet, the Turkish modernity project 
and its secular-Turkish identity came under question during the years of economic and social 
turmoil that followed, with Islamists along with Kurds constituting the most significant 
political movements contesting the official discourse.311 The popularity of Islam and its 
promise of “Just Order” can be read as a reaction to the failure of the 
Westernization/modernization project. By proposing to rediscover core Islamic ethics and 
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aesthetics and reject the supremacy of the Western model of society, Islamic movements and 
politics promised Muslims a return of the glorious Islamic past in the new world stage.312 
This worldview was presented as an alternative to Kemalist secular nationalism of the sixty 
years, which had attempted to sever ties with the Ottoman past.  
 
Istanbul, the glorious capital of the Empire, was a key symbol for the Ottoman/Islamic 
hegemony and its “re-conquest” has been crucial to revival of the “Ottoman model.”313 This 
aspect of Islamic politics manifested itself in 1995, the year of the general elections, when the 
pro-Islamic Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) campaigned by inviting their supporters, people 
they considered to be the “real inhabitants” of the city, to “conquer the city second time.”314 
On May, 29 2009, at the anniversary of the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, in one of the most 
visited points of Istanbul, in one of the most visited points of Istanbul, the mayor of 
Istanbul unveiled the Fatih Sultan Mehmed Monument reincarnating the moment when 
Fatih gave the order for the conquest. The same year the municipality inaugurated Panorama 
1453, the Museum of Conquest, with the Prime Minister alongside other important 
bureaucrats in attendance. According to its designers, the Museum’s purpose is to allow 
visitors to (re)experience the spectacle of the conquest and witness how Mehmed had earned 
the title “the Conqueror” through three-dimensional simulations of the historic day. A 2012 
blockbuster movie Conquest 1453, offered a Turkish version of Braveheart, telling the story of 
the Ottoman Turkish commander, Fatih, and of the genius of his attempts to conquer the 
city with his heroic soldiers. Among the most recent exampled of neo-Ottomanism in 
Istanbul is the plan to name a new third bridge on the Bosphorus after Yavuz Selim, the 
third Sultan of the Golden Age.315   
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Turkish social scientists scholars usually end their study of the Millet system and its 
incorporation into Islamic-Turkish imagery with the 1995 elections. However, there is more 
to the story of Ottoman revivalism and multiculturalism. This is why this dissertation goes 
beyond the 1995 milestone, analyzing the subsequent historiography and discourse on the 
Ottoman Millet system and tolerance up until present time. Since 1994, the mobilizing 
power of Islam has been becoming ever more evident. The Refah Partisi had a significant 
success in the 1995 local elections of that year, taking over many important municipalities, 
including Istanbul, and subsequently forming a coalition government. Since 2002, its 
successor, AKP (the Justice and Development Party), has been the ruling party and 
continued to entrench its power at the national as well as municipal levels.  
 
It is important to note here that the AKP government endeavored to weave together the 
discourses of Islamism (emphasizing the Ottoman version of Sunni Islam), nationalism (i.e., 
Turkish ancestry and blood are still considered important markers of a proper Turk), and 
neo-liberalism (instituting a deregulated market, privatization, and gentrification, expanding 
an big export-oriented economy, appropriation of commons, foreign investments, flexible 
and precarious employment practices).      
 
Amongst many other factors, what made the Islamic movements and pro-Islamic political 
parties so effective was their appeal to certain sectors of the society, that had been ignored 
by the global neo-liberal economic system since the 1980s. As Yüksel Taşkın observed, "For 
those segments of the population marginalized, oppressed and disenfranchised by the 
onslaught of capitalism, the aspirational tenets of Just Order populism was very appealing.”316 
The Islamic movement reached out to the poor, domestic migrants, living mostly on the 
outskirts of metropolitan areas and impoverished groups in the agricultural sector. Thus, 
Islamic party organizations and religious communities served as a caring social network 
during neo-liberalism for the lower classes and promised to keep their social and economic 
upward mobility within reach. In that sense, Islamic politics, especially the AKP policies, 
kept the masses within the capitalist system, whose resentments might have otherwise 
jeopardized it. As a result of this “passive revolution,” as Cihan Tuğal (borrowing from 
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Antonio Gramsci) called it, anti-capitalist ideas and fractions within the Islamic movements 
were contained and neo-liberal capitalism was presented as the inevitable model.317        
 
However, the adherents of this Islamic mobilization were not limited to the lower classes. 
Pro-Islamic parties and their governments facilitated the emergence in Anatolia of a new 
Islamic bourgeoisie, who began to challenge the hegemony of state-supported economic 
elites of pre-1980s era. This new rising bourgeoisie, usually referred to as “the Anatolian 
Tigers,” were provincial capitalist entrepreneurs from export-oriented industries in cities 
such as Bursa, Denizli, Kayseri and Mersin who they received considerable state and local 
financial support for their global investments.318  
 
Seen from this perspective, the Islamic politics of the post-80s brought new and strong 
economic actors and political elites to the center of Turkish society, which had formerly 
been occupied by the secular-Turkish elites of the state-sponsored domestic bourgeoisie and 
by army and civil bureaucrats.319 In that sense, the revival of Ottomanism and Turkish-
Islamism was a liberation struggle against not directly to the Western colonial power. Instead 
it aimed to seize the power and conquer Istanbul second time from classes and elites in 
Turkey who were perceived to be the embodiment of everything the corrupted Westernized, 
secular life style and culture represented. This class movement was achieved by electoral 
success rather than armed-struggles waged in the anti-colonial struggles of the 1960s.  
 
To secure its ascendancy Islamic movement mobilized its supporters, including the lower 
and middle class masses, with the promise of a just and prosperous society. As explained 
above, what interests me in the class transformations and antagonisms of recent Turkish 
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politics is the mobilizing power of the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance and Millet System. I 
perceive it to be the vital foundational myth of the new Turkish-Islamic nationalism. It is the 
essential social fantasy enabling its adherents – whether they are laypeople or scholars – to 
claim to be the “authentic natives” of the historical Turkish-Islamic state and to sustain their 
identities in the present via the promise of a harmonious future. It so does, however, by 
depicting certain groups as the enemy out to undermine these aspirations. The Armenian 
and Greek “traitors” of the past and Kurdish “separatists” of the present, for instance, are 
understood as threats to the unity and stability of the nation and its promise. At the same 
time, this fantasy takes on an international significance as it captures the essence of the 
reaction to the European imperative “you should become multicultural and liberal like us.” 
The fantasy of Ottoman tolerance beats its European Other at its own game: “we were 
already multicultural.” During the opening ceremony of an Istanbul hospital in 2013, the 
Prime Minister’s speech reflected on his recent trip to Africa.    
 
At this point, to quote another speech by the Turkish Prime Minister will illuminate how 
pedagogical political discourse of nationalism caters to the nativist sensitivities. He explained 
Niger could not be a point of reference for Turkey’s self-image and what he instead regarded  
as the proper yardstick:  
We cannot say that we are better off just by looking at them. If we are to 
elevate Turkey above the level of the contemporary countries we will take the 
most developed as our basis. Therefore our goal is to take place in top 10 
countries. We are seventeenth at the moment but we do not find the 17th 
rank sufficient. We will enter the top ten… Once upon a time we were 
number one in the world but then unfortunately we ended up in the well-
known situation. For this reason we have to go back to our essence.320     
 
This speech crucially illustrates the ways in which derivative nationalism constitutes itself 
through return to a source-and-essence discourse. Moreover, it shows us how Turkish 
domestic dynamics are being connected to international ones. On the one hand there are 
tectonic class antagonisms and movements within domestic sphere. However winning the 
global development contest is constituted as an object of desire for the disciplined and 
mobilized domestic classes. “Once upon a time we were the world power,” draws a direct, 
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spatial and temporal connection between the glorious Ottoman Empire and Turkey. 
Moreover, we are promised to regain a golden age. Only, it is with one condition: “to go 
back to the essence.” 
 
This manifestation of an outward glance from Turkey toward the global arena is a good 
starting point for thinking about her international policy, which is called neo-Ottomanism in 
scholarly and journalistic circles. It is highly sensitive to the needs and balance of domestic 
dynamics. Bearing this in mind let us continue our analysis of the global aspects of the 
Turkish nationalism. Neo-Ottomanism initially emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War 
and had been presented by Prime Minister Turgut Özal, and a number of journalists, as 
Turkey’s solution to the changing global power dynamics. As mentioned in the second 
chapter, Ottomanism has been an important stream of nationalism in Turkish social and 
political thought. What changed was the revival, especially at the outset of the 1990s, of 
Ottomanism as a desired international policy that would give more influence over the 
politics in Caucasus, Balkans and Middle East, vast ex-Ottoman territories. Twenty first 
century was heralded as the century of the Turks. The 1993 death of Prime Minister Özal 
and the subsequent economic, socio-political crises impeded the actualization of this fantasy, 
but over the last ten years, the image of Turkey asserting heightened influence in ex-
Ottoman regions was back on the agenda.  Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 2011 speech after his 
third consecutive victory in the national elections was, according to many, a clear 
manifestation of Ottomanism’s revival: “Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much as 
Istanbul, Beirut won as much as İzmir, Damascus won as much as Ankara, Ramallah, 
Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakır.”321 The Strategic Depth, a 
book by Turkish foreign minister (2007 onward) and scholar Ahmet Davutoğlu, is 
considered the manifesto behind neo-Ottomanism.322  
 
Davutoğlu defines Turkey as a relatively newly established nation-state which had a  
defensive and introverted character. Except the weak and ill-equipped attempts during 
Turgut Özal’s presidency, Davutoğlu argues, a defensive, international policy that lacked 
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vision was determined Turkey’s own national imagery. He moves the hands of the clock way 
to offer an alternative reading of Turkish history and identity based on the Ottoman Empire, 
and its legacy.  His choice of the term  “Ottoman-Turkish international policy” reveals the 
continuity in his historical analysis. What emerges out of his analysis is a quite assertive 
identity for Turkey that claims its active role in the dynamic process of global power and 
regional power reconfiguration.323 The new perception of the country must be capable of 
shaping the future for next generations and cultivating with honor and self-esteem.324 It is 
this new Turkey, marching towards her future, that will join the family of the nation   
harmonizing her own regional existential interest with that of the global one.325 Furthermore 
he claims that amongst the superpowers Turkey has a unique place. For Davutoğlu, Turkey’s 
political culture and dynamic character highly distinguishes her from Western Europe and 
America. This distinction, the argument goes, can be best understood in terms of the 
essential difference in the 16th century between the Ottoman Empire’s stable infrastructure 
and European societies’ internal tensions.326 He similarly differentiates Turkey’s political 
culture from the tribal culture of Middle Eastern nations caught up between absolute 
monarchies and totalitarian dictatorships. Eastern European/Near Asian countries are 
differentiated from Turkey, Davutoğlu believes, because social change and transformation in 
Turkey come from the society itself rather than elites’ struggles. The list goes on, 
demarcating Turkey’s political culture is demarcated from those of authoritarian China, other 
East Asian countries, as well as Latin American, and African nation-states.327 In sum, country 
of the West or East nor of the Global South or North would qualify for a regional influence 
power as much as that of Turkish-Ottoman origin. 
 
 It is important to note that in this picture Turkish people and state appear as the chosen 
ones. Therefore what is to be done by politicians and scholars, according to Davutoğlu, is to 
envision a confident strategy for dominance similar to Ottoman Empire’s 16th century 
“Nizam-i Alem” (World Order) project.  In addition drawing on the analogy to the Ottoman 
imperial project, Davutouğlu mentions how important Samuel Huntington’s “the Clash of 
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Civilizations” thesis has been for American foreign policy.328 If Huntington’s work lays out 
the parameters for the future of the U.S international policy, Turkey must find her own 
Huntington and calculate strategic plans for becoming an influential actor. Only then, he 
argues, could the lost battle at the front against the West be reversed.329             
 
During his (2007 onward) term as Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu no doubt strove to 
apply the principles and agenda he had set out as a scholar. His interview with Aljezeera 
News in 2011 is a very good case in point.330 At its outset, following convention, the host 
welcomed the foreign minister to the show “Empire.” With Istanbul’s Bosphorus showing 
in his background, Davutoğlu confidently replied: “Welcome to the capital of the Empire.” 
in the end of the show Davutoğlu elaborated on his joke with a serious and commanding 
tone. The host asked why Turkey would want to be a regional power or even world power. 
Davutoğlu replied: “Which country does not want to be a global power?” Furthermore he 
stated that when European countries become imperial super powers, no fuss is made but 
when Turkey elevates herself to this level, she faces obstacles, prejudice and Orientalist 
perceptions.  
 
Under Davutoğlu’s influence Turkey initiated a number of protocols in what has become is 
broadly known as “Zero Problem [with Neighbors]”. The main aim was to put the traces of 
the previous introverted period behind and become a proactive local and transnational 
trading partner and collaborator. Based on the “Zero Problem” motto, Turkey indeed tried 
to play a leadership role. The attempt to encourage Iran sign an international treaty for the 
control of nuclear weapons in Iran, or enthusiasm to play mediating role in Palestine-Israel, 
and Pakistan-India peace talks, are but a few examples. These attempts have been well 
received in many circles.    
 
As optimistic as this portrayal of a neo-Ottoman foreign policy may sound, the policy 
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nonetheless has run into serious obstacles. Turkey’s recent performance reveals that one 
could almost say the “Zero Problem” motto has resulted in “Zero Peace.” Improving 
relations with the Greeks of South Cyprus was on hold. The protocols initiated with 
Armenia in 2009 were put aside. Turkey’s good relationship with Iran neared a crisis when 
Turkey accepted to host NATO anti-missile shield bases against Iran’s nuclear threat. There 
have been a series of tense events and disputes between Turkey and the Asad regime of 
Syria. Likewise, Turkey and Israel had. Many still wonder how Turkey will deal with the 
Kurdish population in the northern Iraq. Others found Turkey’s stance during the Arab 
spring very problematic and insufficient. While all this is happening the main question mark 
is being placed on neo-Ottomanism and on Turkey’s claim of this heritage. “Is Turkey 
mutating into a neo-Ottoman fantasies and political influence, as critics particularly in the 
Balkans and secularist in the Middle East suggest?”331 Apparently the topic whether Turkey is 
an emerging global power or “soft” and “middle power” will keep journalists and scholars 
occupied.    
 
Dibyesh Anand’s recent work on Chinese and Indian imperial revivalism332 enables us to 
unbind our analysis from the Ottoman-Turkish case and detect strategies and rhetoric 
common in relatively newly independent postcolonial nation-states. Anand’s departure point 
for his brilliant analysis of Postcolonial Informal Empires (PIEs) and the ways in which they 
deal with their past, historical legacy and minorities within their borders, is the overarching 
scholarly tendency to neglect the study of the non-Western states or reduce them to merely 
collaborators or victims.333 Instead, Anand offers insights into emerging economic and 
geopolitical players with limited agenda-setting power in the global order, Postcolonial 
Informal Imperialism and their creation of a self-image, which portrays itself as former 
victims of Western imperialism, and “continuations of historical, great civilizational empires, 
which sets them apart from some Western hegemonic power, such as the United States.”334 I 
find his reading of these nation-states particularly relevant to the Ottoman-Turkish 
experience of Empire for two main elements: i) The nationalist appropriation of the past and 
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ii) the perception of the minorities, ethno religious communities. I would like to quote in 
length from Anand here to bring his eloquent analysis these two essential strands of the 
generation of non-Western post-colonial imperialism. In terms of their use and abuse of the 
past he states that:  
PIEs [Postcolonial Informal Empires] nurture discourses of past and future 
glory. They seek to give a solid base to the core nation-states by marshalling a 
strong historical memory of being great empires in the not-too-distant past 
and striving to regain their rightful place soon. The future is seen in terms of 
a historical continuity ruptured temporally by a couple of hundred years of 
decline.335  
 
This last aspect, the issue of the rupture and of attack-via-disunity-within connects us to the 
perception of the minorities in the emerging powers e.g., Tibetans in China, the Kashmiri 
Muslim in India. 
In PIEs, the minorities especially those on the periphery and those with 
distinct identities, are represented in a manner similar to the Orientalist 
depiction of the non-Western world. The images range from that of a 
grateful, colourful minority to an ungrateful one out to split community. 336 
PIEs have a certain paranoia at the hearth of their being. The fear is that a 
compromise over political control in the periphery is a slippery slope that 
ends with a break up of the empire/state.337  
 
The reason I brought these two issues from experience of China and India to our attention 
is to underscore their uncanny similarity to Ottoman-Turkish case in terms of the 
appropriation of the past to develop an imperial imaginary, civilizational identity, and of the 
treatment and perception of the minorities. From the speeches of the Turkish Prime 
Minister to the foreign affairs minister Davutoğlu’s doctrine of neo-Ottomanism, to the 
Turkish Ottoman historian scholars whose work we’ve closely examined, one can 
throughout detect the portrayal of a victimized people, a glorious Empire fallen victim to 
Western imperial portrayal of a hegemony and the internal backstabbers, the minorities. This 
discourse is pervaded with a resentful yearning for the not-too-distant glorious days of the 
Empire, as they prophesize ascendancy of Turkey that is well deserved due to its Ottoman 
legacy. For the adherents of this neo-colonial fantasy, Turkey’s attempt to regain its “rightful 
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place” in the world history (i.e. becoming a World power, a regional power, among the top 
ten and so on) has been interrupted all too many times. 
 
This imperial imagination of the Turkish nation, as much as the legacy of the glorious past, 
appears haunted by the minority question. Like Tibetans in China, and Kashmiri in India, or 
Kurds, Alevis, and Armenians in Turkey, are all celebrated as symbols of the Ottoman 
multiethnic mosaic’s harmony. These ethnic and religious communities are to be protected 
against themselves, from the perspective of the nationalist discourse, since they do not know 
what is best for them. As we’ve seen in the first chapter, the reluctance of the Turkish state 
authorities to properly acknowledge the cultural differences and rights of the Kurds as well 
as the non-Muslim communities, and their half-hearted attempts to recognize their 
autonomies, are symptoms of this tendency. At the heart of this ambivalent approach, as 
Anand observes for the cases of China and India, lies paranoia about disintegration of the 
unity and sovereign totality of the nation. Insofar as much as the Turkish Prime Minister, 
statesmen and Turkish nativist intellectuals entertain the revival of the Ottoman-Turkish 
Golden Age and strive to mobilize Turkish-Muslim adherents with it, minorities in Turkey 
will keep facing paranoiac perception of otherness. We should note that the fear of the 
nation’s disintegration does not solely target minorities but also other marginalized and 
suppressed groups, such as feminists, dissidents university students, unions, pro-labour and 
human rights activists, environmentalist and feminists. Their demands are likewise seen as a 
threat to the harmony and the totality of the nation.     
 
The chapter of the thesis started off with the premise that Turkish historians’ debate and 
discourse on the Ottoman tolerance and millet system should be seen not just only as myth, 
or ideologically-biased but also as a fantasy that of Turkish-Ottoman nationalism. Drawing 
upon the urgent lessons of post-colonial experience, theory and history, it has investigated 
the pitfalls of uncritically clinging to such an imaginary. Turkish historians and state 
authorities today face the same aporias of the colonial history as had that haunted non-
Western nationalisms and their reaction to their Orientalist image. The next chapter 
considers whether there are alternative ways of remembering the Ottoman past and offers 
different paths toward dealing with the past and its injuries.   
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Chapter Four: 
The Ethics and Politics of  Collective Memory and Mourning: 
Ottoman Loss and Melancholy in Modern Turkey 
 
What kind of a state are we in when we start to think about the state? 
 Judith Butler and Gayatri C. Spivak. Who Sings the Nation?338 
 
 
In the previous chapter we saw that the fantasy of the tolerant Ottoman millet system 
involves a critical pitfall: it offers the image of a pre-colonial and harmonious coexistence 
under the Ottoman rule. As the narrative goes, this idyllic past was thwarted by external 
powers and internal traitors from the turn of the 19th century onwards. In this context, 
Turkish nationalism appears to be an appealing alternative social script, one that is 
continuously reiterated in contemporary Turkish public discourse. The fantasy of Ottoman 
tolerance and peace portrays the golden age before the fall and thus creates a narrative of 
how things went wrong for the Empire. As such, it constitutes a pervasive social text for 
Turkish nationalist historiography that deals with the past as well as the loss of the Empire.  
 
Staging an encounter with the past through questioning: “who are we?” has become an issue 
around the 1980s and the importance of this search intensified over the last decade in 
Turkey. It has become necessary for Turkey to reflect on issues of identity, power and justice 
given Turkey’s recent history. The focus of much of this criticism has been Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk and the founding Republican cadre of elite bureaucrats and army commanders who 
ran the Turkish Republic under a single party regime until the end of 1940s. During this 
period, the official ideology of Kemalism burnt the bridges with the Empire, which 
represented archaic and despotic Oriental society and aimed to create a homogeneous 
Turkish nation composed of Westernized, educated and secular citizens. New state 
institutions were deployed to modernize the population in the areas such as health, law, 
education, and family. After intensive state interventions in various spheres of the society 
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through changes in dress code, alphabet, and marital law between 1923-1950, the following 
decades witnessed emergence of new political visions, parties and leaders in the parliament. 
In the 1960, 1971 and 1980 coup d’etats, the Turkish army led by high-ranking commanders 
directly and physically intervened in Turkish politics. The army, “the gatekeepers” of the 
secular Western republic temporarily declared martial laws on its own accord, not at behest 
of the government of that time, to restore the “security and order” in the country and 
prevent the elected government and the society from “extremism” of all kinds, i.e., 
communism, ultra-nationalism, and Islamism. The army suspended all political activities, and 
arrested and interrogate politicians, bureaucrats, members of political parties and civil society 
organizations, and student activists. Those arrested faced injuries, torture and the death 
penalty for their allegiances. When tanks appeared in the streets of Ankara, in 1997, it was 
conceived of as an ultimatum by the secular Turkish army to the coalition government run 
by the “unruly” pro-Islamic Welfare party, which would eventually gave rise to AKP. This 
event was later considered by the Turkish public and AKP government as another attempted 
coup d’etat. Since coming to power, the AKP has sought to prevent any further army coups. 
Since the 1980s, but particularly since the early 2000s this pro-Islamic nationalist party has 
challenged the power of secular Republican bureaucrats, the bourgeoisie and army leaders 
condemning their suppression of the Ottoman past and their domination of pious Muslim 
Turks, positioned as underdogs the underdogs and “authentic people” of the nation. The 
Turkish parliament has also established a commission to investigate criminal activities behind 
the previous coup d’etat interventions, especially since the 1980s. 
 
Minorities in Turkish politics have been frequently targeted by  state discourse in the modern 
history of Turkey. The year of 1915 marked the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman 
lands, which the Turkish government up until the present has never condemned more than 
half-heartedly. The years 1922-23 marked another catastrophic event in which a forced 
population exchange with Greece moved over a million ethnic Greeks from their towns in 
Western Anatolia. Under the special circumstances of WWII, in 1942, the Turkish 
government subjected its non-Muslim mostly Jewish citizens to a special levy which, in 
certain cases, extracted more than half of their wealth. In September 6-7 of that year, after a 
racist outburst that mobilized thousands, Turkish patriots looted the stores of non-Muslims 
located in the most known boulevard of Istanbul and lynched many people in their 
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neighborhoods and apartments. Many non-Muslims, mostly Greeks fled their homes and left 
their stores and wealth behind – as they also had to do in 1967. These events of racial 
violence demonstrate that the minorities inherited from the Empire were subject to the 
Turkish state’s homogenizing and disciplinary attempts. As a result these state policies the 
number of the non-Muslim minorities became immensely diminished, and of their 
occupations and workplaces had been confiscated or handed over to Turkish Muslims. What 
used to be twenty percent of the late Ottoman population before WWI, has declined to 2.5 
percent in 1920s and is today far less than one percent.  
 
Kurds and Alevis, as Muslims were also Others of the Sunni Muslim Turk idealized by 
Turkish nationalism. They managed to retain their numbers despite that  the Kurdish riots of 
1925 (involving both Zazas and Kırmanci Kurds) and the 1938 Alevi revolts in Dersim had 
been repressed by the state, with more than ten thousand of casualties. There were many 
incidents of massacre, forced migration and torture in the history of Kurds and Alevis from 
the late 1970s onward. The deep impact of the massacres of Alevis Kurds in Maraş in 1978, 
Alevis in Corum in 1980 and in Sivas in 1993, are still being felt by the community. Like the 
Greeks, Armenians and Jews of Turkey, today Alevis and Kurds face the pain and loss of 
these traumatic events in their collective memories.  
 
In addition to various factions vying for control of the state, contemporary Turkey faces 
other pending human rights, civil rights and transitional justice issues. International and local 
non-governmental agencies and minority groups have been making claims for the 
recognition of the injuries and deaths pertaining to the Republican past. While Kurds and 
Alevis, alongside Armenian communities, ask for recognition of losses inflicted as a result of 
ethnic and racial violence, the state wishes to monopolize mourning of deaths and wounds 
of victims and to claim sole ownership of Turkish collective memory and remembrance.339 
Thus a major part of the contemporary political struggle in Turkey is waged over collective 
memory of loss and mourning.  
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Indeed, Turkey is going through many transformations,340 with seemingly contradictory 
events are unfolding. On one hand, the ruling AKP party, seeks reconciliation with Armenia 
and to revitalize commercial activities with it,341 so the AKP Prime Minister Erdoğan is 
holding reconciliation and trade talks with his Armenian counterpart. On the other hand he 
has ordered the demolition of a peace statue during his visit to one of the Eastern Turkish 
provinces near the border of Armenia. In a move towards peace, that AKP government 
recently allowed human rights organizations and Armenian community members to 
commemorate 1915; concurrently, the Turkish state and public reacted with hysteria to the 
French parliament’s adaption of a bill that penalized the denial of the events of 1915 were 
genocide.342 The Prime Minister reminded the French public that France herself had 
committed a bloody genocide in Algeria before and during its decolonization. Furthermore, 
Erdoğan firmly restated that “there is no such genocide in our past and there is no way we 
can admit it.”343 This kind of state discourse displaces blame and acts to deny and silence the 
wounds caused in the past. It also establishes a causal link and attachment to the old order 
and the Ottoman Turkish ancestors by defending the past. This rhetoric indicates that while 
Turkey is moving forward in certain areas concerning its image, it still looks at its own 
history through clouds of denial and silence as it enters the 21st century.  The fantasy of 
Ottoman tolerance plays a crucial role in this process.      
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Is there any discursive space left out of the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance? Are there 
alternative ways of remembering the Ottoman legacy? What are other methods of dealing 
with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the loss of Ottoman civilization than the state-
sanctioned official narrative? In this chapter I will discuss these issues at length. In order to 
be able to properly tackle these questions, let’s first take a thorough look at the ways in 
which conservative (as opposed to revisionist and critical) Ottoman historians and Turkish 
nationalists conceive the loss of the Empire, and cope with both the ills and excesses of the 
Western hegemony.  
 
However, towards the end of the chapter on Ottoman history – be it in a scholarly work or 
high school curriculum material – the clouds start gathering. On the eve of the 19th century, 
the imagined harmony of the Golden Age gives way to the grief caused by the decline and 
fall of the Empire, which in this view created melancholy within the Muslim Turkish psyche. 
According to this narrative, the image of the victorious Turk began to crumble; and it is at 
the turn of the 20th century that he finally succumbs. The historians’ accounts of this fall 
explain why it happened and who had been responsible for it; in other words their narrative 
speaks in the language of causes; of how tolerance had been possible towards the Other, and 
where the limits of tolerance lie.  
 
4.1 The Unbearable Heaviness of External Forces: The Overwhelming 
Influence of the West upon the Empire 
 
Let us begin our exploration of the “Golden Age” and the subsequent collapse with a sketch 
of “external forces” as narrated by scholars of the Ottoman Empire. It is impressed on 
readers of Ottoman history that especially around the 18th century, defeats and land losses 
had become routine rather than exceptional. Thereafter, then the Ottoman state authorities 
tried to resist the great powers of the time, such as Russia, Britain, France and Germany, 
from encroaching geographically and politically. According to Yavuz Ercan, each of these 
powers wanted a share of the Empire: 
The power struggle and interests of the powerful European states converges 
on Ottoman land. For instance, in order to be successful in colonial battle 
Russia had to move into temperate seas, such as the Mediterranean. 
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However, the Ottoman lands were in her way and intervening. The same 
situation holds for Germany and Austria. As for England, the safest and 
shortest way to her colonial lands would pass through the Mediterranean, 
Suez Canal and the Red Sea, which to a large extent were part of Ottoman 
territories. France and Italy on the other hand, due to their Mediterranean 
origin, wanted not to see yet another powerful state in the Mediterranean sea 
but rather to see fewer.344  
 
Due to the conflicting interests of European powers regarding the Empire, which was by 
then regarded as “the sick man of Europe”, the Ottoman state’s total defeat was deferred. 
Meanwhile, what the historians call “powerful European states” or “opportunist and 
imperialist powers” (mainly Russia, England and France) did not aim to conquer the 
Ottoman territories only by way of war.345 They simultaneously sought to agitate and 
organize non-Muslim subjects within the Empire to seek autonomy from it. This is why ex-
Ottoman territories in the Balkans, such as Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria, became 
independent states one after another. According to orthodox Turkish historians’ reading of 
Ottoman history, during the fall of the Empire, these foreign powers had a huge influence 
on the relations between state authorities and non-Muslims. Again, to put it in Yavuz 
Ercan’s words,  
These European foreign powers gave rise to the emergence and spread of 
revolutionary ideas such as enlightenment and nationalism. Having colonized 
almost two thirds of the world, the European states promoted the nationalist 
propaganda among these various ethnic and religious communities that had 
lived on the Ottoman territories for centuries. Once the revolts began, [the 
European states] immediately sided with those groups and, as a result of this 
support, first Serbia, then Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and the other Balkan 
states separated one by one and became independent.346 
 
Accordingly, these European states damaged the Empire not only by causing land loss 
through revolts and conquests but also by disturbing the harmonious coexistence in what 
remained of the Empire. In this way, Christian minorities were divided in accordance with 
the stakes of outside powers in the declining Empire: Catholics in Turkey were safeguarded 
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mainly by France, Italy, and Austria; Protestants by Great Britain, Germany, and the USA, 
and the Orthodox by Russia. Each of the European state, including Russia, directly or 
indirectly would cause unrest and agitation, and encourage them to revolt.347  
 
4.2 “Stabbed in the Back”: Ottoman Non-Muslims as Accomplices 
 
In the historians’ narrative, “internal threats” play a keyed role in digging the grave of the 
Empire. As the narratives above reveal to us, non-Muslims appear as the puppets of 
imperialist states, fooled into agitated against their own Empire. In this picture, we are asked 
to believe that non-Muslims would not have wished for independence or extended rights, 
had these desires not been ignited by outside forces. This sort of belief applies in perhaps 
most imperial situations: when a nation or minority group’s separation or independence 
comes to be at stake, they are often accused of acting against own interest under the 
influence of agitators, as in this quote from Salahi Sonyel:         
Some of the Christian spiritual and communal leaders started to collaborate 
with the foreign powers in their intrigues by abusing the rights and privileges 
granted by the Empire, which created a state within a state. Fooled by the 
promise of autonomy or independence these Ottoman subjects were 
manipulated by the great powers striving to divide and annihilate the 
Ottoman state.348  
 
Non-Muslims in the Empire became the “instruments” of the European states yet, 
according to Ottoman historians, the fall of the empire did not hinder them from improving 
their conditions and wealth. During the 18th and 19th countries, as the narrative of the 
Ottoman loss goes, non-Muslim communities’ influence penetrated in all spheres of state 
and society.349 Thus, the historians’ fantasy of the fall disparages the imagined enjoyment and 
wealth of non-Muslim communities and subjects, contrasting these to Muslim Turkish 
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losses. This is an imagined class war, where the Other ends up enjoying its difference more 
than the Self. For Mustafa Gülcan for instance, “the most important reason behind the fact 
that these communities’ (millets’) wish for independence came true was the privileges 
granted by capitulations and the protective policies of the Western states, which enabled the 
communities to economically develop themselves.”350 According to Bilal Eryılmaz, the non-
Muslims “became economically better off compared to the Muslims, at the same time as 
they cooperated with foreigners who sought commercial and industrial privileges granted to 
the non-Muslims, consequently the non-Muslims increased their wealth and welfare while 
becoming highly influential in the governance of the state and attaining a privileged position 
in terms of education and economy.”351 Similarly, Demirağ firmly believes that “the non-
Muslims [who] sent their children to Europe for their education and raised them with the 
Western culture and [who] attained high ranking posts and benefited greatly from exemption 
from military service and they rebelled with the desire of independence.352  
 
In their recount of the past, what really bothers these historians in their remembrance of the 
past is that despite the privileges and wealth that non-Muslims enjoyed, they betrayed and 
wrecked the Empire in times of turbulence. The Ottoman non-Muslim communities’ 
accumulation of economic, social and political capital, especially in the 19th century, is seen as 
a theft of enjoyment that was inaccessible to “Muslim Turks.” This theft is inscribed in 
collective memory and the political unconscious of the historians and of the Turkish society 
in general.  In Kücük’s words, “despite the good will and tolerance of Turks, non-Muslim 
minorities (whether Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian, Jewish), facilitated the enemies’ plans and 
some of them even collaborated with enemies instead of helping Turks who were 
surrounded and attacked on all sides.”353 Furthermore, Kücük concludes that through the 
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tragic flaw of goodwill and tolerance, which had to allowed these Others to retain their 
ethnic and religious identity, Muslim Turks of the Empire essentially dug their own grave.354        
 
Another historian, Bilal Eryılmaz, expresses a similar mood of vexation in the following 
sentences: 
The issue that has to be thought of is why these communities that had 
coexisted with each other for a long time begs to pursue the idea of 
independence and why they ended up at a point like this.  Why did the 
Greeks – ha been endowed with opportunities and rights unavailable during 
the Byzantine era and who were already a state within a state – feel the need 
to form a state? Another non-Muslim community, the Armenians, attempted 
to collaborate with the enemies at the most critical point and stab in the back 
the [Ottoman] state that granted them rights non-existing before the Seljuks 
and Ottomans, permitted them to select their own theocratic leaders, 
assigned them to influential state posts, trusted them so much that they were 
called “the Loyal Nation”. Why then, had the Jews, who had spread to the 
most remote corners of the world to flee from the Christian smack, who had 
taken refuge in Ottoman lands due to the cruelty of Spanish, German and 
other European nations, did not consider themselves Ottomans.355 
 
This point has a special significance in explaining what was going to happen to the non-
Muslim communities during the collapse of the Empire. We are asked to believe that, under 
the conditions of war, Turks might have been so frightened as to lose their humanity, not 
only with the Armenians but also with Pontus Greeks in the Black Sea region or in the 
Balkans.356 For this reason we are told to conceive of what happened to the non-Muslim as 
both an indignation and reaction to destruction of the Empire from inside and outside 
forces. When Ortaylı writes “during the process of the fall of the Empire various 
communities and parties entered into irrational fights” and therefore the histories of the 
Armenians or Greeks “should not be confused with the anti-Semitism in France or 
Germany,”357 he asks us to believe that Turks might have been so frightened as to lose their 
humanity.  
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As we have seen in previous chapters, references to the Holocaust and anti-Semitism are key 
themes that recur not only in the work of Ortaylı but also other historians taking up theme 
of the Ottoman tolerance, whether critically or otherwise. As a counterpoint to the “ethnics 
problems” of the Ottoman Empire, the Holocaust occupies a vital place in the remembrance 
of the Turkish history and in formations of Turkish identity. The underlying message is that 
Europe was much worse.  This extra-territorial quality of Holocaust memory, which has 
transcended national boundaries and become part of global collective memory, was nicely 
captured by Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, who argue that events such as the Holocaust 
are becoming increasingly embedded in the “everyday life and moral life worlds of an 
increasing number of people” reflecting on their own nations’ histories.358 Turkey’s 
relationship with the Holocaust warrants investigation in this dissertation, as the 
appropriation of Holocaust memories provides a means of explaining how Turkishness and 
Turkish identity have been formed with reference to European modernity. Anti-Semitism in 
Europe and especially the Holocaust are critical reference points and a negative foil against 
which Turkish native intellectuals-historians set the image of the “humanist” and 
“benevolent” Turk.  As far as this comparison goes, the Ottoman state authorities extended 
more tolerance towards the minorities within the Ottoman Empire and what they did to 
those communities under conditions of war is not comparable to an event as ghastly as the 
Holocaust. In another interview, Ortaylı gives a similar account for the destiny of the non-
Muslims during the collapse of the Empire:   
There occurred many bloody incidents between the First World War and 
the War of Independence. Bloody incidents happened in the 19th century’s 
Black Sea region and at the turn of the 20th century in Eastern Anatolia 
which were heavily populated by the Armenians and Kurds. Discussing 
issue of what-happened-to-who is of no avail. Because there is no loyalty 
in these sectors [read the non-Muslim communities]. For this very reason 
these non-Muslim communities have nothing to say about commitment to 
living together since they were the ones who welcomed the occupying 
forces marching towards Istanbul during the Balkan War.359    
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In such narratives of Ottoman historians, we encounter a portrayal of the Ottoman non-
Muslims as enjoying economic, social and religious rights and freedoms that they could not 
then have accessed in many places in Europe. It is as though they had been equal citizens, 
with rights to own land and property and to excel in state service without forced or self-
imposed conversion; it is as though there were no restrictions or limitations upon their rights 
as Ottoman subjects. In addition, we are told time and again that with support of European 
imperial powers, non-Muslims played an important role in the fall of the Empire.  The Other 
became the enemy that betrayed the Muslim Turks from within. This resentment informs 
today’s public and political discourse in Turkey not only in terms of perception of a non-
Muslim alterity, but also in terms of Alevi, Kurdish and other Republican minorities. 
 
4.3 (Self)reproach towards the Ottoman-Turkish Ancestors of  the 
Republican Society 
  
Though narratives of the loss and fall of the Empire fault both imperial Western powers and 
the “traitor” non-minorities, another factor lurks in the background, between the lines, are 
touched on only in passing. One can detect in contemporary fantasies of Ottoman tolerance 
both aggression and self-reproach towards the Ottoman-Turkish forebears of modern 
Turkish society. Hostility towards Ottoman state authorities, the Turkish-Muslim governors 
of the Empire in particular, reveals how ambivalent and conflicted the affective bond is 
between the ancestors and the succeeding generations (e.g. Turkish historians of the 
Ottoman Empire). Let’s take a detailed look at how the Ottoman ancestors failed to modern 
Turkey as narrated by do as narrated by these historians. Ercan provides a typical account:  
The reformation movements undertaken by the Ottoman State aimed to 
prevent the interventions of the European states rather than saving or 
developing the collapsing state. Therefore, these so-called reforms, and 
insufficient reformation movements could not prevent the fall of the state; 
on the contrary they accelerated the attacks and riots”.360 Although the 
reforms brought up since the Tanzimat increased in terms of their extent, 
                                                
360 Yavuz Ercan, “Türkiye`de Azınlık Sorununun Kökeni: Osmanli’dan Cumhuriyet`e Gayrimüslimler,” [The 
Origin of Minority Question in Turkey: Non-Muslims from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic] 13. 
141 
they nonetheless remained bad imitations and could not yield the desired 
results. 361   
 
The same author also diagnoses why the Tanzimat (Reorganization) reforms of 1839-1876 
remained insufficient and bad replicants of Western models of modernity, i.e. because, “the 
Ottoman state did not pay attention to the inventions in the West, on the contrary it 
constantly relied on its own power”. Moreover “institutions became corrupted; the 
educational system, and thus the sphere of science, collapsed, and the economy turned into 
that of a semi-periphery.”362   
 
Another author, Yetişkin, essays a similar account of the failure of the Ottomans in 
consolidating the country and uniting the Empire. According to Yetişkin,  
the Ottomans failed to make necessary changes as the time required. In 
Europe, such developments as the Renaissance, the Reformation, Scientific 
Revolution, the French Revolution and finally the Industrial Revolution had 
made fundamental changes in administrations, religious affairs, social and 
cultural structures.363  
 
From his perspective, “such ideas as humanity, freedom, democracy, nationalism, human 
rights, constitutional rights, individualism and liberty increasingly affected public and 
governmental lives. When these ideas entered the Ottoman Empire, the rulers had difficulty 
dealing with them.”364 
 
Though self-reproach towards Turkish forefathers is expressed above, at the end of the day 
these affects are overshadowed by hatred for external enemies and internal betrayers. The 
latter occupy the center of the narrative whereas self-reproach is only faintly expressed. The 
fantasy of the Ottoman millet system does not confront the failure of the ancestors or to the 
hostility and anguish arousing from it. As long as the question of the Ottoman-Turkish 
ancestors’ and the old order’s role in the Empire’s demise is denied, ignored or indirectly 
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confronted, it would be very difficult to sustain robust relation between the subject of 
Turkish nationalism and minorities in Turkey.365  
 
The disintegration and loss of the Empire has left its traces in the contemporary political 
unconscious as a traumatic event. What are the ways of responding to this loss? What makes 
it troubling to continually remember the “sick man” (if we borrow the common metaphor of 
the collapsing Empire), and his dead body as a trope in today’s Turkey? At the turn of the 
20th century, even as the Ottoman Empire was facing its disintegration, Sigmund Freud as 
endeavoring to connect loss to remembrance. His work has become a key source for 
investigating the catastrophes, traumatic events and losses of the modern age.366 If we 
remember that Freud himself was invested in both understanding and curing traumatized 
survivors of WWI, we realized that his interest transcended the clinical setting. His work 
become a touchstone for scholars problematizing the social and collective process of the 
emergence of loss, trauma and grief, and how they are addressed. Post-Freudian scholars 
now conceive of melancholy and morning as problems that, for survivors of mass trauma – 
of wars, racism, genocide, apartheid, migration, decolonization, colonial oppression, atomic 
bombs and the AIDS epidemic – are intrinsically linked to the process of modernity.  
 
This perspective initiated by Freud opened up possibilities for contemporary scholars to 
problematize social and collective aspects of loss. Although it was written in the clinical 
context this work yielded insights and analytical tools to analyze how loss, trauma and grief 
emerge and are dealt with in social and political space. In the contemporary literature this 
connection between the self and the social world has been made. Post-Freudian scholars 
now conceive melancholia and mourning as fundamentally historical problem linked to the 
experience of modernity. From the victims of genocides, wars, racism, migration, 
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decolonization, colonial oppression, and apartheid to those affected by the devastating 
impacts of the atomic bombs in Japan and the AIDS epidemic, recent contemporary 
literature looked at how the imprints of the traumatic historical processes of modernity were 
worked through in collective and cultural settings.367  
 
4.4 Social Losses and Melancholia 
 
For Freud, there are at least two fundamental ways of dealing with the grief of loss, whether 
it be personal or collective, such as in the loss of a “homeland.” The first is for the ego to be 
attached to the lost object in a melancholic way, so that “the melancholic lives with the 
dead”, and “becomes literally the object jettisoned in the grave.”368 Why is it so troubling to 
live with the dead? Is it not virtuous to remain loyal to them and keep their image alive? 
From the Freudian lens, the “shadow” of the lost object is seen to fall upon the ego and its 
apparently irrevocable wound haunts and possesses the present. The too-soon and too-
sudden shock of a traumatic event and the loss it inflicts can not be fully known and 
registered in the consciousness until it imposes itself, repeatedly, in the nightmares and 
repetitive actions of the survivor.369 The past’s wound and the present state of affairs 
become indistinguishable: everything that follows the loss is seen and understood by 
reference to it. Freud enumerates a number of features that are characteristic of the 
melancholic response to loss: “painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, 
loss of capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and lowering of self-regarding feelings to a 
degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-reviving, and culminates in a 
delusional expectation of punishment.”370 
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Amongst these features I want to focus particularly on self-reproach for a moment, as it is 
the most significant for an analysis of post-colonial nationalism and its subjectivities, as well 
as for how the society copes with the loss of desired socio-political harmony and pre-
colonial authenticity. This should come as no surprise to us after having touched in the third 
chapter upon the affective aspects of derivative nationalisms’ strategies for dealing with pre-
modern times. While dealing with self-reproach, the melancholic subject is so fixated on the 
lost object as to simultaneously lives with it and dies. No distance remains between the 
melancholic subject and the lost object. Psychoanalytically informed analysis would remind 
us that as the distance between the melancholic subject and its loved ones (e.g. the Empire, 
the Ottoman-Turkish ancestors) vanishes, the melancholics’ reproach towards the lost one is 
expressed as self-reproach. But why is the lost one to be reproached in the first place?       
 
As Darian Leader eloquently puts it, “[f]or Freud, the melancholic’s self-reproach is in fact a 
reproach to the lost one” because “the absence is never accepted without rage.”371 Seen from 
this perspective, the loss of the Empire, the fall of paradise, cannot be easily accepted by the 
adherents of the Turkish nationalist fantasy. Obviously both affection and nostalgia are felt 
towards the Turkish ancestors of the Golden Age. Yet simultaneously there exists anger and 
hostility towards the Ottoman ancestors since it was they and their superficial attempts, as 
the narrative goes, who could not prevent the fall of the Empire despite all of those 
superficial attempts. We are told that their unsuccessful reforms, in the end, proved only to 
satisfy the interests of Western states and the Empire’s minorities.  The next generations 
(including the generation of the Ottoman historians) felt a sense of abandonment in this loss 
– an abandonment is manifested in their narratives of nationhood today.  
 
It is not possible for a melancholic subject to articulate the hostility and anger he feels for 
the loved lost one, since his intimate identification with the lost object creates an ambivalent 
distance. This unaccounted, unresolved anger is likely to overwhelm the self. In many cases, 
this hostility is managed by being directed against Others. How hatred towards the 
Ottoman-Turkish predecessors is displaced onto the external and immanent others can 
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readily be observed. Since Ottoman historians deeply identify with their Turkish-Muslim 
ancestors, despite their critical remarks on past failures, they place responsibility for the 
Ottoman fall upon non-Muslims. Even a cursory look at the amount of ink dedicated to 
minorities and the “destruction” they caused reveals this tendency.  
 
Prominent scholar on collective and national memory and trauma Eric Santner underscores 
a similar danger to the post WWII generations in Germany. For Santner, narcissistic 
identification with the old order of Germany, as represented by Hitler and National 
Socialism, makes it very difficult to properly encounter loss. Instead this identification with 
the old regime sustains an inability or refusal to mourn the atrocities of the past because a 
“fantasy of omnipotence” that is a “fantasy of return to the purity of a self-identity” blocks 
the process. In this narcissistic fantasy, “losses are never necessary or irrevocable there to be 
lost in the first place.”372 Furthermore, this fantasy of the nation is deeply implicated in “the 
notion that alterity is something that requires a solution” and narcissism that projected 
difference and otherness as something that could and should be purged from an otherwise 
pure system that is seamlessly continuous with the self.373    
 
Inasmuch as a nostalgic Turkish national identity is enjoyed, the desire for seamless group 
identity is sought and the narcissistic attachment to a loved object is sustained, the 
perception of the Other, the Ottoman non-Muslim communities, is doomed to remain 
hostile. Whether a Jew, an Armenian, a Greek, or any other person seen as a threat to the 
fantasy of omnipotent Turkish identity and the self-image, the Other is understood as an 
element to be disposed from the social body. It is as if, under conditions of war, the image 
of the victimized Turkish-Ottoman is defending himself against the minorities. Such 
defenses, coupled with experiencing the perceived weight of history as the worst loss of all, 
do nothing but prevent the possibility of dealing with the loss. In Freud’s jargon, the 
melancholic subject acts out the traumatic event in the same loop rather than working 
through the traumatic loss. Hence, the past is reenacted and reincarnated in the present.       
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Being caught up in the fantasy of the nation leaves no alternative to confusing the 
Armenians of the past with those of in the present. This holds for the other communities of 
the Ottoman state: Greeks, Bulgarians, Arabs and so on, who are seen as traitors to be held 
culpable for the loss of paradise.  The image nationalist historiography creates of the West is 
likewise haunted by the intrusion of the past in the present. While Turkish state authorities 
point to the European Union and its reforms as a goal on one hand, on the other hand the 
same authorities and their pedagogical nationalist discourse readily evoke the historical image 
of the West/Europe as overwhelming forces playing various tricks to conquer and divide the 
country. This inflamed ambivalence between the Turkish and European identities only 
complicates the prospect of reconciliation in the future.  
 
If this is one way of dealing with the loss of civilization, as it was known, are there 
alternative paths to encountering the injuries and the traumas of the past? What conditions 
would trigger a move away from melancholy, living with the dead, displacing unaccounted 
hostility towards the loved ones to the others around us, away from the suffocating loop of 
repetitious reenactments that collapse past and present? What would be needed for the 
energy invested in these resistances to be transformed into strategies of working through the 
past? 
 
4.5 Mourning Social Losses and Traumas 
 
Another way of relating to loss according to Freud, is mourning, wherein the subject 
responds to the lost object by relinquishing it go. “Mourning impels,” as Freud has put it, 
“the ego to give up the object by declaring the object to be dead and offering the ego the 
inducement of continuing to live.”374 Through the mourning process the subject comes to 
leave the lost object behind. By working painstakingly through the past, the ego breaks out 
of the loop of recreating the specter of loss and learns to live in spite of it. In Dominick La  
Capra’s words, mourning  
involves a different inflection of performativity [as opposed to 
melancholic reaction]: a relation to the past that involves recognizing its 
difference from the present –simultaneously remembering and taking 
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leave of or actively forgetting it, thereby allowing for critical judgment and 
reinvestment in life, notably social and civic life with its demands, 
responsibilities, and norms. 375 Moreover through mourning and the at 
least symbolic provision of proper burial, one attempts to assist in 
restoring to victims the dignity denied them by their victimizers.376  
 
While I agree with LaCapra, there still remains a critical reminder for us regarding Freud’s 
notion of “giving up” the lost object. What Freud means by “giving up the object by 
declaring the object dead” is not merely its shallow appropriation — i.e., forgetting the lost 
ideal or country and becoming attached to the new ones.377 The key difference between 
mourning and melancholy is not the former’s “normative supremacy” and latter’s 
“pathological status.” Rather, it is that in the mourning process one makes an effort to 
distance oneself from the loved one and entertain a different relation to it, rather than fully 
identifying with it. Admittedly mourning is a difficult venture, to put again in Freudian 
terms, it is an “arduous task” at which we often fail. There are no guarantees. Even Freud 
with his enduring commitment to the transformation of melancholy, once said: “Experience 
has taught us that psycho-analytic therapy - the freeing of someone from his neurotic 
symptoms, inhibitions and abnormalities of character - is a time consuming business.”378 
          
That this task is burdensome is no reason not to attempt it. It may yield constructive shifts in 
our perception of others and their pain.379 In other words, mourning or in our particular 
understanding, taking a different position from one’s melancholic attachment to the Empire, 
involves emerging from the cocoon of a narcissistic group imaginary that allows one to 
perceive other people in their complexity. It calls for a traversal of the fantasy of alterity, 
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which sees the Other as a threat intruding on an otherwise seamless national identity and 
social body. Moreover to make mourning part of public discourse and open up a space for a 
robust dialogue about the injuries of the past would be a key intervention. “Mourning 
without solidarity is the beginning of madness,” as Santner nicely puts it.380 Encountering the 
past traumas caused by wars and the festering wounds of the fall of the Empire cannot be 
undertaken in the solitude of Turkish subjectivity; the presence of the others or third party, 
and their stories and affects must be inscribed into the public record. Rather than fixing 
everything to merely onto a monolithic narrative such as the fantasy of the Ottoman 
tolerance, one can remember the past through Armenians, Greeks, Kurds and other minority 
perspectives on the Empire’s fall.    
 
Otherwise we may find ourselves locked in a cycle of narcissistic remembering of Turkish 
ancestors and identity, minorities are perceived of the once victorious who became victims 
of minorities, of their own tolerance and hospitality. Therein, everything other than 
Turkishness becomes to be a problem to be solved – the Kurdish Problem, the Armenian 
Problem etc. The tempting fantasy of a once harmonious Empire has immense grip on its 
adherents and on political and public discourse; it posits that a paradise of multiculturalism 
and peace existed until the non-Muslims betrayed it. This fantasy has proven tempting and 
has seemingly lots of purchase power in the political and public discourse. To escape this 
narrative requires a transition in our fantasmatic imagination of the Other and necessitates a 
different stance towards the ethics of alterity. It that the defense mechanisms we deploy 
when we write and remember national histories be renounced and our desire to entertain our 
epic fantasies be resisted, that we instead confront the mundane ugliness of our own history. 
This transition involves the ability and will to not fully confuse the characters of past with 
those of the present. It asks for a readiness to distinguish the “Greeks,” “Armenians,” and 
“Arabs” of the past from today’s minorities and ethnic religious communities. This should 
not be understood as a call to forget history or become mute about it Turkish history. To 
this end, as I underscored above, the ability to hear, learn and read minority histories and 
their pain during the fall is important.  
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To be clear, melancholic national identity and remembrance may well be productive in the 
aftermath of a loss. It is an open-ended process. In the contemporary literature on 
melancholy there are many scholars who underscore the melancholic agency’s political 
potential. They find in Freud’s understanding of melancholia “a persistent struggle with its 
lost objects, not simply a grasping and holding on to a fixed notion of the past but rather 
continuous engagement with loss and its remains.”381 This potential of the melancholic 
condition is seen as vital for politics for the marginalized, oppressed and colonized 
communities and minorities.382 
 
I am aware this reading of melancholy. In it, having lost an object, whether loved one or an 
Empire, makes us constantly conjure up their image. Melancholic attachment to the past is 
not pathological in and of itself or normatively inferior. Productive and open-ended as this 
melancholic condition may be, it becomes troubling when all the images of the object are 
reduced to a single image, and all voices and narratives are reduced to one and the same. 
One ought not to too readily accept and glorify the melancholic attachment to the Empire 
and the Turkish-Muslim ancestors just because it engenders dynamism and constructive 
possibility, and because there is no ahistorical and universal ethical ground to normatively 
judge it.        
 
A few ethical paths open to us to consider when we remember the sufferings and traumas of 
the fall and aftermath.  One is to find the traces of minority stories.  On this matter, 
Santner’s reading stands out for its illuminating suggestions that it’s possible to detect the 
sketches of past possibilities by examining not only what has happened in history, but also 
what could have come to pass.383 These instances would be, for him “the traces of 
knowledge denied, of deeds left undone, of eyes averted from pain, of shades drawn, of 
moments when it might have been possible to ask a question or to resists, but one didn’t ask 
and one didn’t resist.384 According to Santner, this notion of the subjectivity enables us to 
                                                
381 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 4. 
382 The Difference between melancholia and mourning and its implications of this divergence for social analysis 
have been the subject of much recent discussion, and this is not the place to rehearse those intricate debates. 
For a sophisticated attempt at this task, see Greg Forter, “Against Melancholia: Contemporary Mourning 
Theory, Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, and the Politics of Unfinished Grief,” Differences 14, no.2 (2005). 
383 Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects, 152. 
384 Ibid., 153. 
150 
play with boundaries of the self and the Other (instead of refusing them or reifying them), 
and to claim solidarity which the oppressed of history, past and present.385 
 
Once we reframe our vision with these ethical concerns in mind, we can acknowledge the 
heteroglossia of alternative histories and ways of remembering the Ottoman past alongside 
the pedagogical national history and fantasy. By bracketing the story of the always-already 
victimized Turkish identity that is perpetually set forth in historical narrative, it is possible to 
encounter the stories of collective memory that attempt to register non-Muslim communities 
and their affects wrought by expulsions, loss of the loved ones, health and home.     
 
4.6 Alternative Ways of Remembering the Ottoman Loss and Minorities 
 
A rapidly flourishing terrain of collective memory work, puts the above-mentioned ethics of 
collective remembrance at its center. These works, while remembering the past, take issue 
with the old order, by acknowledging both its violence towards minorities in the past as well 
as the possibilities of resistance and solidarity with the oppressed in the present. One of the 
most recent and interesting recent works, Speaking to One Another: Personal Memories of the Past 
in Armenia and Turkey, which involves anthropologists, academics and human right activists 
of contemporary Turkey is a good case in point.386 Its approach is to render audible the voice 
of local and individual narratives alongside official didactic discourse. Such collective 
memory work re-traces the past such as the events took place between the Armenians and 
Muslims of the Empire.387 This work attempts to register the tragedy of the past not only 
through not only the perspective of current day Turks but also through a multiplicity of 
voices including those of Ottoman Armenian, Greeks and Kurds.388 We can understand it as 
a significant departure point for creating a collective understanding for pursuing dialogue 
and inviting the presence of the third party [future generations on both side] by fostering a 
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space which has been curtailed and hindered by the rhetoric of official history. It is a work of 
mourning undertaken in the presence of the Others. Oral histories and interviews conducted 
with the grandchildren of the generations of people who experienced the events of 1915 
open up a space to register the pain of the catastrophic experiences of Ottoman Others and 
thus enable us to register various perspectives by viewing their narratives from the ground. 
Moreover, this study constitutes  
 
Another important intervention performed by collectively recounting memories and 
mourning is that these allow us to confront and come to terms with feelings such as regret 
and sin. This encounter in turn opens up a crucial space for contradictory and overwhelming 
affects such as self-reproach to be expressed.  Within Speaking to One Another, Turkish 
interviewee Kamil’s story reflects many of these ambivalent affects. He recalls what 
happened between Turks and Armenians (“gavurs”/“infidels”) as narrated by his father and 
grandfather around 1915, when his father had been only a child. He reflects through his 
narrative the common nostalgic tendency among the contemporary dwellers of his small 
Anatolian town where to recall a past whence harmonious relations between Turkish and 
Armenian residents ruled. However, Kamil tells, for some reason, this companionship and 
neighborliness were deeply cut and destroyed. At some point, as the interviewer nicely 
underscores, Kamil turns towards the official rhetoric and uses its narratives to explain the 
causes of the rupture of the community which heavily affected not only the Armenians but 
also Turkish residents.  
 
According to Kamil: 
These guys [the Ottoman Armenians] were decent honest people. Only, crap 
came in between, somebody derailed them, somebody indoctrinated them 
and the two people became enemies. According to what my grandfather told 
me, they were cheerful people. Until when? Until these provocations 
happened.389  
 
This narrative sounds all too familiar and comes as no surprise given our discussion on 
Ottoman peace and tolerance. What Kamil resorts to in explaining the loss resonates with 
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what historians and scholars celebrating Ottoman tolerance and peace fantasy most often 
produce and circulate. Yet, in his narrative another voice and trace of memory emerges too. 
It shows that it may be possible to refuse to explain everything with reference to external 
forces and to perform a kind of subjectivity that can claim solidarity with the victims of the 
rise of Turkish nationalism.  
According to Kamil:      
You rip men from the land on which they have been living for thousands of 
years and send them away. I ask you, can such a cruel thing be accepted! It 
can’t, right? [...] There is a mistake, an obvious mistake made by the 
Ottomans.390 
 
Furthermore: 
Look I noticed something interesting, these men were cultivated. And when 
they were gone, Turks froze in astonishment, like, ‘who is going to construct 
our stairs, who is going to sew our clothes, who is going to do our work?’ 
They did not know anything [...] If there was not this separation, if we were 
living with Armenians, maybe Akşehir would be rich, very successful in trade 
and industry... Maybe if they stayed here, Turkey would be a very advanced 
society. This is one of the points about which I’m sorry.391 
 
One can read a narcissistic tone in the rationale to retain these lost Armenian neighbors, 
whose departure impedes the development of commercial activities of the town. In other 
words, I read these sentences with caution. There are clearly other important affects and 
wishes present in this narrative: traces of solidarity with the victim, a reference to possible 
other “points about which I’m sorry” and gesture of going beyond calculating the interest of 
his town and pure utilitarianism.         
 
If something else had happened, and these Armenians who were part of everyday life had 
not left, life could have unfolded differently. The Other here appears as someone who 
should have been saved and not as a problem to be solved. It is important to be able to 
remember this figure of the Armenian and register its role in our everyday life and mourn its 
absence. “What might have been but was not” is catalyst for us to face the sins, regrets and 
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self-reproaches of the past and maintain the dynamism of mourning.392 It may trigger a 
reconfiguration and rearrangement in relations with the Armenians of today. It raises the 
question of what could be done to address the injuries of the survivors. It makes us question 
whether other social spaces can be created to mourn the losses and pains of the Armenian 
and other ethnic religious communities of the Empire. Collective mourning fosters 
possibilities for those minorities, both survivors and for their successors who consider 
moving back to their places of origin. Confiscated property could be returned and 
compensations could be made for losses could be provided by governments. Public 
commemorations could be arranged to undertake the task of mourning collectively rather 
than in solitude. The heartening news is that there are rapidly increasing numbers of 
examples of each of these forms at reconciliation in Turkey.  
 
I concur with Santner that to remember lost opportunities is crucial and that oppressed 
histories must be brought to light of day as a means to reconcile our relationship with the 
Other. What I would like to add are comments on the study and remembrance of Turkish 
figures and moments of resistance. Of course, the point would not be find or create an 
innocent and benevolent Turkish character, or to keep the narcissistic Turkish core intact by 
doing so. The aim of introducing these minor histories is not to write yet another glorious 
history. However, emphasis must be placed on those who resisted orders and saved others 
rather than inciting injury during the disintegration of the Empire. It is important to bring 
these characters (who acted at the liminal line of self-other) into the public memory and 
collective remembrance. Commemoration of the Turkish ancestors who seized opportunities 
to protect the lives of Armenians, Greeks, or Jews must be brought to our attention. This is 
admittedly one of the most effective ways of studying minor(ity) histories and dealing with 
the traumas and injuries the past. Investigating the found opportunities for resistance nicely 
complements considering the lost opportunities for solidarity with the victim.   
 
This point calls to mind the significant gesture of a founding member of pro-Kurdish 
opposition party, BDP, who moved that the Turkish parliament declare the official 
commemoration of April 24th, the anniversary of the Armenian genocide, as the “Day of 
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Mourning and Sharing the Pain of the Victims of 1915.” What this parliament member said 
later during a press conference is meaningful to think about how to approach the traumas 
and sorrows of the catastrophes of the fall of the Empire. 
Such a thing happened on this soil. The Union and Progress Party created 
this massacre. The equivalent of this in all world languages is genocide. Their 
property assets and cultural assets were sacked as were their bodies. What 
should be done in this situation is to condemn the ones who participated in 
this crime of murder rather than using the defense of ‘our grandfathers did 
not do this’.  To encounter the pains of the past is to share those pains. What 
must be done is therefore to establish the future with empathy (merhamet).393    
 
What the member of parliament sought to emphasize is that commemoration of those army 
personnel, local governors, bureaucrats and others who found and seized opportunities for 
resistance is important for a dialogue with the Ottoman-cum-Turkish Others to be initiated 
and sustained. It is through the ancestors who somehow traversed the boundaries of Self-
Other dichotomy and disobeyed orders that one can have solidarity with the victims of these 
catastrophes and their descendants. Though this shouldn’t be taken as the only viable 
practice of commemoration that must be done and repeated, ad infinitum. There is also the 
risk of turning ancestral figures of resistance into monuments of nationalism with which 
future generations can narcissistically identify. Thus these potentially monumentalized 
Turkish figures may lose their initial transformative potential. In summary, it’s important to 
recognize that we may not need to invoke these figures forever, though for now their 
remembrance and public acknowledgment may yield a new means of addressing the past.  
Remembrance of resistors to the status quo aids in creating feelings of solidarity with the 
victim as a part of Republican public culture. This constitutes an important step towards 
registering the injuries of the past in the presence of third parties, instead of mourning in 
solitude and isolation.  
4.6.1 Turkish Nationalism’s Quest for the Other 
 
It is possible to find reflections of ethics of collective mourning in certain historical novels. 
For instance Kemal Yalçın’s autobiographic novel, Emanet Çeyiz: Mubadele İnsanlari (The 
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Entrusted Dowry: Peoples of the Exchange) is a paradigmatic case.394 Winner of peace prizes in 
literature, the novel probes into the times of turmoil following the Empire’s fall when 
population exchange caused suffering and losses. The novel tells the story of a dowry 
entrusted to a Turkish family by their Greek neighbors in a small Anatolian village. It is a 
story about Turkish ancestors who refuse to see their Greek neighbors as enemies. The 
protagonist, Kemal, narrate the story by relying on fragments of what his father had 
witnessed when he was eight years old in 1915. As a child, Kemal had worked in the fields 
where his father would tell him stories about the landscape and dwellers of these lands. 
During these retellings Kemal learns what Greek men, women and children in their village 
had experienced around 1915. He recounts sewing machines, pots, pans and bedding being 
ransacked, as well as women and children being put in one of the local barns. His father 
remembers the day their Greek neighbor brought her little girls’ dowry to entrust it to his 
family and then walked away from the village.      
 
After hearing the stories of his father’s Greek neighbors, in his adult years, Kemal decides to 
find and return the dowry to whom it belongs. Eventually he learns that the former Greek 
residents had been part of a population exchange. He was told that his father’s village had 
received many émigrés from the Vrasno and Kastro villages of Thessalonica, Greece so that 
these villages would be a good place for his guest to start. During his journey he encounters 
both Greeks sent away from Turkey and Anatolian Turkish Muslims in Greece. This novel 
opened a valuable space for acknowledgement of the affects of Greek minorities, the grief of 
the Other facing loneliness and poverty as result of the loss of family wealth and 
livelihood.395     
 
Stories like The Entrusted Dowry that confront and register the traumas and grievances of the 
Others (be they Armenians or Greeks) during and after the collapse of the Empire, are 
strategically important for the legacy of current day Turkish nationalism. Stories of ancestors 
who helped the victims and protected them or their belongings are significant because they 
portray subjects of Ottoman alterity not as intruders and problems to be annihilated but as 
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Others toward whom Muslim Turks should feel ethically responsible or at least connected. 
Meanwhile, as was mentioned above, this task of mourning the Ottoman loss may run 
certain risks and dangers. Such resistance stories can create mummified heroes and these 
emblems may well feed into the narcissistic national identity formation of future generations 
in Turkey. Unless critically approached, these stories could nurture the fantasy of an 
unblemished face of national identity and sustain the very self-centered character of 
nationalism that they try to overcome. They could permit the next generation to remember 
the past without questioning the old order by creating the fantasy that “Muslim Turks helped 
the enemy even when they themselves were the victims” and that Anatolian Muslims were 
equally victims of the same war conditions.      
 
4.6.2 Saving the Lives of the Others 
 
A good case in point to discuss the risk of over-valorizing these ancestors comes from an 
edited work entitled Armenians in the Society of Tolerance, aversion of the conference discussions 
and papers at the Art of Living Together symposium. A conference participant, Ömer Çakır, 
authored a chapter focusing on the life story of a heroic Turkish ancestor Faik Bey, a poet 
and experienced local governor, who comes to the town of Kütahya where he is ordered to 
deport and transport Armenians. According to Çakır’s narrative, Faik Bey resisted the order 
and the Armenian communities within his jurisdiction remained where they were. Even 
some Armenians fleeing from other large neighboring cities, such as Eskişehir and 
Adapazarı, took refuge in Kütahya as Faik Bey made sure that their accommodation and 
food supplies were safe. We also learn that ignoring the order did not occur in Kütahya 
alone. In other cities too, the order was suspended and according to his estimates 
“thousands of them” stayed in their place in cities such as Istanbul, İzmir, Konya as well as 
Adana, Anakara, Kayseri and Elazig.396  
 
What makes a hero like Faik Bey, more interesting for us, according to our scholar, is the 
letter he addressed to the clerk Sahak Efendi of the Armenian Church four years after the 
atrocities of 1915. In it, Faik Bey expresses his gratitude for the Church’s gestures of 
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recognition, including the dedication of a religious ceremony to him. In the same letter Faik 
Bey also takes the occasion, as we are told, to address the Armenian people in general and 
share his concerns about recent history. Faik Bey firmly believes that the Turkish nation 
cannot be held responsible for the atrocities committed at the hands of a “mere few 
opportunist villains”. On the contrary, he finds both victims and sinners on both the Turkish 
and the Armenian side of the conflict.397 Faik Bey concludes his letter and makes a call to the 
Armenian community: “Please join us when we declare that the Armenian are victims as 
much as the Turks; and the Turks are victims and sinners as much as the Armenians.”398 If 
one wishes, one can read resistance within the stories like that of Faik Bey. Certainly, there is 
opposition in his refusal to follow orders from Istanbul. However, bearing psychoanalytically 
influenced social analysis in mind, one can detect a deeper resistance in Faik Bey and 
perhaps even in the author who narrates his story. The author trivializes the deportation of 
Armenians by magnifying the numbers of those who had not been deported, and failing to 
recognize the names of the cities and people who did face the genocide. Another strategy of 
resistance to facing and acknowledging the traumas of the Other comes when pain of 
Muslim Turks is correlated with the suffering and grief of Ottoman Armenians. It is a 
common rhetorical strategy to perceive whatever has been done under conditions of war as 
legitimate. By using the voice of war hero Faik Bey, it is as if the author wants to condemn 
contemporary Armenian society in Turkey and Armenia, by suggesting that they too were 
complicit. By restating Faik Bey’s words, resistance and denial are maintained and reenacted.  
 
This can also be read as an example of what Santner was afraid of: public denial and silence. 
The recognition of wounds on both sides of an antagonism may be important in terms of 
acknowledgement of civil casualties. However, it sustains and reproduces the identification 
with the old order by attributing responsibility to rogue soldiers, conditions of war and 
collateral damage. This way of remembering the past would have us believe that it was as 
good as it could have been under the circumstances. It still sees the past through a nationalist 
and discriminatory group identification, not in a context of state authorized systemic 
oppression.  
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Despite these drawbacks, these cases and memories may generate reconciliation of relations 
and cure the wounds of the past as long they are shared and contested through dialogue. If 
we think of how recent the emergence of works on minority histories is in Turkey, all these 
attempts can be considered as progress towards a nuanced and valiant encounter with the 
past. However, we have not exhausted all the possibilities. We do not need to be concerned 
solely with the fall of the Empire every time we recall the history of the Empire and its 
minority communities: we ought not only study the dawn of the 20th century to make sense 
of what unfolds during the 21st. A flourishing body of historical work on Ottoman everyday 
life and institutions casts an eye towards minorities and local histories in the classical age, in 
an endeavor as important in understanding how the Empire governed its people. If someone 
wishes to escape the grip of the fantasy of Ottoman peace, (or its obverse, Ottoman 
despotism) there is plenty of sophisticated material on the classical age to be discovered.      
 
4.7 Investigating Ottoman Institutions and Civilization: Some Remarks 
on Alternatives  
 
Fortunately, there are some scholars whose works enable us to investigate Ottoman 
institutions, practices, and political and social subjectivities from a fresh perspective399 that 
offers a much more nuanced stance towards the past. For instance, Amy Singer and her 
work on Ottoman soup kitchens and imarets comes to mind immediately as she studies the 
social texture of everyday life in Ottoman cities from a perspective not immediately 
informed by Orientalist or Occidentalist historiography,400 but seeks to understand these 
subjectivities and practices in their own terms and all these waqfs as philanthropic 
institutions. She is more interested in how concepts such as poverty, the poor, and the needy 
for were themselves produced and enacted in given social contexts and institutions. Singer 
aims to unbind the investigation of Ottoman philanthropic institutions from hegemonic 
                                                
399 On this topic the recent co-authored works of Engin Isin on Ottoman waqf and th enactment of citizenship 
through gift-giving practices and pious endowments, not without their own antagonisms of course, might come 
as revealing: Engin F. Isin and Alexandre Lefebvre, “The Gift of Law: Greek Euergetism and Ottoman Waqf,” 
European Journal of Social Theory 8, no.1 (2005); Engin F. Isin and Ebru Üstündağ, “Wills, deeds, acts: women‘s 
civic gift-giving in Ottoman Istanbul,” Gender, Place and Culture 15, no.5 (2008); and Cemal Kafadar, Kim var ımış 
biz burada yog iken: Dört Osmanlı: Yeniçeri, Tüccar, Derviş ve Hatun [Who was here when were not here: Four Ottomans: 
Janissary, Merchant, Devish and Lady] (Istanbul: Metis, 2009).  
400 Singer. Amy, “Soup and Sadaqa: Charity in Islamic Societies,” Historical Research 79, 205 (2006): 306-324.  
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Orientalist perspective, which had even widely held by the state elites within Turkey who 
liked extremism and support for fundamentalism that threatened the secular Republic. 
Instead of reducing all the motivations and practices of these foundations to religious 
fundamentalism, she insists that while studying Ottoman history, “we must understand the 
social context in which they exist, how they serve interests associated with class, confession, 
gender, or national identities and why charity is a chosen medium for acting.”401 At the same 
time as she avoids an Orientalist perspective, Singer also manages not to get caught up in a 
nostalgia for waqfs, such as Halil İnalcık shows in writing of the Ottoman Empire as an 
exemplary welfare state. While Singer agrees that “the welfare ethos and the responsibility 
for providing relief were rooted in the society at large and [that] it was the entire society, 
including the Sultan, which participated in providing social services”402 she also sees 
problematic aspects in this comparison between Ottoman charitable institutions and 
contemporary social welfare. According to Singer: 
Nor were the recipients chosen according to uniform criteria based on an 
assessment of economic need as in today’s welfare states. Rather, need was 
defined according to criteria that were economic for some and social for 
others. Some of the services provided by Ottoman philanthropy, like 
fountains and bridges, were available to the population at large, and might 
today be classified as public utilities rather than social services. Yet many of 
the facilities supported by Ottoman philanthropy were not available to 
everyone, nor were they intended to be. For example, people outside of the 
cities were largely excluded because of the way they lived; girls mostly did not 
attend schools (maktab and madrasa); libraries belonged to the literate; 
Christians and Jews obviously did not benefit from the mosques (on wonders 
whether they would even avail themselves of the shady urban parks created 
by mosque courtyards); and hospitals were too few in number and had too 
few beds to offer care to any but a small number of people.403  
 
Investigating the Ottoman Empire and its institutions, as Singer does, has great merits since 
her historiography neither immediately nor unquestionably identifies with the Ottoman 
order using history to sustain a narcissistic group identity. It does not unquestionably 
disavow it, either. Instead, it allows for a constructive space to remember, study and 
encounter the Ottoman past. Singer’s project along with a few other works of historiography 
                                                
401 Singer, Amy. Charity in Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2008), 223.   
402 See also Engin F. Isin, “Beneficence and Difference: Ottoman Awqaf and ‘Other’ Subjects,” in the Other 
Global City, ed. Mayaram Shail (London: Routhledge, 2008).   
403 Ibid.,184. 
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constitute texts of great importance for studying the Ottoman heritage in modern Turkey 
from a critical lens and also for the benefit of a transnational/post-colonial audience.  
Having a perspective such as this may enable us to consider the possibilities of inclusion and 
exclusion in the past, present and future, not only for Greek, Armenian and Jewish 
communities but also for the other Others of contemporary Turkey. With the help of these 
historical re-readings, we could overturn the resistances that are still deeply embedded in 
contemporary official and public discourses of nationalism and, in particular, that affect how 
we deal the atrocities marking our histories. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
As I write this dissertation and investigating postcolonial criticisms of derivative 
nationalisms, Turkey continues to go through transformations, especially some beginning 
over the last decade, that demonstrate many of the same symptoms that scholars of 
postcolonial studies have noted. Since the turn of the millennium, Turkey has witnessed the 
rehabilitation of its identity and society through the state policies of the ruling party, the 
AKP. The historiographic ideas in this dissertation were, formulated and written during this 
period of AKP rule.  I wanted to critically engage with the use of this Ottoman legacy which 
I saw being used both by historians and politicians to legitimate Ottoman-Turkish nativism. 
My dissertation bears witness to how the “moderate” pro-Islamic political movements in 
Turkey shifted their democratic stance to a conservative and nationalist agenda all the while 
being transposed by a nostalgic for the Ottoman past. Their tightening grip on political and 
state power led to with events such as the Gezi Park revolts, began in May 2013. These 
revolts were sparked when it was proposed that Taksim Park be redeveloped into an 
Ottoman-style barrack containing a massive shopping center at a site that had once the 
Armenian Cemetery of Istanbul and that during the Republican years had been the main site 
of public protests and secular cultural activities. The public reaction to the government 
endorsed plan to privatize of public space was triggered massive unrest, not only in Istanbul 
but also many other Turkish cities. The excessive police violence, civilian injuries and 
casualties, as well as mass arrests eventually caused tension with the EU mentioned at the 
very beginning of this dissertation. Yet, above and beyond the call of current events, this 
dissertation bears witness to how the appropriation of the Ottoman past and especially the 
Millet system to form a new, post-imperial/post-colonial nation has run into pitfalls and 
aporias.  
 
Observers of the last few decades in Turkey should heed the prophetic prognosis laid out by 
Fanon and the other postcolonial scholars discussed in the third chapter regarding the fate 
of derivative third world nationalisms and their tainted response to Western hegemony.  
Marxists criticized, such reactionary nationalisms on the grounds that the state and the 
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people remained within the capitalist system and exploitative relations were maintained if not 
escalated. Moreover, within derivative nationalisms the political party and/or national leader 
who are in charge of revival of national culture for the “rehabilitation” of the nation are 
often deeply criticized. Postcolonial thinkers warn us against nativist intellectuals’ use of the 
past that had preceded Western intrusion. It must be said that there are contextual 
differences between the Jamaica and Algeria of the 1960s and Turkey at the beginning of the 
new millennium that must be addressed. Turkey’s struggle is not waged directly against 
occupying forces or the legacy of colonial empires such as those of France or England.  
When there have been such movements to liberate the Turkish nation and the people from 
an intrusive force, these have been mobilized against particular elements of an internally 
colonialized nation: the urban elite and middle classes who base their lifestyle on Western 
values. During the first couple of decades of the twentieth century, first round of this 
cleansing targeted the non-Muslim communities of Asia Minor, including but not limited to 
Anatolian non-Muslims. Some 70 years after the founding of the secular Turkish Republican 
state, the second round took the form of a nascent class struggle, in which the AKP strove 
to mobilize the “silent masses” and “blacks” of Turkey, the people who live in Anatolian 
towns the periphery of the big cities, saying they had been Orientalized and othered by the 
“oppressive” and “alienating” discourse of Republican elites.  
 
Of course, I am aware the class topology and antagonisms of Turkey are much more 
heterogeneous than this brief sketch can depict. However, the state plainly presenting the 
people as such in its discourse to “the national subject” The official state discourse claims 
that these natives, the authentic Turks, those “silent masses”, began to regain positions of 
power in business, public office and in the departments of universities. Since the mid 1990s 
the dream of once again conquering Istanbul was realized. After the AKP’s electoral 
successes in the early 2000s, it utilized state institutions in an attempt to return society to a 
Turkish-Muslim essence, which it claimed had been interrupted by those westernized secular 
elites. AKP policies additionally endeavored to repair the reputation of the Turkish state and 
nation both domestically and internationally by becoming a regional broker of power.  In 
particular, membership in the EU and closer relations with the state of Israel promised 
ample opportunities of class mobility and unprecedented financial gains for the emerging 
Muslim bourgeoisie.  Sadly, in recent Turkish history and its political trajectory, I detect all 
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the symptoms of a derivative and anti-colonial nationalism where politicians and historians 
form an image of Turkishness vis-à-vis its Western Other, attempt to forcibly insert 
themselves into global affairs, and take an uncompromising position against what they 
perceive as domestic threats such as those posed by  maligned Istanbul’s secular masses, 
including but not limited to the elites. As this marks the sad recurrence of the same pitfalls 
endemic to post-colonial nationalism across the globe, it is hard not to give into the 
pessimism of the intellect felt by postcolonial thinkers when their warnings went unheeded, 
as Fanon’s had been vis-à-vis Algeria. In this dissertation I have cast light on the role of 
Turkish historians and Ottoman historiographers in creating and perpetuating such the 
nativist fantasies of an “authentic” and pure Turkish Muslim culture. 
 
As this dissertation has demonstrated, the recently flourishing Ottoman historiography of 
officially-sanctioned Turkish historians is a way of reacting to the Western/European 
hegemony. It is almost impossible to find a book on Ottoman tolerance and peace in which 
Turkish historians do not resentfully reference their Western counterparts.  From the 
perspective of the nativist Turkish historian, it was European social and political thinkers 
were the ones who perverted and misunderstood the Ottoman past. Seeing it as a 
paradigmatic case of Orientalist Despotism, wherein the rule of the Sultan and his 
supposedly automaton-like soldiers and subjects appear antithetical to Western societies’ 
supposed tolerance, democracy, rule of law and respect for minorities.  This image of the 
Turk and the Sultan had been deeply inscribed not only in Western political thought but also 
in the public and popular unconscious in Europe. From the mechanical Turk, the automaton 
chess player piece who was showcased in Europe and the States, as appears in Walter 
Benjamin’s famous thesis one,404 to the image of the “snapping Turk,” the mute villain 
adorned in a fez and curled shoes in the Beatles’ animated 1968 film, The Yellow Submarine, 
the image of Oriental despotism and Turkish barbarism is indeed alive and well. The 
Economist’s recent sensationalized cover design, which photoshopped the Turkish Prime 
Minister’s head onto the painting of an Ottoman Sultan,405 again indicate that Orientalist 
                                                
404 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1968), 253.   
405 “Democrat or sultan?,” The Economist, June 08, 2013, accessed June 16, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579004-recep-tayyip-Erdoğan-should-heed-turkeys-street-
protesters-not-dismiss-them-democrat-or-sultan. 
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images continuously inform Western perception. It is to this image and perception that the 
nativist and nationalist Turkish historians and state authorities are reacting. It is this 
perception of the Ottoman and the Turk that they strive to rewrite. And yet, they do so at a 
cost, as they fall victim to Occidentalism of another sort.  
 
In terms of how to deal with the Orientalist perception of the Turk, I underscored the 
significance of recent Ottoman historiography. Seen from the perspective of critical 
scholarship opened up by Fanon’s generation and further elaborated by contemporary 
postcolonial scholars in the Indian subcontinent, the Caribbean and elsewhere, it becomes 
clear that Turkish historians are attempting to undo the stereotypes and reverse the binary 
between Turkey and Europe by one-upmanship. They suggest an alternative reading in 
which the Ottoman Empire was not ruled by a despotic Sultan so much as a harmonious 
accommodation of non-Muslim communities in particular and minorities in general. In this 
narrative, the Sultan emerges as the ruler who extended autonomy and hospitality to –the 
people of the Book – his Armenian, Greek and Jewish subjects. One of the main tenets of 
my work has been to call attention to the contemporary political functions of this idyllic 
image, rather than to discuss whether the Empire had been indeed tolerant or multicultural. 
This fascination with the Ottoman Golden Age as a genuine birthing ground of 
multiculturalism and (as the most beautiful example of the art of living together) has more to 
say about contemporary Turkish society than the past, as it provides a mirror for its current 
tensions and antagonisms.  
 
Contemporary global liberal governance literature, which covers the West and emerging 
powers in the Global South, increasingly emphasizes tolerance and respect for both the 
individual and minority/group rights. These expectations and requirements are reflected in 
the EU-Turkey accession debates. As articulated at the end of the first chapter, the EU 
commission’s report on Turkey’s recent progress concludes “Turkey needs to improve its 
respect for minority rights.”406 This conclusion, whether accepted or rejected, constitutes a 
significant injunction for Turkish state authorities. As I point out in this dissertation, Turkish 
                                                
406 European Commission, Turkey 2012 Progress Report (Brussels, 2012), 32, accessed Feb 12, 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm. 
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historians’ responded to this injection by appropriating a peacefully multicultural Ottoman 
history as evidence. They shout together in protest: “but we were already multicultural!”  
 
Having developed in reaction to the Western perception of the Turk, the Oriental despot,  
and Ottoman-cum-Turkish history, this recast history has serious pitfalls. Nietzsche already 
cautioned us against the dangers of using history to create a unified national culture. His 
warnings about Monumental History are most pertinent for the Turkish case, as the 
Ottoman Sultans have been acclaimed as the heroic figures of Turkish-Ottoman history and 
monumentalized for present purposes. The planned third bridge over the Bosphorus is to be 
named after, one of the key rulers of the Ottoman Golden Age, Yavuz Sultan Selim. The 
MiniaTurk theme park, built in Istanbul by the Turkish state, intentionally connects different 
places and symbolic architectural monuments from the ex-Ottoman lands (the Balkans, the 
Middle East), constituting another case of monumental fascination with the Ottoman past 
by new elites.  The recently opened Museum of Conquest reenacts the moment of the siege 
and capture of Constantinople for its visitors with the light effects. All of these, I believe, are 
a part of broader investment in a monumental mode of remembering Ottoman history.  
Nietzsche’s warning regarding the Antiquarian mode, too, is salient as popular, academic and 
political imagination and discourse supporting displays of Ottoman-Turkish grandeur make 
it hard to see and hear anything else about that past. Oversaturation of the Ottoman 
Classical Age and Millet system as well as the imagined Turkish-Ottoman essence reifies 
culture and limits the breadth of national consciousness. Nietzsche and Fanon would rightly 
advise us to be wary of such abuses of history. 
 
The classical era, as was shown in Chapter Two, constitutes an idyllic period in which both 
Muslim-Turkish rulers and non-Muslim minorities enjoyed great prosperity and harmony – 
at least this is what the historiography of Ottoman tolerance would have us believe. For this 
particular reason I contend throughout this dissertation that the literature on Ottoman 
tolerance must be seen as an important social fantasy that offers its adherents affective 
harmony and equilibrium. We closely examined, especially in chapter two, the ways in which 
Turkish historians produce an image of paradise under the rule of the Turkish-Muslim 
ancestors. As much as the fantasy of Ottoman tolerance produces and promises this social 
harmony, it explains why we are deprived of it today. This is why the notion of fantasy is 
166 
significant in my understanding of the use of Ottoman historiography. These narratives are 
important scenarios that give an account for why Turkey was and is lacking unity. By 
producing a harmonious classical age and then reiterating why such loss has occurred, 
historians only enhance the fantasy’s grip, coordinating the affective ties of the national 
subjects and their group psychology. Thus historiography detailing the harmoniousness of 
precoloniality is not only an epistemological attempt to symbolically rewrite Turkish identity. 
It equally regards the ontological situation and struggle of the adherents of this fantasy, 
becoming a crucial social script with which Turkish intellectuals and statesmen produce an 
image of a harmonious future.  
 
One of the greatest perils of appropriating history as the Ottoman historians do is that the 
story of the West and Western hegemony is written so that heroes and victims become 
inverted. Turkish historians’ narratives rewrite monstrous image of the West where Jews 
were subjected to discrimination, expulsion and ultimately a Holocaust. Not only within the 
boundaries of their homelands but also throughout the world, and throughout history, 
Western civilization has been the cause of suffering. It was as a result of Western imperialist 
greed, Turkish intellectuals remind us, that the harmonious coexistence of the Ottoman 
Empire was destroyed. Then too, we are told that non-Muslim communities of the Empire 
were equally complicit in the destruction of its social fabric, as they collaborated with the 
Western imperialists. As far as the fantasy goes, these communities that had enjoyed the 
fruits of Ottoman tolerance and peace, and were therefore able to retain their culture and 
ethnicity for centuries, were those who ultimately betrayed the Empire when it needed unity 
and loyalty the most.  
 
This social fantasy is crucial to investigate because it continues to inform state authorities’ 
and nativist intellectuals’ perception of the Other in contemporary Turkey. It is a potent 
social fantasy, widely employed. If we revisit the introduction of this dissertation, the Gezi 
protests and the reaction of state authorities to these events, we can draw a full circle. Just as 
the Imperialist great powers of the 19th century are depicted as acting as guardians to 
minorities, the EU and its policies are depicted as acting to police the Turkish state. The 
former “collaborators” and “backstabbers” who caused the downfall of the Empire are 
fleshed out in today’s immanent threats. As long as the nationalist fantasy of Turkish nativist 
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intellectuals and statesmen persists, the Other continues to be an issue of threat and source 
of paranoid anxiety. When it comes to justify reforms in Turkey, Western countries may be 
acknowledged as a reference point and standard. However, the very same Western countries 
can be accused of wearing a mask of concern about rights violations in other countries, while 
using these violations as grounds to begin wars and pursue capitalist imperialist projects. 
Even as in the 19th century, the warnings of the European states are understood as an 
intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey and part of a broader attempt to prevent 
Turkey’s ascendancy as a “regional power”.  Expressing a hysterical relationship with the 
EU, Turkey was prompting to legislate the extension some cultural rights to the non-Muslim 
communities, by only taking these rights only go so far: the government remains mutely to 
formulate and implement policies to prevent hate speech and racism in the media. Behind 
this ambivalent stance towards the Other, as I have pointed out in this thesis, is the fantasy 
of Ottoman tolerance.  
 
Coming to accept that our relationship with the Other is mediated by the fantasy of 
Ottoman tolerance takes to the discussions of the ethics of collective memory in chapter 
four. The major question was to what degree one can mobilize historically and renounce the 
fantasy of Ottoman tolerance in explaining the past. The crossroad that I would like to 
propose in this thesis was that we can entertain a different remembrance of Ottoman 
history, one is informed by neither the fantasy of Oriental Ottoman Despotism nor of 
unfettered Ottoman tolerance. The former disavows the Ottoman past and ancestors as the 
antithesis of everything modern and democratic while the latter unquestionably identifies the 
ancestors as models of tolerance. There is an alternative and it involves different ethics of 
relating to the Other. It requires the subjects of Turkish nationalism to renounce the fantasy 
of a guilt-free, culturally and racially uniform Turkish identity. It involves a shift in our 
understanding of the Other as one to be silenced, to one whose story must be heard.  
Achieving distance from the nationalist fantasy also involves renouncing the temptation to 
imperiously rule the Other by creating systems which supply or deny rights and freedoms.  
 
I believe these are essential steps and gestures towards establishing national consciousness 
without nationalism as formulated by Fanon. Turkey, as the successor of the Ottoman 
Empire, constitutes a province in modern nation formation and it is going through 
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challenges in creating a national consciousness. To be able to create a healthy national 
consciousness we must open up a space where minorities can articulate their historical 
traumas and mourn their losses and injuries inflicted during and after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. In this respect, the critical space opened up by the Gezi Park events was a 
meaningful one in which silenced collective memories and traumas could be recalled and 
mourned. Though it is crucial to foster this social space it is difficult because the state and 
politicians are preoccupied with restoration and revival of the old glory and cannot tolerate 
the suspension of time and “order” that the protests create.  
 
In terms of alternative practices of remembrance and historiography, I proposed in this 
thesis the inclusion of the accounts of the silenced, the Other, and in general micro-histories 
into the collective public discourse. These practices of remembrance enable us to encounter 
those possibilities available to prevent the catastrophes and tragedies of the fall but were not 
acted upon. Rather than conceiving of the Ottoman-Turkish ancestor and his heirs as the 
only victims of the events that took place in the 19th and 20th centuries, and thus enjoying a 
melancholic stance, it is ethically necessary to establish solidarity with all the victims of the 
fall. This newfound perspective would allow us to investigate history and Ottoman 
institutions with an eye towards the political and social subjectivities which Ottoman society 
engendered. This perspective makes it possible to study Ottoman history without reading it 
as either a dark age of despotism or a harmonious age of tolerance; it occasions a critical 
opportunity to think about how to remedy the exclusions and injuries of the past in the 
present.        
 
A year ago, ancestors and descendants of various groups of minorities who had been living 
in Turkish-Ottoman territories now inherited by the successor Turkish state, came together 
in the small Anatolian city of Bolu. Therein Circassians, Georgians, Assyrians, Armenians, 
Abkhassians, Zazas and Kirmanc people gathered to discuss solutions for the prevention of 
racist state policies as exemplified by narratives of official history and proposed means of 
respecting difference and minority cultures. At the end of the forum, delegates and 
participants shared memories of injuries inflicted by the Ottoman state and Turkish 
authorities, as well those caused by other modern nation states. They shared ideas about how 
to heal those injuries today and in future. After having shared their grief, they stated that “we 
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conversed with each other and had no difficulty having dialogue. We therefore became 
convinced that we could have a real exchange”. Delegates concluded their forum with a 
question concerning the readiness of all Turks for substantive change in social consciousness 
of history: “Minorities stand together ready to critically address the past, “what about 
you?”407 This is an urgent question for modern Turkey which should speak to every one of 
us. Are we ready to entertain a different mode of remembering our pasts? 
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